Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

Douglas and Marian Campbell Professor of Economics

28 Hillhouse Ave

New Haven, CT 06520-8268

United States

http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281

New Haven, CT 06520-8281

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

90

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23,179

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1,247

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1,349

Scholarly Papers (90)

1.
Downloads 1,548 ( 12,308)
Citation 101

Robust Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1,142 (19,362)
Citation 31

Abstract:

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Mechanism Design, Common Knowledge, Universal Type Space, Interim Equilibrium, Ex-post Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies

Robust Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 May 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 406 (77,980)
Citation 26

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Mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex-post equilibrium, Dominant strategies

2.
Downloads 1,493 ( 13,067)
Citation 52

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R3
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 543 (54,444)
Citation 4

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 384 (83,193)
Citation 9

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 330 (99,067)
Citation 2

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Correlated Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Robust Predictions, Information Structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R2
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 236 (141,365)
Citation 4

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11867
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
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Citation 29
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Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure., robust predictions

3.

Bandit Problems

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1551
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Jan 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 1,274 (16,702)
Citation 3

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One-Armed Bandit, Multi-Armed Bandit, Bayesian Learning, Experimentation, Index Policy, Matching, Experience Goods

4.
Downloads 883 ( 28,684)
Citation 46

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 315 (104,366)
Citation 4

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 202 (164,141)

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 145 (219,776)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 130 (239,954)

Abstract:

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 91 (309,020)
Citation 46

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

5.

The Value of Benchmarking

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 16 Sep 2002
Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 669 (41,982)

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Venture Financing, Optimal Stopping, Benchmarking, Stage Financing, Abandonment Option

6.
Downloads 651 ( 43,563)
Citation 10

Information and Market Power

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 070_2015
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 04 Aug 2015
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann
MIT, Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and HEC Montreal
Downloads 364 (88,572)

Abstract:

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Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 05 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 220 (151,448)
Citation 10

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 06 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 67 (371,013)
Citation 1

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10791
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, demand function competition, incomplete information, linear best responses, market power, moment restrictions, price impact, quadratic payoffs, supply function competition, volatility

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13295
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 1
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Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 388 (82,165)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Information bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 18 Oct 2012
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 127 (244,257)
Citation 1

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RRR, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 62 (386,547)
Citation 36

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Dec 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 58 (399,844)

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

8.
Downloads 585 ( 50,139)
Citation 18

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1682R
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 04 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 10 Dec 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege and Liang Peng
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University
Downloads 296 (111,644)
Citation 8

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Venture Capital, Sequential investment, Stage financing, Intertemporal returns

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1682RR
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 20 Oct 2009
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege and Liang Peng
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University
Downloads 174 (188,060)
Citation 16

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venture capital, sequential investment, stage financing, intertemporal returns

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1682R
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 25 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege and Liang Peng
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University
Downloads 115 (263,156)

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Venture capital, Sequential investment, Stage financing, Intertemporal returns

9.
Downloads 551 ( 54,026)
Citation 11

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 28 Dec 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 551 (53,409)
Citation 11

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Innovation, venture capital, relationship financing, arm's length financing, learning, time-consistency, stopping, renegotiation-proofness

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship
Posted: 10 Nov 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics

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R&D, Information asymmetry, Uncertainty, Commitment, Interpersonal relations, Angel investors, Conflict management, Financing, Rates of return

10.

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 537 (55,862)
Citation 10

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Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 283 (117,174)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher Order Preferences, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Sep 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 102 (286,699)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R3
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 63 (383,355)

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 28 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 45 (448,897)
Citation 5

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 25 (551,721)
Citation 3

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1758R
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 19 Aug 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 299 (110,454)
Citation 7

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Targeting, Advertising, Online Advertising, Sponsored Search, Media Markets

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1758
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 29 Mar 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 196 (168,956)
Citation 8

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Targeting, Advertising, Online advertising, Sponsored search, Media markets

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7988
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 14 Nov 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 3 (716,228)
Citation 7
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Advertising, Internet Advertising, Media Markets, Sponsored Search, Targeting

