School of Economics, Room B18,
SCG, University of Nottingham
Nottingham, NG7 1GD
University of Nottingham
majority voting, secession risk, cultural distinctiveness, conflict, overlapping regional preferences
GATT, WTO, Dispute Settlement, Political Economy
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Dispute Settlement, GATT, Political Economy, WTO
international trade, majority voting, inequality, income taxation, tariffs
Committees, Endogenous Status Quo, Experimentation, redistribution, reforms, Voting rules
bidimensional voting, citizen-candidate, flexicurity, labor market rigidities, party competition
Electoral competition, income polarization, party formation, salience, stable green party
Electoral competition, polarization, political parties, salience
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