Are Online Job Postings Informative to Investors?

Management Science, forthcoming.

36 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2019 Last revised: 30 Apr 2020

See all articles by Elizabeth F. Gutierrez

Elizabeth F. Gutierrez

Universidad de Chile

Ben Lourie

University of California, Irvine

Alexander Nekrasov

University of Illinois at Chicago

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine

Date Written: July 15, 2019

Abstract

Human capital is a key factor in value creation in the modern corporation. Yet the disclosure of investment in human capital is scant. We propose that a company’s online job postings are disclosures made outside of the investor relations channel that contain forward-looking information that could be informative to investors about future growth. We find that changes in the number of job postings are positively associated with changes in future performance and that this relation is stronger when postings likely represent growth rather than replacement. Consistent with job postings providing new information to the market, investors react positively to changes in the number of job postings. The market reaction to postings is stronger when firms are likely to be hiring for growth rather than replacement and for firms with low labor intensity (and therefore high marginal productivity of labor).

Keywords: human capital, hiring, disclosure, job postings, firm performance, market reaction

JEL Classification: G14, J20, M21, M40, M51

Suggested Citation

Gutierrez, Elizabeth F. and Lourie, Ben and Nekrasov, Alexander and Shevlin, Terry J., Are Online Job Postings Informative to Investors? (July 15, 2019). Management Science, forthcoming., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3342669 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3342669

Elizabeth F. Gutierrez

Universidad de Chile ( email )

Pío Nono Nº1, Providencia
Santiago, R. Metropolitana 7520421
Chile

Ben Lourie (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine ( email )

Irvine, CA 92697-3125
United States

Alexander Nekrasov

University of Illinois at Chicago ( email )

1200 W Harrison St
Chicago, IL 60607
United States

HOME PAGE: http://business.uic.edu/profiles/alexander-nekrasov/

Terry J. Shevlin

University of California-Irvine ( email )

Paul Merage School of Business
Irvine, CA California 92697-3125
United States
2065509891 (Phone)

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