Daniel Ferguson Garrett

University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Junior Chair

Place Anatole-France

Toulouse Cedex, F-31042

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

DOWNLOADS

253

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 13,191

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 13,191

in Total Papers Citations

87

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (7)

1.

Dynamic Managerial Compensation: A Mechanism Design Approach

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 05 Jun 2010
Daniel Ferguson Garrett and Alessandro Pavan
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and Northwestern University
Downloads 102 (325,004)
Citation 69

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Incentives, Optimal Pay Scheme, Risk-Aversion, Stochastic Process

2.

Foundations for Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 10 Oct 2012
Daniel Ferguson Garrett
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 75 (392,334)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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procurement, simple mechanisms, minimax

3.

Managerial Turnover in a Changing World

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 01 Jun 2010
Daniel Ferguson Garrett and Alessandro Pavan
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and Northwestern University
Downloads 60 (441,131)
Citation 16

Abstract:

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managerial turnover, termination clauses, dynamic mechanism design, adverse selection, moral hazard

4.

Optimal Technology Design

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 10 Dec 2020
Daniel Ferguson Garrett, George Georgiadis, Alex Smolin and Balazs Szentes
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics
Downloads 16 (670,855)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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moral hazard, limited liability, contract theory

5.

Payoff Implications of Incentive Contracting

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14725
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 May 2020
Daniel Ferguson Garrett
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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mechanism design, Procurement, robustness

6.

Relational Contracts: Public Versus Private Savings

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14722
Number of pages: 78 Posted: 20 May 2020
Francesc Dilme and Daniel Ferguson Garrett
University of Bonn and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
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private savings, Relational Contracts

7.

Competitive Screening Under Heterogeneous Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10036
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Daniel Ferguson Garrett, Renato D. Gomes and Lucas Maestri
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Northwestern University - Department of Economics and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 0 (810,019)
Citation 2
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adverse selection, competition, heterogeneous information, price discrimination, screening