Richard P. McLean

Rutgers University - Department of Economics

Professor

75 Hamilton Street

New Jersey Hall

New Brunswick, NJ 08901

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

20

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2,661

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 25,007

in Total Papers Citations

36

CROSSREF CITATIONS

14

Scholarly Papers (20)

1.

Aggregation of Expert Opinions

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 05 Apr 2005
Dino Gerardi, Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 421 (132,910)
Citation 12

Abstract:

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Information aggregation, Asymmetric information, Cheap talk, Experts

2.

On Price-Taking Behavior in Asymmetric Information Economies

PIER Working Paper No. 04-040
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 18 Oct 2004
Richard P. McLean, James Peck and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 295 (196,755)

Abstract:

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Rational Expections Equilibria, Informational Smallness

3.

Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Interdependent Valuations and Multidimensional Signals

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 15 Aug 2001
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 253 (229,060)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values

4.

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 02 May 2001
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 186 (305,535)
Citation 1

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Asymmetric Information, Incentive Compatibility, Informational Size

5.

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility with Aggregate Uncertainty

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 03 Feb 2003
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 167 (336,020)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Incomplete Information, Informational Size

6.

Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 17 Nov 2003
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 153 (361,759)

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Core, Asymmetric Information, Incentive Compatibility, Exchange Economy

7.

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations

PIER Working Paper No. 06-007
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Mar 2006
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 141 (386,422)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Ex Post Incentive Compatibility

8.

Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of an Economy with Incomplete Information

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 02 May 2001
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 141 (386,422)
Citation 3

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core, incentive compatibility, general equilibrium, asymmetric information

9.

Informational Size and Efficient Auctions, Second Version

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 11 May 2003
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 140 (388,532)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values

10.

Informational Size and Efficient Auctions

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 10 Aug 2002
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 126 (421,641)
Citation 1

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Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values

11.

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 05-024
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Richard P. McLean, Ichiro Obara and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 122 (432,118)
Citation 1

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Communication, Informational size, Perfect Public Equilibrium, Private monitoring, Public monitoring, Repeated games, Robustness

12.

A Very Robust Auction Mechanism

PIER Working Paper No. 18-001
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 17 Jan 2018
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 118 (442,990)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Robustness, Optimal auctions, Incentive Compatibility

13.

Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility Without Negligible Aggregate Uncertainty

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Jan 2002
Andrew Postlewaite and Richard P. McLean
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Rutgers University - Department of Economics
Downloads 116 (448,668)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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14.

Informational Size and Two-Stage Mechanisms

PIER Working Paper No. 15-011
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 06 Mar 2015
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 97 (509,541)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Ex Post Incentive Compatibility, Informational Size

15.

Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 11-029
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 14 Sep 2011
Richard P. McLean, Ichiro Obara and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 90 (534,605)

Abstract:

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Communication, Folk theorem, Informational size, Perfect monitoring, Private monitoring, Public monitoring, Repeated games, Robustness

16.

Implementation with Interdependent Valuations (Second Version)

PIER Working Paper No. 13-005
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 30 Jan 2013
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (691,896)

Abstract:

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Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Ex Post Incentive Compatibility

17.

A Dynamic Non-Direct Implementation Mechanism for Interdependent Value Problems, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 15-023
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 01 Jul 2015
Richard P. McLean and Andrew Postlewaite
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 39 (803,663)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Privacy, Auctions, Incentive Compatibility, Mechanism Design, Interdependent Values, Ex Post Incentive Compatibility, Informational Size

18.

Auction Form Preference and Inefficiency of Asymmetric Discriminatory Auctions

Economics Letters, Vol. 86, No. 1, 2005
Posted: 07 Feb 2012
Octavian Carare, Richard P. McLean and Colin Campbell
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Rutgers University - Department of Economics and East Carolina University

Abstract:

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Multi-unit, discriminatory, auction, equilibrium

19.

Weighted Aumann-Shapley Pricing

Posted: 13 Jan 1999
Richard P. McLean and William W. Sharkey
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

Abstract:

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20.

Alternative Methods for Cost Allocation in Stochastic Service Systems

Posted: 01 Oct 1998
Richard P. McLean and William W. Sharkey
Rutgers University - Department of Economics and Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

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