Fragmentation and optimal liquidity supply on decentralized exchanges

Abstract

We investigate how liquidity providers (LPs) choose between high- and low-fee trading venues, in the face of a fixed common gas cost. Analyzing Uniswap data, we find that high-fee pools attract 58% of liquidity supply yet execute only 21% of volume. Large LPs dominate low-fee pools, frequently adjusting out-of-range positions in response to informed order flow. In contrast, small LPs converge to high-fee pools, accepting lower execution probabilities to mitigate adverse selection and liquidity management costs. Fragmented liquidity dominates a single-fee market, as it encourages more liquidity providers to enter the market, while fostering LP competition on the low-fee pool.

Keywords: FinTech, decentralized exchanges (DEX), liquidity, fragmentation, adverse selection

JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14