Hideshi Itoh

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

Waseda Business School

Graduate School of Business and Finance, Waseda University

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda

Shinjuku-ku

Tokyo, Tokyo 169-8050

Japan

http://https://www.waseda.jp/fcom/wbs/en

  • Waseda Business School

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

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SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 24,340

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37

CROSSREF CITATIONS

9

Scholarly Papers (9)

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1.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1786
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 12 Sep 2004
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 670 (68,344)
Citation 18

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Holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, renegotiation, repeated transaction, long-term relationships

2.

The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Mar 2005
Kohei Daido, Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Kwansei Gakuin University - School of Economics and Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 498 (98,907)

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Self-fulfilling prophecy, Pygmalion effect, Galatea effect, reference dependent preferences, agency model, moral hazard

3.

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Downloads 370 (139,769)

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Oct 2003
Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 370 (138,690)
Citation 20

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Posted: 13 Nov 2003
Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

4.

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2019
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Kimiyuki Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Senshu University, Department of Economics
Downloads 362 (143,214)
Citation 3

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Decision Process, Preference Heterogeneity, Information Acquisition, Communication, Biased Agent, Complementarities

5.

Enterprise Law Conference of 2014: Edited Transcript

Number of pages: 202 Posted: 26 Sep 2014
Bruce E. Aronson, Kenneth Ayotte, Takaaki Eguchi, David Gamage, Mark P. Gergen, Gen Goto, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Yohsuke Higashi, Akio Hoshi, Hidefusa Iida, Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh, Takahito Kato, Nobuo Matsuki, Manabu Matsunaka, Manabu Matsunaka, Curtis J. Milhaupt, Hiroshi Mitoma, Hideaki Miyajima, Sadakazu Osaki, J. Mark Ramseyer, Shruti Rana, Roberta Romano, Takuji Saito, Kenichi Sekiguchi, Masakazu Shirai, Zenichi Shishido, Shinjiro Takagi, Wataru Tanaka, Takashi Toichi, Hideaki Umetsu, J. H. Verkerke, Tetsuya Watanabe and Noriyuki Yanagawa
Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Hitotsubashi University, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of California, Berkeley, Independent, Gakushuin University, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute), University of Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nagoya University, Graduate School of lawNagoya University, Graduate School of law, Stanford Law School, Independent, Waseda University - Graduate School of Commerce, Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, Harvard Law School, Indiana University Bloomington - Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Yale Law School, Waseda University, Independent, Doshisha University, Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, Independent, Independent, Independent, Independent, University of Virginia School of Law, Waseda University - School of Law and University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 346 (150,391)

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6.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Oct 1998
Shingo Ishiguro, Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Nanzan University - School of Business Administration and Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 263 (200,241)

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7.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3533
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 Aug 2011
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 160 (315,841)
Citation 1

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holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, repeated transactions, long-term relationships

8.

The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 18 Jul 2011
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Zenichi Shishido
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law
Downloads 147 (338,882)
Citation 2

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9.

Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 23 Aug 2019
Eric S. Chou, Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Chien‐Lung Chen
National Tsing Hua University, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Academia Sinica
Downloads 84 (504,130)

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relational contracts, hidden action, unequal discounting