Anna Rohlfing-Bastian

Goethe University Frankfurt

Full Professor

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4

Frankfurt am Main, 60629

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS
Rank 45,886

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 45,886

in Total Papers Downloads

1,284

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 42,624

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 42,624

in Total Papers Citations

12

CROSSREF CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Why Do Not All Firms Engage in Tax Avoidance?

FAccT Center Working Paper Nr. 19/2014
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 11 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 01 Jun 2016
Martin Jacob, Anna Rohlfing-Bastian and Kai Sandner
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, Goethe University Frankfurt and Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU)
Downloads 567 (62,057)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

moral hazard, tax avoidance, tax planning

2.

Levelized Product Cost: Concept and Decision Relevance

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 11 Feb 2014
Stefan J. Reichelstein and Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 166 (228,057)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

3.

Contractual Relations and Organizational Structure in Franchising – Empirical Evidence from Germany

Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 393-421
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 10 Aug 2009 Last Revised: 05 May 2011
Anna Rohlfing-Bastian and Philipp Sturm
Goethe University Frankfurt and University of Tuebingen
Downloads 155 (241,505)

Abstract:

Loading...

Franchising, Double Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, Capital Scarcity

4.

Task Assignment and Variable Pay Ratio

AAA 2011 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 10 Aug 2010 Last Revised: 07 Dec 2010
Christian Hofmann and Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Business Administration (Munich School of Management) and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 141 (260,735)

Abstract:

Loading...

Task Assignment, Principal-Agent Analysis, Variable Pay Ratio

5.

Delegation of Task Allocation Authority and the Value of Communication when Performance Measures are Imperfect

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 06 Jun 2019
Anna Rohlfing-Bastian and Anja Schöttner
Goethe University Frankfurt and Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics
Downloads 102 (329,634)

Abstract:

Loading...

Delegation, Communication, Incentive Contracts, Performance Measurement, Task Assignment

6.

Incentives and the Delegation of Task Assignment

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 05 Oct 2017
Anna Rohlfing-Bastian and Anja Schöttner
Goethe University Frankfurt and Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics
Downloads 78 (389,070)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Delegation, Decision Rights, Incentive Contracts, Performance Measurement, Task Assignment

7.

Incentive Provision and Optimal Team Size for Managing Innovation

AAA 2017 Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 16 Aug 2016 Last Revised: 04 Oct 2017
Oliver M. Dürr, Markus Nisch and Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
Esslingen University of Applied Sciences, Goethe University Frankfurt and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 48 (494,095)

Abstract:

Loading...

Incentive Contracts, Uncertainty, Team Size, Innovation

8.

Delegation of Job Design and the Value of Communication with Imperfect Performance Measurement

TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency Working Paper Series No. 47, 2021
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 28 May 2021 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2021
Anna Rohlfing-Bastian and Anja Schöttner
Goethe University Frankfurt and Humboldt University of Berlin - School of Business and Economics
Downloads 27 (602,074)

Abstract:

Loading...

Delegation, Job Design, Task Assignment, Performance Measurement, Congruity, Communication, Incentive Contracts

9.

Decentralized Task Assignment and Centralized Contracting: On the Optimal Allocation of Authority

Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2014
Posted: 15 Aug 2011 Last Revised: 12 Feb 2014
Steffen Reichmann and Anna Rohlfing-Bastian
University of Mannheim and Goethe University Frankfurt

Abstract:

Loading...

task assignment, incentives, decision right, authority, organizational structure