Universitatsstr 30
Bayreuth, D-95447
Germany
University of Bayreuth
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
Shapley value; institutional design; two-tier voting; collective choice; equal representation; random order values
power index analysis, economic perspectives and methodology, committee voting, optimal voting rule
electoral systems, simple games, weighted voting games, square root rule, Penrose limit theorem, Penrose-Banzhaf index, institutional design
institutional design; two-tier voting; collective choice; Shapley value; pivot probability; equal representation; random order values
weighted voting, simple games, social choice, geometry of voting, equivalence classes, Borda rule, Copeland rule, plurality, antiplurality
nucleolus, power, limit behavior, weighted voting games
Shapley value, Shapley-Shubik index, roll call model, voting power
simple games, weighted games, dimension, real-world voting systems, set covering problem, computational challenges
influence, voting games, cooperative games, Banzhaf value, Shapley value