Hideshi Itoh

Waseda Business School

Graduate School of Business and Finance, Waseda University

1-6-1 Nishi-Waseda

Shinjuku-ku

Tokyo, Tokyo 169-8050

Japan

http://https://www.waseda.jp/fcom/wbs/en

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5

Munich, DE-81679

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS
Rank 32,616

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Top 32,616

in Total Papers Downloads

3,123

TOTAL CITATIONS
Rank 25,036

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 25,036

in Total Papers Citations

49

Scholarly Papers (9)

1.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Holdup Problem

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1786
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 12 Sep 2004
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 687 (76,369)
Citation 18

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Holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, renegotiation, repeated transaction, long-term relationships

2.

The Pygmalion Effect: An Agency Model with Reference Dependent Preferences

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Mar 2005
Kohei Daido, Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Kwansei Gakuin University - School of Economics and Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 523 (107,745)

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Self-fulfilling prophecy, Pygmalion effect, Galatea effect, reference dependent preferences, agency model, moral hazard

3.

Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 22 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2019
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Kimiyuki Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Senshu University, Department of Economics
Downloads 425 (138,011)
Citation 3

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Decision Process, Preference Heterogeneity, Information Acquisition, Communication, Biased Agent, Complementarities

4.
Downloads 393 (150,984)
Citation 25

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Oct 2003
Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 393 (149,687)
Citation 25

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

Posted: 13 Nov 2003
Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

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Principal, agent, incentives, other-regarding preferences, inequity aversion, status seeking, team, relative performance, behavioral contract theory

5.

Enterprise Law Conference of 2014: Edited Transcript

Number of pages: 202 Posted: 26 Sep 2014
New York University School of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Hitotsubashi University, University of Missouri School of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, University of Tokyo - Graduate School of Law and Politics, University of California, Berkeley, Independent, Gakushuin University, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Law, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute), University of Tokyo, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nagoya University, Graduate School of lawNagoya University, Graduate School of law, Stanford Law School, Independent, Waseda University - Graduate School of Commerce, Nomura Institute of Capital Markets Research, Harvard Law School, University of Missouri at Columbia, Yale Law School, Waseda University, Independent, Doshisha University, Faculty of Law, Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law, Independent, Independent, Independent, Independent, University of Virginia School of Law, Waseda University - School of Law and University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 373 (159,954)

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6.

Moral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Oct 1998
Shingo Ishiguro, Hideshi Itoh and Hideshi Itoh
Nanzan University - School of Business Administration and Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Downloads 269 (226,263)

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7.

The Firm as a Legal Entity: What Distinguishes Wholly Owned Subsidiaries from Internal Divisions in Japan?

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 18 Jul 2011
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Zenichi Shishido
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University Graduate School of Law
Downloads 175 (339,675)
Citation 2

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8.

Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3533
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 Aug 2011
Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Hodaka Morita
Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hitotsubashi University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 168 (351,941)
Citation 1

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holdup problem, formal contract, relational contract, cooperative investment, fixed-price contract, relation-specific investment, repeated transactions, long-term relationships

Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 23 Aug 2019
Eric S. Chou, Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Chien‐Lung Chen
National Tsing Hua University, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Academia Sinica
Downloads 99 (534,715)

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relational contracts, hidden action, unequal discounting

Relational Incentive Contracts with Hidden Action and Unequal Discounting

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 07 Oct 2024
Eric S. Chou, Hideshi Itoh, Hideshi Itoh and Chien-Lung Chen
National Tsing Hua University, Waseda Business SchoolCESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) and Hubei University of Economics
Downloads 11 (1,158,933)

Abstract:

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relational incentive contracts, hidden action, unequal discounting, agency costs