Tomasz Sadzik

New York University (NYU)

Bobst Library, E-resource Acquisitions

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

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159

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.
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Citation 62

Dynamic CEO Compensation

Journal of Finance 67(5), 1603-1647, October 2012
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 18 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2013
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 3,309 (3,182)
Citation 10

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Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, principal-agent problem, private saving, manipulation, vesting

Dynamic Incentive Accounts

NBER Working Paper No. w15324
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
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Dynamic Incentive Accounts

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7497
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 17 Nov 2009
London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting, Harvard University - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
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Contract theory, executive compensation, incentives, manipulation, principal-agent problem, private saving, vesting

2.

Partnership with Persistence

Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 20 Oct 2019
Joao Ramos and Tomasz Sadzik
Marshall School of Business - University of Southern California and New York University (NYU)
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partnership, dynamic games, continuous time, relational capital