Hideshi Itoh

Waseda Business School

Graduate School of Business and Finance, Waseda University

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda

Shinjuku-ku

Tokyo, Tokyo 169-8050

Japan

http://https://www.waseda.jp/fcom/wbs/en

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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2,339

CITATIONS
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in Total Papers Citations

98

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1786
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 12 Sep 2004
Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business School and University of New South Wales - School of Economics
Downloads 617 (41,712)
Citation 47

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Holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, renegotiation, repeated transaction, long-term relationships

2.

The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1444
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Mar 2005
Kohei Daido and Hideshi Itoh
Kwansei Gakuin University - School of Economics and Waseda Business School
Downloads 416 (68,513)
Citation 2

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Self-fulfilling prophecy, Pygmalion effect, Galatea effect, reference dependent preferences, agency model, moral hazard

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Oct 2003
Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business School
Downloads 330 (89,110)
Citation 53

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Japanese Economic Review, Forthcoming
Posted: 13 Nov 2003
Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business School

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

4.

Enterprise Law Conference of 2014: Edited Transcript

Number of pages: 202 Posted: 26 Sep 2014
Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Hitotsubashi University, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of California, Berkeley, Independent, Gakushuin University, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law, Waseda Business School, University of Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nagoya University, Graduate School of law, Stanford Law School, Independent, Waseda University - Graduate School of Commerce, Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, Harvard Law School, Indiana University Bloomington - School of Global and International Studies, Yale Law School, Waseda University, Independent, Doshisha University, Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, Independent, Independent, Independent, Independent, University of Virginia School of Law, Waseda University - School of Law and University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 261 (115,478)

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5.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Oct 1998
Shingo Ishiguro and Hideshi Itoh
Nanzan University - School of Business Administration and Waseda Business School
Downloads 243 (124,210)
Citation 4

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6.

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 22 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 20 Jul 2018
Hideshi Itoh and Kimiyuki Morita
Waseda Business School and Senshu University, Department of Economics
Downloads 215 (140,100)

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Decision Process, Preference Heterogeneity, Information Acquisition, Communication, Biased Agent, Complementarities

7.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3533
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 Aug 2011
Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business School and University of New South Wales - School of Economics
Downloads 136 (209,031)
Citation 3

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holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, repeated transactions, long-term relationships

8.

The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 18 Jul 2011
Hideshi Itoh and Zenichi Shishido
Waseda Business School and Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law
Downloads 96 (268,992)
Citation 1

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9.

Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 54, pp. 49-73, March 2003
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Jun 2003
Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business School
Downloads 25 (487,117)
Citation 1
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