Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

Douglas and Marian Campbell Professor of Economics

28 Hillhouse Ave

New Haven, CT 06520-8268

United States

http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281

New Haven, CT 06520-8281

United States

  • Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

    • Email
    • Tel: 203-432-3592
    • Fax: 203-432-2128
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

82

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451

Scholarly Papers (82)

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1.

Robust Mechanism Design

Downloads 1,533 ( 10,855)
Citation 62

Robust Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,132 (17,128)
Citation 62

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Mechanism Design, Common Knowledge, Universal Type Space, Interim Equilibrium, Ex-post Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies

Robust Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421R
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 May 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 401 (70,132)
Citation 62

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Mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex-post equilibrium, Dominant strategies

2.

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Downloads 1,340 ( 13,474)

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R3
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 421 (66,127)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 374 (76,065)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 315 (92,799)

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Correlated Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Robust Predictions, Information Structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R2
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 230 (129,356)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11867
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure., robust predictions

3.

Bandit Problems

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1551
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Jan 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 1,154 (16,952)
Citation 17

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One-Armed Bandit, Multi-Armed Bandit, Bayesian Learning, Experimentation, Index Policy, Matching, Experience Goods

4.

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Downloads 837 ( 27,245)

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 308 (95,181)

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 197 (150,227)

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 127 (219,118)

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 126 (220,426)

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 79 (303,402)

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

5.

The Value of Benchmarking

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1379
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 16 Sep 2002
Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 657 (37,908)
Citation 3

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Venture Financing, Optimal Stopping, Benchmarking, Stage Financing, Abandonment Option

6.

Information and Market Power

Downloads 613 ( 41,532)

Information and Market Power

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 070_2015
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 04 Aug 2015
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann
Princeton University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and HEC Montreal
Downloads 343 (84,302)

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Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 05 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 214 (138,835)

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 06 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (366,037)

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10791
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, demand function competition, incomplete information, linear best responses, market power, moment restrictions, price impact, quadratic payoffs, supply function competition, volatility

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13295
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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7.

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Downloads 612 ( 41,623)
Citation 3

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 380 (74,682)
Citation 3

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Information bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 18 Oct 2012
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 122 (225,923)
Citation 3

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RRR, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (359,627)
Citation 3

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Dec 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 52 (379,166)
Citation 3

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

8.

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

Downloads 552 ( 47,646)
Citation 9

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1682R
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 04 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 20 Feb 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege and Liang Peng
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University
Downloads 274 (107,992)
Citation 9

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Venture Capital, Sequential investment, Stage financing, Intertemporal returns

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1682RR
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 20 Oct 2009
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege and Liang Peng
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University
Downloads 168 (173,743)
Citation 9

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venture capital, sequential investment, stage financing, intertemporal returns

Venture Capital and Sequential Investments

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1682R
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 25 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Ulrich Hege and Liang Peng
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics and Smeal College of Business, The Pennsylvania State University
Downloads 110 (243,983)
Citation 9

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Venture capital, Sequential investment, Stage financing, Intertemporal returns

9.

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

Downloads 526 ( 50,671)

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1292R
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 28 Dec 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 526 (50,069)
Citation 31

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Innovation, venture capital, relationship financing, arm's length financing, learning, time-consistency, stopping, renegotiation-proofness

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship
Posted: 10 Nov 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Ulrich Hege
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Toulouse School of Economics

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R&D, Information asymmetry, Uncertainty, Commitment, Interpersonal relations, Angel investors, Conflict management, Financing, Rates of return

10.

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 521 (51,278)
Citation 8

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Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

11.

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Downloads 505 ( 53,327)
Citation 3

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 280 (105,437)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher Order Preferences, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Sep 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 99 (262,818)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R3
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 60 (353,508)
Citation 3

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 28 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 43 (411,532)
Citation 3

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (508,253)
Citation 3

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

12.

