Tristan Tomala

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

12, place du Panthéon

Paris, IL

France

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

211

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 48,097

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Top 48,097

in Total Papers Citations

10

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Mechanism Design and Communication Networks

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 17 Oct 2008 Last Revised: 10 Jan 2010
Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala
Queen Mary University of London and Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Downloads 80 (378,513)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Mechanism design, incentives, Bayesian equilibrium, communication networks, encryption, secure transmission, coding

2.

Belief-Free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1739
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 04 Nov 2009
Johannes Horner, Stefano Lovo and Tristan Tomala
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, HEC Paris - Finance Department and Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Downloads 56 (456,212)
Citation 14

Abstract:

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Repeated games with incomplete information, Harsanyi doctrine, Belief-free equilibria

3.

Secure Message Transmission on Directed Networks

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 27 Jun 2012
Jerome Renault, Ludovic Renou and Tristan Tomala
University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), Queen Mary University of London and Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Downloads 50 (479,695)

Abstract:

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secure communication, protocols, communication

4.

Communication, Correlation and Cheap-Talk in Games with Public Information

Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 13 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 30 Sep 2011
Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan and Tristan Tomala
Bar Ilan University, Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences and Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne
Downloads 25 (607,969)

Abstract:

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cheap-talk, normal-form correlation, distributed computation

5.

Repeated Proximity Games

Posted: 13 Jan 1999
Jerome Renault and Tristan Tomala
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne and Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

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6.

Pure Equilibria of Repeated Games with Public Observation

Posted: 10 Sep 1998
Tristan Tomala
Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne

Abstract:

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