1300 Sunnyside Drive
Lawrence, KS 66045-7585
University of Kansas
contract theory, complementarities, principal-agent problem, multiple agents, teams, synergies, influence
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
complementarities, contract theory, influence, multiple agents, principal-agent problem, synergies, teams
complementarities, Contract theory, influence., multiple agents, principal-agent problem, synergies, teams
Oscillation, Cycles, Self-Enforcing contracts, Differential discounting, Dynamic contracts, Principal-agent models
Part-time work, alternative work arrangements, self-selection, labor productivity, wage-hour relation
This page was processed by aws-apollo-l2 in 0.314 seconds