David McAdams

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Assistant Professor

77 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

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SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 16,909

in Total Papers Citations

23

CROSSREF CITATIONS

34

Scholarly Papers (14)

1.

Internal Markets for Supply Chain Capacity Allocation

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4546-05, MIT Center for Coordination Science Working Paper No. 224
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 20 Jun 2005
David McAdams and Thomas W. Malone
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 404 (78,619)
Citation 3

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supply chain capacity, internal markets

2.

Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 15 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2014
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, American University - Washington College of Law, The Brattle Group, University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, Columbia University, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - College of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, University of Michigan, Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Zurich, University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business, Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit, University of Oxford, Smith School, Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, affiliation not provided to SSRN, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, University of North Texas, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Clemson University, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration, Public Utility Research Center, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased), Independent, Penn State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), Technology Policy Institute, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST), Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA), Stanford University, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics, Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Georgetown University, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management, Technology Policy Institute, Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS), University of Nevada, Las Vegas - College of Business - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, Charles River Associates (CRA) and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Downloads 343 (95,002)
Citation 1

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3.

Bidding Lower with Higher Values in Multi-Object Auctions

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4249-02
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 18 Jul 2002
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 208 (159,157)
Citation 2

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4.

Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4254-02
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 22 Jul 2002
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 203 (162,833)
Citation 15

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Autions, Multi-unit Auctions, Uniform-price Auction, Vickrey Auctions Bidders, Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4248-02
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 09 Jul 2002
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 159 (202,321)
Citation 5

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Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information

Econometrica Vol. 71, No. 4, July 2003
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract:

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6.

All Mixed Strategy Equilibria are Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4256-02
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 07 Aug 2002
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 136 (229,511)

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Asymmetric First-price Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4606-06
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 14 Jun 2006
David McAdams and Michael Schwarz
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) and Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs
Downloads 84 (323,470)
Citation 9

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Credible Sales Mechanisms, Intermediaries

Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries

American Economic Review, Vol. 97, No. 1, 2007
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams and Michael Schwarz
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) and Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs

Abstract:

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Credible Sales Mechanisms, Intermediaries

Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4618-06
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 20 Aug 2006
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 81 (330,842)
Citation 4

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Uniform-Price Auctions

Uniform-Price Auctions with Adjustable Supply

Economics Letters, Vol. 95, pp. 48-53, 2007
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract:

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Uniform-price auction, Adjustable supply

9.
Downloads 78 (335,082)
Citation 2

Who Pays When Auction Rules are Bent?

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4607-06
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 14 Jun 2006
David McAdams and Michael Schwarz
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) and Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs
Downloads 78 (338,461)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Auction Rules

Who Pays When Auction Rules are Bent?

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 25, No. 5, 2007
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams and Michael Schwarz
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) and Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs

Abstract:

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Auction Rules

10.

Adjustable Supply in Uniform-Price Auctions: The Value of Non-Commitment

MIT Sloan Working Paper No. 4522-05
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 31 Jan 2005
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 76 (340,178)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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uniform-price auctions

11.

Perverse Incentives in the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit

NBER Working Paper No. w12008
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 22 Apr 2006 Last Revised: 15 May 2010
David McAdams and Michael Schwarz
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA) and Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs
Downloads 29 (510,187)

Abstract:

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12.

Monotonicity in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions with Affiliation

International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 35, No. 3, 2007
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract:

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Asymmetric First-price Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium

13.

Uniqueness in Symmetric First-Price Auctions with Affiliation

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 136, 2007
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract:

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First-price auction, uniqueness, affiliation, interdependent values, all-pay auction

14.

On the Failure of Monotonicity in Uniform-Price Auctions

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 137, No. , 2007
Posted: 14 Jan 2008
David McAdams
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)

Abstract:

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Uniform-price auction, monotonicity, independence, affiliation