Neuroethics: Neurolaw

In Oxford Handbooks Online (February 2017)

U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-9

53 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2017  

Stephen Morse

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Date Written: September 2016

Abstract

This is a pre-copyedited version of a chapter in the Oxford Handbooks Online (Philosophy) edited by Sandy Goldberg. In altered form, it was published online in February, 2017 and can be found at the Oxford Handbooks Online website. The entry discusses whether the findings of the new neuroscience based largely on functional brain imaging raise new normative questions and entail normative conclusions for ethical and legal theory and practice. After reviewing the source of optimism about neuroscientific contributions and the current scientific status of neuroscience, it addresses a radical challenge neuroscience allegedly presents: whether neuroscience proves persons do not have agency. It then considers a series of discrete topics in neuroethics and neurolaw, including the “problem” of responsibility, enhancement of normal functioning, threats to civil liberty, competence, informed consent, end of life issues, and the ethics of caution. It suggests that the ethical and legal resources to respond to the findings of neuroscience already exist and will do so for the foreseeable future.

Keywords: neuroscience, neuroethics, neurolaw, agency, responsibility, enhancement, civil liberty, competence, informed consent, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)

Suggested Citation

Morse, Stephen, Neuroethics: Neurolaw (September 2016). In Oxford Handbooks Online (February 2017); U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 17-9. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2919011

Stephen J. Morse (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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