The Design and Price of Information

Downloads 466 ( 59,007)

The Design and Price of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2049
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 20 Jul 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Bonn
Downloads 290 (101,565)

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selling information, experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation

The Design and Price of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2049R
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 06 Jun 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Bonn
Downloads 176 (166,671)

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Information design, Price of information, Statistical experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Hypothesis testing

The Design and Price of Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11412
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 25 Jul 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Bonn
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experiments, mechanism design, price discrimination, product differentiation., selling information

13.

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Downloads 465 ( 59,176)
Citation 10

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1758R
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 19 Aug 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 277 (106,718)
Citation 10

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Targeting, Advertising, Online Advertising, Sponsored Search, Media Markets

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1758
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 29 Mar 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 185 (159,292)
Citation 10

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Targeting, Advertising, Online advertising, Sponsored search, Media markets

Targeting in Advertising Markets: Implications for Offline vs. Online Media

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7988
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 14 Nov 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 3 (640,206)
Citation 10
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Advertising, Internet Advertising, Media Markets, Sponsored Search, Targeting

14.

Information in Mechanism Design

Downloads 459 ( 60,117)
Citation 15

Information in Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1532
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 25 Aug 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 263 (112,722)
Citation 15

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Mechanism design, information acquisition, ex post equilibrium, robust mechanism design, interdependent values, information management

Information in Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1532R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 19 Jan 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 164 (177,431)
Citation 15

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Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex Post Equilibrium, Robust Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Information Management

Information in Mechanism Design

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5494
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 19 May 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 32 (458,423)
Citation 15
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Information, acquisition, mechanism, design, robust

15.

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1818, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 020-2011, ROBUST MECHANISM, D. Bergemann & S. Morris, eds., World Scientific, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 388 (73,551)
Citation 57

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Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

16.

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 378 (75,801)
Citation 2

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

17.

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Downloads 375 ( 76,464)
Citation 12

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 213 (139,479)
Citation 12

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Iterative Deletion, Direct Mechanism

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561R
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 May 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 162 (179,315)
Citation 12

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

18.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Downloads 372 ( 77,231)

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 289 (101,982)

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correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R, Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 May 2014 Last Revised: 22 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (375,873)

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Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 30 (468,463)

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

19.

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Downloads 360 ( 80,298)

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973R
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 14 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 188 (156,992)

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 067_2014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 123 (224,548)

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief Free Rationalizatility

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 49 (389,354)

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

20.

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Downloads 349 ( 83,208)

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 267 (110,960)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953R3
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 27 May 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (440,461)

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Dynamic mechanism design, Repeated sales, Stochastic flow, Flat rates, Two-part Tariffs, Leasing

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953RR
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 23 Jan 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 30 (468,463)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales, Impulse response function, Stochastic flow

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 01 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 16 (552,294)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales

21.

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1519
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 337 (86,631)
Citation 14

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Interative Deletion, Dominant Strategies

22.

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Downloads 326 ( 89,906)
Citation 4

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757R
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 16 May 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 206 (144,046)
Citation 4

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Dynamic auctions and mechanisms, Random arrivals and departures, Changing private information, Incentive compatibility

Dynamic Auctions: A Survey

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1757
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 23 Mar 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Maher Said
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and NYU Stern School of Business
Downloads 120 (228,836)
Citation 4

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Dynamic Auctions and Mechanisms, Random Arrivals and Departures, Changing Private Information, Incentive Compatibility

23.

Dynamic Price Competition

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1412
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 15 Apr 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 303 (97,401)
Citation 5

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Dynamic Competition, Marginal Contribution, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Common Agency

24.

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1463R
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 13 Jul 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 265 (112,369)
Citation 9

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Monopoly, dynamic pricing, learning, experience goods, continuous time, Markov perfect equilibrium

25.

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Downloads 261 (114,150)

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 158 (183,266)

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First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (463,458)

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (484,520)

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (508,253)

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 21 (520,710)

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (664,671)
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

26.

