Gilles Grandjean

Université catholique de Louvain

Place Montesquieu, 3

Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348

Belgium

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

116

SSRN CITATIONS

3

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (3)

Whom are You Talking with? An Experiment on Credibility and Communication Structure

University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 285
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 21 Oct 2014
Université catholique de Louvain, Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis à Bruxelles - CERECUniversità degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS), Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) and Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)
Downloads 35 (567,913)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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cheap talk, coordination, coalitions, experiment

Whom are You Talking With? An Experiment on Credibility and Communication Structure

Core Discussion Paper, 2014/42
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 23 Nov 2016
Université catholique de Louvain, Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis à Bruxelles - CERECUniversità degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS), Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles and Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Downloads 26 (624,937)

Abstract:

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cheap-talk communication; coordination; coalition-proof Nash equilibrium; laboratory experiment

2.

Connections Among Farsighted Agents

FEEM Working Paper No. 30 2009
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 05 Aug 2009
Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Gilles Grandjean and Ana Mauleon
Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain and Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles
Downloads 28 (594,691)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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farsighted players, stability, efficiency, connections model, buyerseller networks

3.

Preferences and Strategic Behavior in Public Goods Games

University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 395
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 19 Dec 2018
Université catholique de Louvain, University of Strasbourg and Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis à Bruxelles - CERECUniversità degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)
Downloads 27 (600,893)

Abstract:

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Voluntary contribution, conditional cooperation, free riding, strategic sophistication