SSRN logo
Public User
Advanced Search

Erik Hovenkamp

Harvard Law School

Postdoctoral Fellow

Cambridge, MA

United States

  • Harvard Law School

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

19

DOWNLOADS
Rank 6,823

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 6,823

in Total Papers Downloads

5,459

CITATIONS
Rank 33,235

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 33,235

in Total Papers Citations

6

Scholarly Papers (19)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

The Viability of Antitrust Price Squeeze Claims

Arizona Law Review, Vol. 50, p. 967, 2008, U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-33
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 14 Jul 2008 Last Revised: 13 Aug 2017
Herbert J. Hovenkamp and Erik Hovenkamp
Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business and Harvard Law School
Downloads 555 (35,944)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Antitrust, Monopoly, Sherman Act, Price Squeeze, Predatory Pricing, Linkline

2.

Tying Arrangements and Antitrust Harm

Arizona Law Review, Vol. 52, p. 925, 2010, U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 10-18
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 03 Aug 2009 Last Revised: 30 Oct 2015
Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School and Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business
Downloads 530 (35,335)
Citation 3

Abstract:

antitrust, tying arrangement, tie, welfare, competition, price discrimination, consumers, bundled discounts

3.

Tying Arrangements

The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Roger D. Blair & Daniel Sokol, eds. vol.2, Ch 14)
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Feb 2012 Last Revised: 11 Apr 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School and Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business
Downloads 460 (40,928)

Abstract:

tying, ties, antitrust, consumer welfare, price discrimination, double marginalization

4.

Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy

Buffalo Law Review Vol. 57, No. 3, 2009
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 05 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 30 Oct 2015
Herbert J. Hovenkamp and Erik Hovenkamp
Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business and Harvard Law School
Downloads 412 (52,573)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Antitrust, Monopoly, Sherman Act, Bundled Discount, Predatory Pricing, Tying

5.

Exclusionary Bundled Discounts and the Antitrust Modernization Commission

Antitrust Bulletin, Vol. 53, 2008, U Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-14
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 May 2008 Last Revised: 13 Aug 2017
Herbert J. Hovenkamp and Erik Hovenkamp
Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business and Harvard Law School
Downloads 403 (55,371)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Antitrust, Monopoly, Discounting, Public Policy, Competition, Bundling

6.

Predatory Patent Litigation: How Patent Assertion Entities Use Reputation to Monetize Bad Patents

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 30 Oct 2015
Erik Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School
Downloads 366 (51,377)

Abstract:

patent, assertion, entity, non-practicing, troll, licensing, litigation, predatory, predation, reputation, intellectual property, innovation, thicket, technology, fee shifting, SHIELD Act, software, welfare

7.

Anticompetitive Patent Injunctions

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 3, 2016, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-01
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 10 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 13 Aug 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Thomas F. Cotter
Harvard Law School and University of Minnesota Law School
Downloads 186 (76,833)

Abstract:

patent, injunction, injunctive relief, remedies, nonpracticing entities, innovation, litigation, licensing, entry, integration, organization, welfare, competition, licensing, Federal Circuit

8.

Patent Pools and Related Technology Sharing

Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, eds. 2017)
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 11 Apr 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School and Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business
Downloads 76 (95,583)

Abstract:

patents, patent pools, innovation, antitrust, collusion, exclusion, transaction costs

9.

A Broader Look at Patent Royalties and Antitrust

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 10 Sep 2015 Last Revised: 04 Dec 2015
Erik Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School
Downloads 56 (98,600)

Abstract:

patents, intellectual property, licensing, cross-licensing, patent pool, royalty, antitrust, competition policy, vertical restraints, welfare, double marginalization, royalty stacking, collusion, price fixing, cartel, price competition

10.

Proportional Restraints and the Patent System

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 30 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Jorge Lemus
Harvard Law School and University Of Illinois Urbana Champaign
Downloads 0 (262,815)

Abstract:

Patents, Antitrust, Patent Settlements, Innovation, Licensing, Horizontal Restraints, Validity, Patent Quality, Reverse Payment, Pay for Delay, Actavis

11.

Tying, Exclusivity, and Standard-Essential Patents

Columbia Science and Technology Law Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 11 Oct 2017
Erik Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (122,544)

Abstract:

Standard-Essential Patents, SEPs, FRAND, RAND, Qualcomm, Apple, FTC, standard setting, antitrust, licensing, holdup, tying, exclusive dealing, loyalty discounting, monopolization, exhaustion

12.

Competition, Inalienability, and the Economic Analysis of Patent Law

Stanford Technology Law Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 20 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 11 Sep 2017
Erik Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (212,686)

Abstract:

patent, antitrust, intellectual proprty, inalienability, Coase, law and economics, litigation, settlement, reverse payment, pay for delay, Actavis, FTC, Rule 4, settlement review, Noerr-Pennington, Hatch-Waxman, pharmaceuticals, property dispute, bargaining failure, externality, patent acquisitions

13.

Challenge Restraints and the Scope of the Patent

1 Antitrust Chronicle 48, 2016.
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 13 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2017
Erik Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (81,570)

Abstract:

Patent, validity, infringement, antitrust, challenge, no-challenge, licensing, reverse settlement, pay for delay, Actavis, Hatch-Waxman

14.

How Patent Damages Skew Licensing Markets

Review of Litigation, 2017 Forthcoming, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 774, U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 592
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 06 Oct 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Jonathan S. Masur
Harvard Law School and University of Chicago - Law School
Downloads 0 (187,374)

Abstract:

Patent damages, comparable licenses, Georgia-Pacific, patent licensing, patent litigaiton, patent remedies

15.

Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Office

International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 28 Jul 2016 Last Revised: 17 Oct 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Jorge Lemus
Harvard Law School and University Of Illinois Urbana Champaign
Downloads 0 (120,876)

Abstract:

Patent, Patent Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, PTAB, reverse payment, pay for delay, Actavis, Antitrust., USPOT, pharmaceutical patent, drug patent, Hatch-Waxman

16.

Patent Prospect Theory and Competitive Innovation

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 23 Apr 2016
Erik Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (190,882)

Abstract:

patents, prospect theory, Kitch, competition, innvation, inverted U

17.

Buying Monopoly: Antitrust Limits on Damages for Externally Acquired Patents

Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal, Vol. 25, 2017, U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 17-30
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 23 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 20 Jul 2017
Erik Hovenkamp and Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harvard Law School and Univ. of Pennsylvania Law and Wharton Business
Downloads 0 (132,576)

Abstract:

patents, antitrust, acquisitions, monopolization, patent assertion entities, damages, remedies

18.

Profitable Double Marginalization

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 20 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 14 May 2016
Kevin Bryan and Erik Hovenkamp
University of Toronto - Strategic Management and Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (211,366)

Abstract:

Double marginalization, double markups, royalty stacking, antitrust, vertical integration, theory of the firm, pricing, vertical restraints, delegation, conjectural variation

19.

Online Appendix for 'Delayed Entry Settlements at the Patent Office'

International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 06 Oct 2016
Erik Hovenkamp and Jorge Lemus
Harvard Law School and University Of Illinois Urbana Champaign
Downloads 28

Abstract:

Submit a Paper Section 508 Text Only Pages

Quick Links

Research Paper Series Conference Papers Partners in Publishing Organization Homepages Newsletter Sign Up

Rankings

Top Papers Top Authors Top Organizations

About

SSRN Objectives Network Directors Presidential Letter Announcements Contact us FAQs
Elsevier logo
Copyright Terms and Conditions Privacy Policy

Cookies are used by this site. To decline or learn more, visit our Cookies page. This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.506 seconds

Relx Group logo