Ivan Marinovic

Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

Associate Professor of Accounting

655 Knight Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

16

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in Total Papers Downloads

6,818

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 10,765

in Total Papers Citations

57

CROSSREF CITATIONS

41

Scholarly Papers (16)

1.

Earnings Management and Earnings Quality: Theory and Evidence

The Accounting Review (Forthcoming)
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 31 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 18 Oct 2018
Anne Beyer, Ilan Guttman and Ivan Marinovic
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 2,379 (5,925)
Citation 22

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Earnings Management, Dynamics, Structural Estimation

2.

A Theory of Hard and Soft Information

Accounting Review, Forthcoming, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 194
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 19 Sep 2014 Last Revised: 20 Jul 2016
Jeremy Bertomeu and Ivan Marinovic
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 783 (33,180)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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cheap talk, disclosure, verification, financial reporting

3.

Disclosure Processing Costs, Investors’ Information Choice, and Equity Market Outcomes: A Review

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 123 Posted: 20 Sep 2019 Last Revised: 01 Feb 2020
Elizabeth Blankespoor, Ed deHaan and Ivan Marinovic
University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 744 (35,639)
Citation 10

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disclosure processing costs, limited attention, disclosure pricing, information awareness, information acquisition, information integration

4.

How Often Do Managers Withhold Information?

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 07 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2019
Jeremy Bertomeu, Paul Ma and Ivan Marinovic
University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Rady School of Management, University of Minnesota and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 654 (42,401)
Citation 17

Abstract:

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voluntary disclosure, management forecasts, information endowment, strategic withholding, structural estimation, disclosure cost

5.

No News is Good News: Voluntary Disclosure in the Face of Litigation

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 169, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-19
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 26 Jan 2014 Last Revised: 01 Oct 2014
Ivan Marinovic and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Duke University
Downloads 421 (73,877)
Citation 12

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Dynamic Disclosure, Certification, Litigation

6.

The Credibility of Financial Reporting: A Reputation-Based Approach

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 224, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-10
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 02 Feb 2017
Ivan Marinovic, Ying Liang and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, CUNY Baruch College and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department
Downloads 414 (75,404)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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dynamic cheap talk, reputation, credibility

7.

Optimal Contracts with Performance Manipulation

Journal of Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 152
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 17 Apr 2012 Last Revised: 18 Jun 2014
Anne Beyer, Ilan Guttman and Ivan Marinovic
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 408 (76,700)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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Compensation, Governance, Moral Hazard, Earnings Management

8.

Competition for Talent Under Performance Manipulation: CEOs on Steroids

Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-14.
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 24 Oct 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2018
Ivan Marinovic and Paul Povel
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and University of Houston - Department of Finance, C.T. Bauer College of Business
Downloads 315 (102,983)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Executive Compensation, Competition for Talent, Optimal Contracts, Asymmetric Information, Performance Manipulation, Earnings Management, Regulation

9.

Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-9
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 25 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 06 Mar 2020
Felipe Varas, Ivan Marinovic and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 145 (215,360)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Monitoring, Auditing, Dynamic Contracts, Dynamic Games, Reputation

10.

Debt Contracts in the Presence of Performance Manipulation

Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2018
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 24 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 18 Oct 2018
Ilan Guttman and Ivan Marinovic
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 135 (227,958)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Asymmetric Information, Debt Contracts, Earnings Management

11.

Delegated Bidding and the Allocative Effects of Alternative Accounting Rules

Management Science, Volume 63, Issue 7, July 2017
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 04 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2018
Ivan Marinovic
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 94 (295,169)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Fair Values, Auctions, Accounting, Real Earnings Management

12.

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 25 Jan 2017
Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department
Downloads 77 (333,424)
Citation 5

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Dynamic Certification, Disclosure, Investment trap, Voluntary Disclosure, Certification, Dynamic Games, Optimal Stopping

13.

CEO Horizon, Optimal Pay Duration, and the Escalation of Short-Termism

Number of pages: 86 Posted: 10 Jan 2019
Ivan Marinovic and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department
Downloads 68 (357,389)
Citation 12

Abstract:

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dynamic moral hazard, earnings management, CEO horizon, equity vesting, deferred compensation

The Credibility of Performance Feedback in Tournaments

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 193
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 19 Sep 2014
Ivan Marinovic
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 63 (376,725)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Tournaments, Cheap-Talk, Contracts

The Credibility of Performance Feedback in Tournaments

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 165-188, 2015
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 13 Feb 2015
Ivan Marinovic
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
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15.

Dynamic Blockholder Incentives: Liquidity and Reputation

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 19-2
Number of pages: 94 Posted: 11 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 25 Oct 2019
Ivan Marinovic and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department
Downloads 60 (380,913)
Citation 1

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Strategic Trading, Blockholder, Managerial Ownership, Reputation, Activism

16.

Monitoring with Career Concerns

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 18 Sep 2019 Last Revised: 25 Oct 2019
Ivan Marinovic and Martin Szydlowski
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management
Downloads 58 (387,258)

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monitoring, career concerns, strategic experimentation