Alex Gershkov

Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Mount Scopus

Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905

Israel

http://pluto.huji.ac.il/~alexg/

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

15

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1,831

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 18,147

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 18,147

in Total Papers Citations

42

CROSSREF CITATIONS

16

Scholarly Papers (15)

1.

Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 20 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 18 Nov 2016
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 329 (126,166)
Citation 12

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Revenue Management, Strategic Buyers, Name Your Own Price, Mechanism Design

2.

Optimal Auctions: Non-Expected Utility and Constant Risk Aversion

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 27 Mar 2020 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2021
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II, Yale, Department of Economics and Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 304 (137,038)
Citation 1

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Auction Design, Non-Expected Utility, Non-Linear Probability Weighting, Constant Risk Aversion

3.
Downloads 297 (140,381)
Citation 2

A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 27 Mar 2020 Last Revised: 10 Aug 2020
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II, Yale, Department of Economics and Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 297 (139,669)
Citation 2

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Auctions, Mechanism Design, Investments, Endogenous Valuations

4.

A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 09 Jan 2018 Last Revised: 13 Feb 2018
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 269 (155,360)
Citation 1

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5.

Efficient Tournaments within Teams

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 16 Apr 2008
Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li and Paul Schweinzer
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Humboldt University of Berlin and University of Klagenfurt
Downloads 163 (246,076)
Citation 4

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Moral hazard, Teams and Partnerships, Tournaments

6.

Dream Teams and the Apollo Effect

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6381
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 27 Mar 2017
Alex Gershkov and Paul Schweinzer
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and University of Klagenfurt
Downloads 105 (342,805)

Abstract:

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team composition, leadership, mistakes

7.

Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 18 May 2010
Alex Gershkov, Motty Perry and Motty Perry
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Center for the Study of RationalityPennsylvania State University, College of the Liberal Arts - Department of Economic
Downloads 81 (402,871)

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dynamic moral hazard, adverse selection

8.

When Queueing is Better than Push and Shove

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 23 Apr 2008 Last Revised: 18 Jun 2009
Alex Gershkov and Paul Schweinzer
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and University of Klagenfurt
Downloads 80 (405,739)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Scheduling, Queueing, Mechanism design

9.

Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Jan 2015
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 77 (414,727)
Citation 9

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10.

Optimal Search, Learning, and Implementation

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 29 May 2009
Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II
Downloads 56 (487,761)
Citation 1

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Sequential Assignment, Learning, Dynamic Mechanism Design

11.

How to Share it Out: The Value of Information in Teams

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4906
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 14 Aug 2014
Alex Gershkov, Li Jianpei and Paul Schweinzer
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) and University of Klagenfurt
Downloads 55 (491,729)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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moral hazard, adverse selection, leadership, teams

12.

On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation

Econometrica, Vol. 81, No. 1, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 21 Jul 2019
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, UNSW Business School, Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and University of Toronto - Department of Economics
Downloads 9 (774,742)
Citation 24

Abstract:

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Bayesian implementation, dominant strategy implementation, mechanism design

13.

On Seller Estimates and Buyer Returns

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6503
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 05 Jun 2008
Alex Gershkov and Flavio Toxvaerd
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 3 (831,146)
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Auctions, Buyer credulity, Information disclosure, Seller manipulation

14.

The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 19 Mar 2022
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and University of Toronto - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (842,679)

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Sequential Voting, Interdependent values, Incomplete Information

15.

The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6439
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 30 May 2008
Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II
Downloads 1 (856,128)
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Abstract:

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dynamic pricing, mechanism design, revenue management, sequential assignment