Jay Sethuraman

Columbia University

3022 Broadway

New York, NY 10027

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

631

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

Clearinghouse Default Waterfalls: Risk-Sharing, Incentives, and Systemic Risk

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 09 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 31 Aug 2017
Agostino Capponi, W. Cheng and Jay Sethuraman
Columbia University, Columbia University - Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research (IEOR) and Columbia University
Downloads 236 (141,910)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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clearinghouses, risk-sharing, funding costs, default waterfall

2.

Dynamic Matching in School Choice: Efficient Seat Reassignment after Late Cancellations

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 17-68
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 28 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 09 Aug 2019
Itai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo and Jay Sethuraman
CUNY Lehman College, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Stanford and Columbia University
Downloads 164 (197,904)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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dynamic matching, matching markets, school choice, deferred acceptance, tie-breaking, cancellations, reassignments

3.

Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 12 Jun 2020 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2020
Garud Iyengar, Fahad Saleh, Jay Sethuraman and Wenjun Wang
Columbia University - Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research (IEOR), Wake Forest University - Schools of Business, Columbia University and Columbia University, Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research (IEOR), Students
Downloads 94 (300,463)

Abstract:

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Permissioned Blockchain, Blockchain Adoption, Technology Adoption, FinTech

4.

Multiregional Oligopoly with Capacity Constraints

Forthcoming in Management Science
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 03 Dec 2018 Last Revised: 07 Jul 2020
Columbia University, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, Columbia University, Columbia University - Department of Industrial Engineering and Operations Research (IEOR) and Columbia University
Downloads 74 (347,233)

Abstract:

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Cournot competition, oligopoly, networks, capacity constraints, non-cooperative games, welfare

5.

Minimizing Regret When Dissolving a Partnership

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 02 Jan 2009 Last Revised: 30 Jan 2009
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and Euro-Mediterranean Center for Climate Change, New York University (NYU) - Wilf Family Department of Politics and Columbia University
Downloads 63 (378,446)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Partnership dissolution, fair division, minimax regret, ex-post efficiency, ex-post rationality, Bayesian-Nash equilibrium