Entry and Innovation in Vertically Differentiated Markets

Cowles Foundation Working Paper No. 1226
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 19 Aug 1999
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valmaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 255 (116,957)

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27.

Entry and Vertical Differentiation

Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 04 Jun 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 253 (117,933)
Citation 4

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Entry, Duopoly, Quantity Competition, Vertical Differentiation, Bayesian Learning, Markov Perfect Equilibrium, Experimentation, Experience Goods

28.

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Downloads 252 (118,430)

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2027
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 220 (135,192)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (458,423)

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

29.

Rationalizable Implementation

Downloads 227 (131,504)
Citation 6

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 127 (219,118)
Citation 6

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 May 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 100 (261,068)
Citation 6

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

30.

Ex Post Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1502
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 222 (134,399)
Citation 12

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Ex Post Equilibrium, Implementation, Single Crossing, Interdependent Values

31.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Downloads 213 (139,783)

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RR
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 176 (166,671)

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RRR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Apr 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 37 (436,168)

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

32.

Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

Downloads 213 (139,783)
Citation 23

Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1323
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Downloads 188 (156,992)
Citation 23

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Optimal Auction, Private Values, Information Structures, Partitions

Information Structures in Optimal Auctions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2991
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 21 Oct 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Downloads 25 (496,208)
Citation 23
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Optimal auction, private values, information structures, partitions

33.

Robust Monopoly Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1527RR
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 08 Aug 2005 Last Revised: 01 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Karl H. Schlag
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of Vienna - Department of Economics
Downloads 208 (142,982)
Citation 13

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Monopoly, Optimal pricing, Robustness, Multiple priors, Regret

34.

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Downloads 204 (145,627)

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2102R
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 29 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 109 (245,655)

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Sequential Screening, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Bandit Auctions, Information Management, Dynamic Pricing

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2102
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 25 Aug 2017 Last Revised: 16 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 95 (270,085)

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Sequential Screening, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Bandit Auctions, Information Management

Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12240
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 29 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann and juuso valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Aalto University
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Bandit Auctions, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Pivot Mechanism, Information Management, Sequential Screening

35.

Efficient Dynamic Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1584
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 11 Oct 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 204 (145,627)
Citation 3

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Vickrey Auction, Marginal Contribution, Dynamic Allocation Index, Multi-Armed Bandit, Bayesian Learning, Experimentation, Matching

36.

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Downloads 202 (146,959)
Citation 9

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 123 (224,548)
Citation 9

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 79 (303,402)
Citation 9

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

37.

Information and Volatility

Downloads 198 (149,672)
Citation 1

Information and Volatility

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 056-2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 07 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 160 (181,235)
Citation 1

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Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 03 Dec 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 38 (431,861)
Citation 1

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incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

38.

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Downloads 198 (149,672)
Citation 35

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Yale University, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1248
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 21 Mar 2000
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 198 (149,513)
Citation 35

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Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Econometrica, Vol. 70, pp. 1007-1033, 2002
Posted: 17 Aug 2002
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics

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Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Microeconomic Theory
Posted: 26 Jul 2001
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics

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Auctions, Mechanism Design, Information Acquisition, Ex-ante and Ex-post Efficiency

39.

Information and Volatility

Downloads 187 (157,818)

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928R
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jun 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 140 (202,631)

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Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928RR
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (396,679)

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Incomplete information, Idiosyncratic shocks, Aggregate shocks, Volatility, Confounding information, Moment restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs, Bayes correlated equilibrium

40.

Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Jun 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 186 (158,590)
Citation 4

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-Post incentive compatibility

41.

Selling Experiments: Menu Pricing of Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1952
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti and Alex Smolin
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management and University of Bonn
Downloads 171 (170,952)

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Experiments, Mechanism design, Price discrimination, Product differentiation, Selling information

42.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Downloads 169 (172,710)

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 136 (207,432)

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First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (453,787)

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First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

43.

