Daniel Ferguson Garrett

University of Essex

Wivenhoe Park

Colchester CO4 3SQ

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

DOWNLOADS

285

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 12,946

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 12,946

in Total Papers Citations

87

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (7)

1.

Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 05 Jun 2010
Daniel Ferguson Garrett and Alessandro Pavan
University of Essex and Northwestern University
Downloads 110 (355,839)
Citation 69

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Incentives, Optimal Pay Scheme, Risk-Aversion, Stochastic Process

2.

Foundations for Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 10 Oct 2012
Daniel Ferguson Garrett
University of Essex
Downloads 82 (428,967)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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procurement, simple mechanisms, minimax

3.

Managerial Turnover in a Changing World

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 01 Jun 2010
Daniel Ferguson Garrett and Alessandro Pavan
University of Essex and Northwestern University
Downloads 65 (486,722)
Citation 16

Abstract:

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managerial turnover, termination clauses, dynamic mechanism design, adverse selection, moral hazard

4.

Optimal Technology Design

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 10 Dec 2020
Daniel Ferguson Garrett, George Georgiadis, Alex Smolin and Balazs Szentes
University of Essex, Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics
Downloads 28 (675,002)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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moral hazard, limited liability, contract theory

5.

Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14725
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 May 2020
Daniel Ferguson Garrett
University of Essex
Downloads 0 (951,946)
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mechanism design, Procurement, robustness

6.

Relational Contracts: Public Versus Private Savings

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14722
Number of pages: 78 Posted: 20 May 2020
Francesc Dilme and Daniel Ferguson Garrett
University of Bonn and University of Essex
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private savings, Relational Contracts

7.

Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10036
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Daniel Ferguson Garrett, Renato D. Gomes and Lucas Maestri
University of Essex, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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Citation 2
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Abstract:

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adverse selection, competition, heterogeneous information, price discrimination, screening