13.
Downloads 491 ( 62,519)
Citation 23

Information in Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1532
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 25 Aug 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 293 (112,876)
Citation 1

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Mechanism design, information acquisition, ex post equilibrium, robust mechanism design, interdependent values, information management

Information in Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1532R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 19 Jan 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 166 (195,998)
Citation 2

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Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex Post Equilibrium, Robust Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Information Management

Information in Mechanism Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5494
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 19 May 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 32 (510,052)
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Information, acquisition, mechanism, design, robust

14.
Downloads 485 ( 63,464)
Citation 34

The Design and Price of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2049
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 20 Jul 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 304 (108,490)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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selling information, experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation

The Design and Price of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2049R
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 06 Jun 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 181 (181,670)
Citation 2

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Information design, Price of information, Statistical experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Hypothesis testing

The Design and Price of Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11412
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 25 Jul 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 0
Citation 18
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experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation., selling information

15.

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1818, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 020-2011, ROBUST MECHANISM, D. Bergemann & S. Morris, eds., World Scientific, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 401 (79,810)
Citation 8

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Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

16.
Downloads 396 ( 80,988)
Citation 8

The Economics of Social Data: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2171 (2019)
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 27 Mar 2019 Last Revised: 01 Oct 2019
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 216 (154,107)

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Individual Data, Social Data, Informational Externality, Internet Platforms, Data Collection, Data Markup

The Economics of Social Data

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2203R, September 2019
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 27 Sep 2019 Last Revised: 08 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Tan Gan
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 180 (182,542)
Citation 8

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Social data, Personal information, Consumer privacy, Privacy paradox, Data intermediaries, Data externality, Data flow, Data policy, Data rights

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 305 (108,093)
Citation 2

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correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R, Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 May 2014 Last Revised: 22 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 58 (399,844)
Citation 6

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Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 33 (504,702)
Citation 3

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

18.

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 396 (80,988)
Citation 15

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

19.
Downloads 379 ( 85,183)
Citation 1

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 215 (154,771)

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Iterative Deletion, Direct Mechanism

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561R
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 May 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 164 (198,043)

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

20.
Downloads 374 ( 86,547)
Citation 3

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973R
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 14 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 196 (168,956)
Citation 1

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 067_2014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 126 (245,737)
Citation 2

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief Free Rationalizatility

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 52 (421,388)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 276 (120,299)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953R3
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 27 May 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 41 (466,247)

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Dynamic mechanism design, Repeated sales, Stochastic flow, Flat rates, Two-part Tariffs, Leasing

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953RR
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 23 Jan 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (489,500)
Citation 7

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales, Impulse response function, Stochastic flow

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 01 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 19 (593,031)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales

22.

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 345 (94,902)

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Interative Deletion, Dominant Strategies

23.
Downloads 331 ( 99,333)
Citation 1

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757R
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 16 May 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 209 (158,993)
Citation 4

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Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 23 Mar 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 122 (251,891)
Citation 3

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Dynamic Auctions and Mechanisms, Random Arrivals and Departures, Changing Private Information, Incentive Compatibility

24.

Dynamic Price Competition

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 15 Apr 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 308 (107,552)
Citation 1

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Dynamic Competition, Marginal Contribution, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Common Agency

25.
Downloads 297 (111,903)
Citation 14

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2102R
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 29 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 197 (168,130)
Citation 2

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Sequential Screening, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Bandit Auctions, Information Management, Dynamic Pricing

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2102
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 25 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 16 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 100 (290,534)
Citation 12

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Sequential Screening, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Bandit Auctions, Information Management

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12240
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 29 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann and juuso valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Aalto University
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Bandit Auctions, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Information Management, Sequential Screening

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 167 (194,975)
Citation 8

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First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (494,392)
Citation 2

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 30 (521,023)
Citation 2

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 27 (538,798)
Citation 2

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 24 (558,338)
Citation 2

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1 (741,968)
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Citation 5
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

27.

