Florian Hoffmann

Erasmus School of Economics

Assistant Professor of Finance

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50

Rotterdam, 3062 PA

Netherlands

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

DOWNLOADS

503

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 22,673

in Total Papers Citations

12

CROSSREF CITATIONS

26

Scholarly Papers (8)

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 19-4
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 09 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 23 Jun 2020
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 108 (273,805)
Citation 3

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Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal-agent models, informativeness principle

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

SAFE Working Paper No. 218
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 28 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 14 Sep 2018
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 53 (415,197)
Citation 4

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Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal- agent models, informativeness principle

2.

Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 14 Feb 2014
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Bocconi University - Department of Economics
Downloads 161 (199,850)
Citation 7

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hypertargeting, selective disclosure, limited attention, consumer privacy regulation, personalized pricing, competition

The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements: An Indirect Tax Approach to Compensation Regulation

Swedish House of Finance Research Paper No. 19-3
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Jun 2013 Last Revised: 23 May 2019
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
Downloads 152 (210,155)
Citation 7

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financial regulation, moral hazard, compensation design, clawbacks, bonus deferral, short-termism

Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9877
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 02 Jun 2014
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
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Compensation design, Financial regulation, Principal-agent models

4.
Downloads 19 (569,652)
Citation 4

Taxing Externalities Under Financing Constraints

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 14 Feb 2014
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Ulf Moslener
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
Downloads 19 (589,400)
Citation 1

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Taxing Externalities Under Financing Constraints

The Economic Journal, Vol. 127, Issue 606, pp. 2478-2503, 2017
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Nov 2017
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Ulf Moslener
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH
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Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 17 Apr 2019
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Sergey Turlo
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt
Downloads 8 (670,598)

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Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13641
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 09 Apr 2019
Roman Inderst and Florian Hoffmann
Goethe University Frankfurt and Erasmus School of Economics
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6.

Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation

Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming
Number of pages: 41
Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marcus M. Opp
Erasmus School of Economics, Goethe University Frankfurt and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Finance
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Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal-agent models, informativeness principle

7.

Dynamic Multitasking and Managerial Investment Incentives

Posted: 20 Apr 2018
Florian Hoffmann and Sebastian Pfeil
Erasmus School of Economics and Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

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Continuous Time Contracting, Multiple Tasks, Delegated Investment, Managerial Compensation, Endogenous Financing Frictions, Investment Dynamics

8.

Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model

Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 23, No. 9, pp. 3329-3345
Posted: 02 Oct 2008 Last Revised: 13 Feb 2011
Florian Hoffmann and Sebastian Pfeil
Erasmus School of Economics and Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE)

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continuous time contracting, executive compensation