Selling Cookies

Downloads 162 (179,080)

Selling Cookies

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 19 Oct 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 94 (271,985)

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Data providers, Information sales, Targeting, Online advertising, Media markets

Selling Cookies

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920RR
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 09 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 39 (427,547)

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Data providers, Data pricing, Selling information, Targeting, Online advertising, Cookies, Media markets

Selling Cookies

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1920R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 29 (473,650)

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Data providers, Information sales, Targeting, Online advertising, Media markets

44.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 160 (180,979)

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optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

45.

Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1619, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 25
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Jul 2007
Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki and Xianwen Shi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Helsinki School of Economics and University of Toronto - Department of Economics
Downloads 156 (184,870)

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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Information acquisition, Strategic substitutes, Informational efficiency

46.

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Downloads 151 (190,081)
Citation 1

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1764
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 13 Aug 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 80 (301,110)
Citation 1

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First Price Auction, Repeated Auction, Private Bids, Information Revelation

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1764R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 46 (400,215)
Citation 1

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First price auction, Repeated auction, Private bids, Information revelation

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1764R2
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 07 Sep 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 19 (533,300)
Citation 1

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First Price Auction, Persistent Values, Transparency, Disclosure, Repeated Auction, Independent Private Value, Information Design

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7989
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 14 Nov 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 6 (617,836)
Citation 1
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First Price Auction, Information Revelation, Private Bids, Repeated Auctions

47.

Mechanism Design with Limited Information: The Case of Nonlinear Pricing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1775
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 Nov 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu and Edmund M. Yeh
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Yale University and Northeastern University
Downloads 147 (194,242)
Citation 1

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Mechanism design, Limited information, Nonlinear pricing, Quantization, Lloyd-max optimality

48.

Pricing Without Priors

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1625
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 11 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Karl H. Schlag
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of Vienna - Department of Economics
Downloads 138 (204,421)
Citation 5

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Monopoly, Optimal pricing, Regret, Multiple priors, Distribution free

49.

Dynamic Common Agency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, No. 1206
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 10 Aug 1999
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valmaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 134 (209,317)
Citation 15

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50.

Markets for Information: An Introduction

Downloads 133 (210,547)

Markets for Information: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2142
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 29 Aug 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 133 (211,244)

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Markets for Information: An Introduction

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13148
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 17 Sep 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
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information design, information markets, intermediaries, mechanism design, predictions, ratings

51.

Flexibility as an Instrument in Digital Rights Management

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1505
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 21 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann, Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum and Scott Shenker
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Yale University - Department of Computer Science and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences (EECS)
Downloads 132 (211,888)
Citation 2

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Digital Rights Management, Platform, Flexibility, Piracy

52.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822R
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 124 (222,317)

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

53.

Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2066
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 122 (224,982)

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief-Free Rationalizability

54.

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1600
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 119 (229,256)
Citation 2

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Dynamic auction, Rationalizability, Extensive form, Uniqueness, Strategic uncertainty

55.

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Apr 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 118 (230,716)
Citation 3

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

56.

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Downloads 115 (235,120)
Citation 9

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1672
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 10 Aug 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 77 (308,208)
Citation 9

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Pivot mechanisms, Dynamic mechanism design, Ex-post equilibrium, Marginal contribution, Multi-armed bandit, Bayesian learning

The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1672R
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Dec 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 38 (431,861)
Citation 9

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Pivot mechanisms, Dynamic mechanism design, Ex-post equilibrium, Marginal contribution, Multi-armed bandit, Bayesian learning

57.

Pricing Under the Threat of Piracy: Flexibility and Platforms for Digital Goods

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1834
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 09 Nov 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Thomas M. Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum and Scott Shenker
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Federal Reserve Banks - Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Yale University - Department of Computer Science and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Sciences (EECS)
Downloads 114 (236,692)

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Digital goods, Digital rights management, Platform, Flexibility, Piracy

58.