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 13 Jul 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 278 (120,063)

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Monopoly, dynamic pricing, learning, experience goods, continuous time, Markov perfect equilibrium

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2027
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 225 (148,198)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 40 (470,807)
Citation 20

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

29.

Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 19 Aug 1999
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valmaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 259 (129,322)

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30.

Entry and Vertical Differentiation

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 04 Jun 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 257 (130,317)
Citation 1

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Entry, Duopoly, Quantity Competition, Vertical Differentiation, Bayesian Learning, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Experimentation, Experience Goods

31.
Downloads 234 (143,053)
Citation 16

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 132 (237,125)
Citation 11

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 May 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 102 (286,699)
Citation 2

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

32.

Ex Post Implementation

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 231 (144,871)
Citation 1

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Ex Post Equilibrium, Implementation, Single Crossing, Interdependent Values

33.

Robust Monopoly Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1527RR
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 08 Aug 2005 Last Revised: 01 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Karl H. Schlag
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of Vienna - Department of Economics
Downloads 226 (147,975)
Citation 4

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Monopoly, Optimal pricing, Robustness, Multiple priors, Regret

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RR
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 182 (180,771)
Citation 3

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RRR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Apr 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 41 (466,247)
Citation 36

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

35.
Downloads 219 (152,466)
Citation 55

Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Downloads 194 (170,544)

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Optimal Auction, Private Values, Information Structures, Partitions

Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 21 Oct 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Downloads 25 (551,721)
Citation 10
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Optimal auction, private values, information structures, partitions

36.
Downloads 217 (153,795)
Citation 5

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Yale University, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1248
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 21 Mar 2000
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 217 (153,452)
Citation 5

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Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Posted: 17 Aug 2002
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics

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Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Microeconomic Theory
Posted: 26 Jul 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics

Abstract:

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Auctions, Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex-ante and Ex-post Efficiency

37.

Efficient Dynamic Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1584
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 11 Oct 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 213 (156,504)
Citation 12

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Vickrey Auction, Marginal Contribution, Dynamic Allocation Index, Multi-Armed Bandit, Bayesian Learning, Experimentation, Matching

38.
Downloads 210 (158,553)
Citation 7

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 125 (247,217)
Citation 1

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 85 (322,798)
Citation 6

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

39.
Downloads 209 (159,278)
Citation 2

Information and Volatility

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 056-2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 07 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 167 (194,975)
Citation 2

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Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 03 Dec 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 42 (461,723)
Citation 1

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incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

40.
Downloads 207 (160,743)
Citation 27

Markets for Information: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2142
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 29 Aug 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 207 (160,471)
Citation 7

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Markets for Information: An Introduction

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13148
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 17 Sep 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Citation 20
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information design, information markets, intermediaries, mechanism design, predictions, ratings

Markets for Information: An Introduction

Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 11, pp. 85-107, 2019
Posted: 04 Sep 2019
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management

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41.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 195 (170,697)
Citation 11

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optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

42.
Downloads 195 (169,909)
Citation 13

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928R
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jun 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 145 (219,776)
Citation 12

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928RR
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 50 (428,924)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Idiosyncratic shocks, Aggregate shocks, Volatility, Confounding information, Moment restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs, Bayes correlated equilibrium

43.

Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Jun 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 192 (172,245)

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-Post incentive compatibility

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 151 (212,542)
Citation 2

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First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 36 (489,500)
Citation 7

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First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

45.

Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1952
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 180 (182,580)
Citation 3

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Experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Product differentiation, Selling information

46.
Downloads 180 (182,580)
Citation 22

Selling Cookies

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 19 Oct 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 99 (292,521)
Citation 19

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Data providers, Information sales, Targeting, Online advertising, Media markets

Selling Cookies

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920RR
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 09 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 47 (440,759)
Citation 1

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Data providers, Data pricing, Selling information, Targeting, Online advertising, Cookies, Media markets

Selling Cookies

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 34 (499,488)
Citation 3

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Data providers, Information sales, Targeting, Online advertising, Media markets

