Helmut Bester

Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics

Professor

Boltzmannstr. 20

Berlin 14195, 14195

Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

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561

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18

CROSSREF CITATIONS

63

Scholarly Papers (14)

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1.

Conflict and the Social Contract

Downloads 261 (160,709)
Citation 10

Conflict and the Social Contract

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 10 Mar 2006
Helmut Bester and Karl Warneryd
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and Stockholm School of Economics
Downloads 239 (174,633)

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conflict, social contracts, asymmetric information

Conflict and the Social Contract

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 2, pp. 231-249, July 2006
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 16 Aug 2006
Helmut Bester and Karl Warneryd
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and Stockholm School of Economics
Downloads 22 (691,977)
Citation 2

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2.

Signaling versus Auditing

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7183
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 29 Oct 2019
Helmut Bester, Matthias Lang and Li Jianpei
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) and University of International Business and Economics (UIBE)
Downloads 119 (315,370)

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signaling, information acquisition, auditing, wage differentials

3.

Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Downloads 73 (428,341)
Citation 4

Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

WZB, Markets and Political Economy Working Paper No. SP II 2003-28
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 21 Feb 2004
Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Downloads 60 (480,762)

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Timing of conflict, war, easy targets

Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 27 Feb 2004
Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
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Timing of conflict, war, easy targets

4.

Loan Sales and Screening Incentives

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9084
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Helmut Bester, Thomas Gehrig and Rune Stenbacka
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics, University of Vienna and Hanken School of Economics
Downloads 34 (592,946)
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loan sales, screening, securitization

5.

Delay in Contests

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 04 Apr 2003
Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Downloads 19 (693,437)
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Delay, contest, conflict

6.

Externalities and the Allocation of Decision Rights in the Theory of the Firm

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 18 Apr 2002
Helmut Bester
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics
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Authority, control rights, decision rights, delegation, externalities, incomplete contracts, theory of the firm

7.

Externalities, Communication and the Allocation of Decision Rights

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5391
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 01 Mar 2006
Helmut Bester
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics
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Authority, decision rights, externalities, incomplete contracts, imperfect information, theory of the firm

8.

Wages and Productivity Growth in a Dynamic Monopoly

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 26 Mar 2001
Helmut Bester and Emmanuel Petrakis
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and University of Crete - Department of Economics
Downloads 12 (750,722)
Citation 2
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Dynamic programming, innovation, labour productivity, monopoly, wage differentials, wages

9.

Delegation and Incentives

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 6042
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Jun 2007
Helmut Bester and Daniel Krahmer
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and University of Bonn
Downloads 7 (795,992)
Citation 5
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Authority, Delegation, Limited liability, Moral hazard, Principal-agent problem

10.

Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7332
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 15 Jul 2009
Helmut Bester
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics
Downloads 2 (845,982)
Citation 1
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Holdup Problem, Investments, Matching Market

11.

Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10254
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 17 Nov 2014
Helmut Bester and Matthias Dahm
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (877,695)
Citation 4
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credence goods, information acquisition, moral hazard, subjective evaluation

12.

Strategic Pricing, Signalling and Costly Information Acquisition

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2032
Posted: 13 Jan 1999
Klaus Ritzberger and Helmut Bester
Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS) and Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics

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13.

Wages and Productivity Growth in a Competitive Industry

CEPR Working Paper No. 2031
Posted: 22 Dec 1998
Helmut Bester and Emmanuel Petrakis
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics and University of Crete - Department of Economics

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14.

Quality Uncertainty Mitigates Product Differentiation

Posted: 01 Oct 1998
Helmut Bester
Free University of Berlin (FUB) - Division of Economics

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