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Downloads 113 (238,163)

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-29
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 82 (296,667)

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-64
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 13 Jun 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 20 (526,974)

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Sequential Screening, Ex-Post Participation Constraints, Static Contract, Dynamic Contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2078R2, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-55
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 29 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 11 (584,772)

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Sequential screening, Ex-post participation constraints, Static contract, Sequential contract

The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13018
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 03 Jul 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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ex-post participation constraints, sequential contract., Sequential Screening, static contract

59.

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Downloads 107 (247,514)

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 107 (248,900)

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Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

60.

Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1616
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 17 Jul 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 94 (269,967)
Citation 3

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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, Pivot mechanism, Ex post equilibrium, Marginal contribution, Multi-armed bandit, Bayesian learning

61.

Optimal Pricing with Recommender Systems

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1563
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 31 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Deran Ozmen
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University
Downloads 92 (273,693)
Citation 3

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Recommender system, Collaborative filtering, Add-ons, Pricing, Information externality

62.

Information and Interaction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2088
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 88 (281,465)

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Networks, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

63.

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1628
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 17 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 85 (287,629)
Citation 3

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Common prior, Correlated equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, Uniqueness

64.

Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design with Limited Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1859
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 19 Apr 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu and Edmund M. Yeh
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), affiliation not provided to SSRN and Northeastern University
Downloads 81 (296,177)

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Mechanism design, Multi-dimensional private information, Limited information, Nonlinear pricing, Quantization, Information theory

65.

Efficient Search by Committee

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1782
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 29 Jan 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics
Downloads 74 (312,194)

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Search, Committtees, Voting, Mechanism design, Dynamic pivot mechanism

66.

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561RR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 72 (317,051)
Citation 14

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

67.

Efficient Recommender Systems

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1568
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 19 Jul 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Deran Ozmen
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University
Downloads 72 (317,051)

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Recommender system, Collaborative filtering, Add-ons, Pricing, Information externality

68.

Introduction to: Jet Symposium Issue on 'Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design'

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2016
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 06 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Pavan
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Northwestern University
Downloads 70 (322,020)

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Dynamic mechanism design, Dynamic contracts

69.

The Economics of Social Data

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2171 (2019)
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 27 Mar 2019
Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 67 (329,681)

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Individual Data, Social Data, Informational Externality, Internet Platforms, Data Collection, Data Markup

70.

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

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Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1900
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Achim Wambach
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 36 (440,461)

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Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium

Sequential Information Disclosure in Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1900R
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Achim Wambach
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 20 (526,974)

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Independent private value auction, Sequential disclosure, Ascending auctions, Information structure, Interim equilibrium, Posterior equilibrium

71.

Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1981
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 24 Jan 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Ji Shen, Yun Xu and Edmund M. Yeh
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE), Yale University and Northeastern University
Downloads 52 (373,068)

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Mechanism design, Nonlinear pricing, Multi-Dimension, Multi-product, Private information, Limited information, Quantization, Information theory

72.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 50 (379,537)

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Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

73.

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

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Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 25 (496,208)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (508,253)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

74.

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (389,690)

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First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

75.

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1846, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 30-2012
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 39 (418,630)

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Mechanism Design, Robust mechanism design, Efficient auctions, Interdepedent types, Partial implementation, Full implementation

76.

Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609RR
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 07 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 39 (418,630)
Citation 13

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationaliz¿ability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

77.

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

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Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2133
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 34 (449,236)

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Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12964
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction

78.

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 17 (526,685)

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Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection

79.

Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13332
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
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advantageous selection, Adverse Selection, common values, maximum game, neutral selection, Optimal auction, posted price, revenue equivalence

80.

Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, pp. 713-743, August 2006
Posted: 01 Nov 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Valimaki
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Helsinki School of Economics

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81.

Experimentation in Markets

Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, No. 2, April 2000
Posted: 28 Jul 2000
Juuso Valimaki and Dirk Bergemann
Helsinki School of Economics and Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

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82.

Venture Capital Financing, Moral Hazard and Learning

CEPR Discussion Paper Series Number 1738
Posted: 28 Jun 1998
Dirk Bergemann
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics

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