47.
Downloads 175 (187,161)
Citation 10

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1764
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 13 Aug 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 90 (311,197)
Citation 8

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First Price Auction, Repeated Auction, Private Bids, Information Revelation

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1764R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 54 (414,010)
Citation 2

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First price auction, Repeated auction, Private bids, Information revelation

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1764R2
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 07 Sep 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 25 (551,721)

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First Price Auction, Persistent Values, Transparency, Disclosure, Repeated Auction, Independent Private Value, Information Design

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7989
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 14 Nov 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 6 (690,730)
Citation 1
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First Price Auction, Information Revelation, Private Bids, Repeated Auctions

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-29
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Feb 2017
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 90 (311,197)
Citation 3

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R3
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 19 Jul 2019 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2019
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 33 (504,702)

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Sequential screening, Ex-post participation constraints, Static contract, Sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-64
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 13 Jun 2017
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 24 (558,338)
Citation 4

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R2, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-55
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 29 Jun 2018
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 14 (629,268)
Citation 5

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Sequential screening, Ex-post participation constraints, Static contract, Sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R4
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 09 Apr 2020 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2020
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 7 (682,881)
Citation 1

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Sequential screening, ex post participation constraints, static contract, sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13018
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 03 Jul 2018
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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Citation 2
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ex-post participation constraints, sequential contract., Sequential Screening, static contract

49.

Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1619, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 25
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Jul 2007
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki and Xianwen Shi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Helsinki School of Economics and University of Toronto - Department of Economics
Downloads 167 (194,835)
Citation 1

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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Information acquisition, Strategic substitutes, Informational efficiency

50.

Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1775
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 Nov 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu and Edmund M. Yeh
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Yale University and Northeastern University
Downloads 154 (208,728)
Citation 4

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Mechanism design, Limited information, Nonlinear pricing, Quantization, Lloyd-max optimality

51.

Pricing Without Priors

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1625
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 11 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Karl H. Schlag
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of Vienna - Department of Economics
Downloads 141 (224,211)
Citation 3

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Monopoly, Optimal pricing, Regret, Multiple priors, Distribution free

52.

Dynamic Common Agency

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 10 Aug 1999
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valmaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 137 (229,398)
Citation 2

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53.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822R
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 135 (232,189)
Citation 3

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

54.

Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 21 Apr 2005
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics, Yale University - Department of Computer Science and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences (EECS)
Downloads 134 (233,603)

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Digital Rights Management, Platform, Flexibility, Piracy

55.

Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2066
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 130 (239,127)
Citation 2

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief-Free Rationalizability

56.
Downloads 127 (243,366)
Citation 10

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1672
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 10 Aug 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 83 (327,634)

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Pivot mechanisms, Dynamic mechanism design, Ex-post equilibrium, Marginal contribution, Multi-armed bandit, Bayesian learning

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1672R
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Dec 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 44 (453,027)
Citation 12

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Pivot mechanisms, Dynamic mechanism design, Ex-post equilibrium, Marginal contribution, Multi-armed bandit, Bayesian learning

57.

Pricing Under the Threat of Piracy: Flexibility and Platforms for Digital Goods

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1834
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Yale University - Department of Computer Science and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences (EECS)
Downloads 124 (247,760)

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Digital goods, Digital rights management, Platform, Flexibility, Piracy

58.

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1600
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 122 (250,893)

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Dynamic auction, Rationalizability, Extensive form, Uniqueness, Strategic uncertainty

59.

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Apr 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 120 (254,059)

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

60.

Information and Interaction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2088
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 115 (261,952)

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Networks, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

61.
Downloads 115 (261,952)
Citation 1

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 115 (263,156)
Citation 3

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Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

62.

Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1563
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 31 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Deran Ozmen
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University
Downloads 101 (286,700)

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Recommender system, Collaborative filtering, Add-ons, Pricing, Information externality

63.

Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1616
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 17 Jul 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 99 (290,567)

Abstract:

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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Pivot mechanism, Ex post equilibrium, Marginal contribution, Multi-armed bandit, Bayesian learning

64.

Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1859
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 19 Apr 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu and Edmund M. Yeh
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN and Northeastern University
Downloads 91 (306,598)
Citation 2

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Mechanism design, Multi-dimensional private information, Limited information, Nonlinear pricing, Quantization, Information theory

65.
Downloads 90 (308,701)
Citation 8

The Economics of Social Data

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2203R, March 2020
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 05 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Tan Gan
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 90 (311,197)
Citation 8

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Social data, Personal information, Consumer privacy, Privacy paradox, Data intermediaries, Data externality, Data flow, Data policy, Data rights

The Economics of Social Data

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14466
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 25 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Tan Gan
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and Yale University - Department of Economics
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consumer privacy, data externality, data flow, data intermediaries, data policy, data rights, personal information, privacy paradox, social data

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

67.

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1628
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 17 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
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Common prior, Correlated equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, Uniqueness

68.
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Progressive Participation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2189
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 15 Aug 2019
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Observable Arrival, Unobservable Arrival, Repeated Sales, Interim Incentive Constraints, Interim Participation Constraints, Stopping Problem, Option Value, Progressive Participation

Progressive Participation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2189R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 31 Jan 2020
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Observable Arrival, Unobservable Arrival, Repeated Sales, Interim Incentive Constraints, Interim Participation Constraints, Stopping Problem, Option Value, Progressive Participation

69.

Efficient Search by Committee

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1782
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 29 Jan 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
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Search, Committtees, Voting, Mechanism design, Dynamic pivot mechanism

70.

Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design'

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2016
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 06 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Pavan
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Northwestern University
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Dynamic mechanism design, Dynamic contracts

71.

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561RR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

72.

Efficient Recommender Systems

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1568
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 19 Jul 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Deran Ozmen
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University
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Recommender system, Collaborative filtering, Add-ons, Pricing, Information externality

73.

Third-Degree Price Discrimination Versus Uniform Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2213R
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 19 Feb 2020 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2020
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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First Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Uniform Price, Approximation, Concave Demand Function, Market Segmentation

74.
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Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1900
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Achim Wambach
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
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Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1900R
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Achim Wambach
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
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Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium

75.

Third-degree Price Discrimination versus Uniform Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2213
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 16 Dec 2019
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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First Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Uniform Price, Approximation, Concave Demand Function, Market Segmentation

76.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

77.

Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1981
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 24 Jan 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu and Edmund M. Yeh
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Yale University and Northeastern University
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Mechanism design, Nonlinear pricing, Multi-Dimension, Multi-product, Private information, Limited information, Quantization, Information theory

78.

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

79.

The Economics of Social Data: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2171R
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 27 Sep 2019
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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Individual Data, Social Data, Informational Externality, Internet Platforms, Data Collection, Data Markup

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147R (2019)
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 04 Jun 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Reserve price, Revenue equivalence

81.
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Search, Information, and Prices

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2224
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 19 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information, and Prices

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2224R
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 15 May 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information, and Prices

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-23
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 24 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, \Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information and Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14521
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 25 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Law of One Price, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Bertrand Competition, information structure, price competition, Price Count, Price Quote, search

82.
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Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2133
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12964
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction

83.

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1846, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 30-2012
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
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Mechanism Design, Robust mechanism design, Efficient auctions, Interdepedent types, Partial implementation, Full implementation

84.

Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609RR
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 07 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationaliz¿ability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

85.

Information, Market Power and Price Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2200, September 2019
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Sep 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 27 (523,815)
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Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Price Volatility

86.

Competition and Public Information: A Note

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2234
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 15 May 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

87.

Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13332
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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advantageous selection, Adverse Selection, common values, maximum game, neutral selection, Optimal auction, posted price, revenue equivalence

88.

Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, pp. 713-743, August 2006
Posted: 01 Nov 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics

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89.

Experimentation in Markets

Posted: 28 Jul 2000
Juuso Valimaki and Dirk Bergemann
Helsinki School of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

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90.

Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning

CEPR Discussion Paper Series Number 1738
Posted: 28 Jun 1998
Dirk Bergemann
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

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