Peter Key

Microsoft Research Cambridge

7 J J Thomson Avenue

Cambridge, CB3 0FB

United Kingdom

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Optimal Bidding Strategies and Equilibria in Dynamic Auctions with Budget Constraints

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 May 2012 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2013

Ramki Gummadi, Peter Key and Alexandre Proutiere

Stanford University, Microsoft Research Cambridge and Royal Institute of Technology (KTH)

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