New Haven, CT 06520-8281
Yale University - Cowles Foundation
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Value of information, Dynamic game
Moral hazard, Teams, Experimentation, Collaboration, Public goods, Learning
Experimentation, Learning, Agency, Dynamic agency, Venture capital, Repeated principal-agent problem
Experimentation, Learning, Agency, Dynamic agency, Venture Capital, Repeated principal-agent problem
experimentation, learning, agency, dynamic agency, venture capital, repeated principal-agent problem
Revenue Management, Intertemporal Price Discrimination, Coase Conjecture, Perishable Goods, Reserve Price, Dutch Auction
Revenue management, Intertemporal price discrimination, Coase conjecture, Perishable goods, Reserve price, Dutch auction
Bayesian games, Repeated games, Folk theorem
Bayesian games, repeated games, folk theorem
First Price Auction, Repeated Auction, Private Bids, Information Revelation
First price auction, Repeated auction, Private bids, Information revelation
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP7989.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
First Price Auction, Information Revelation, Private Bids, Repeated Auctions
Mediation, War and Peace, Imperfect Information, Communication Games, Optimal Mechanism
Bargaining, Mechanism Design, Market for Lemons
Bargaining, Mechanism design, Market for lemons
Moral hazard, Dynamic moral hazard, Commitment, Principal-agent, Cash flow diversion
Mechanism design, Principal-Agent, Token mechanisms
Career concerns, Experimentation, Career paths, Up-or-out, Reputation
Repeated game with incomplete information, Zero-sum games, Partially observable Markov decision processes
Informational herds, Cascades, Selection bias
financial market microstructure, belief-free equilibria, informed market makers, price volatility
Stochastic games, Repeated games, Folk theorem
Repeated games with incomplete information, Harsanyi doctrine, Belief-free equilibria
Two-armed bandit, Bayesian learning, Strategic experimentation, Strongly symmetric equilibrium
Experimentation, Social learning, Mechanism design
Experimentation, Free-riding, Mixed strategies, Monitoring, Delay
This is a Wiley-Blackwell Publishing paper. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing charges $38.00 .
File name: iere.
Career Concerns, Mechanism Design, Ratings
Repeated games, Rates of convergence
File name: JEMS.
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