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KU Leuven
Finance Theory Group (FTG)
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
hypertargeting, selective disclosure, limited attention, consumer privacy regulation, personalized pricing, competition
Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal-agent models, informativeness principle
Compensation design, duration of pay, moral hazard, persistence, principal- agent models, informativeness principle
financial regulation, moral hazard, compensation design, clawbacks, bonus deferral, short-termism
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bonus deferral, clawbacks, compensation regulation, moral hazard, principal-agent models with externalities, Short-termism
bonus deferral, clawbacks, Compensation design, financial regulation, moral hazard, Short-termism
Compensation design, Financial regulation, Principal-agent models
Compensation structure of non-executive employees, high-skilled employees, contagious turnover, worker runs, dilutable compensation, asymmetric compensation, time- and performance-vesting, retention bonuses.
selective disclosure, hypertargeting, limited attention, privacy regulation
hypertargeting, limited attention, privacy regulation, Selective disclosure
Continuous Time Contracting, Multiple Tasks, Delegated Investment, Managerial Compensation, Endogenous Financing Frictions, Investment Dynamics
Compensation Design, Duration of Pay, Moral Hazard, Persistence, Principal-Agent Models, Informativeness Principle
Negotiations, auctions, competition, optimal mechanism, payment method, mergers and acquisitions, negotiations with employees, compensation structure, patent licensing.
continuous time contracting, executive compensation
