The Political Economy of the COVID-19 Pandemic

33 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2021 Last revised: 1 Mar 2021

See all articles by Peter J. Boettke

Peter J. Boettke

George Mason University - Department of Economics; Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Benjamin Powell

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute; Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business

Date Written: January 11, 2021

Abstract

We argue that the policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic by all levels of government around the world is not consistent with recommendations from standard welfare economics. Thus, it is important to ask why such policies have been adopted. That opens the door to examining the political economy of the COVID-19 pandemic. This requires examining the incentives and information that confront policy makers and voters and the institutional environments that shape their incentives and information. This lead article frames questions addressed in the remainder of the symposium.

Keywords: COVID-19, Pandemic, Political Economy, Public Choice, Transmission Externality

JEL Classification: I18, I31, H1, D6, D7, P5

Suggested Citation

Boettke, Peter J. and Boettke, Peter J. and Powell, Benjamin, The Political Economy of the COVID-19 Pandemic (January 11, 2021). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 21-02, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764085 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3764085

Peter J. Boettke

Mercatus Center at George Mason University ( email )

3434 Washington Blvd., 4th Floor
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
703-993-1149 (Phone)
703-993-1133 (Fax)

Benjamin Powell (Contact Author)

Texas Tech University - Free Market Institute ( email )

Box 45059
Lubbock, TX 79409-5059
United States
806.742.7138 (Phone)
806.742.1854 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.fmi.ttu.edu

Texas Tech University - Rawls College of Business ( email )

Lubbock, TX 79409
United States
806.834.3097 (Phone)
806.742.1854 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
620
Abstract Views
2,287
Rank
84,783
PlumX Metrics