Mount Scopus
Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905
Israel
http://pluto.huji.ac.il/~alexg/
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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Revenue Management, Strategic Buyers, Name Your Own Price, Mechanism Design
Auctions, Mechanism Design, Investments, Endogenous Valuations
Auction Design, Non-Expected Utility, Non-Linear Probability Weighting, Constant Risk Aversion
Moral hazard, Teams and Partnerships, Tournaments
team composition, leadership, mistakes
Scheduling, Queueing, Mechanism design
dynamic moral hazard, adverse selection
Sequential Assignment, Learning, Dynamic Mechanism Design
moral hazard, adverse selection, leadership, teams
Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design
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Auctions, Buyer credulity, Information disclosure, Seller manipulation
dynamic pricing, mechanism design, revenue management, sequential assignment
