Philipp Strack

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

549 Evans Hall #3880

Berkeley, CA 94720-3880

United States

http://philippstrack.com

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

21

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4

Scholarly Papers (21)

1.

Until the Bitter End: On Prospect Theory in a Dynamic Context

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 16 Feb 2012 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2015
Sebastian Ebert and Philipp Strack
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 931 (21,649)
Citation 1

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Behavioral Economics, Disposition Effect, Irreversible Investment, Prospect Theory, Skewness Preference, Time-Inconsistency

Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 15 Jul 2014 Last Revised: 08 Jul 2017
Philipp Strack and Paul Viefers
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and A.T. Kearney GmbH
Downloads 672 (33,761)

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Optimal stopping, Dynamic behavior, Regret

Too Proud to Stop: Regret in Dynamic Decisions

DIW Berlin Discussion Paper No. 1401
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 29 Jul 2014 Last Revised: 06 Jul 2017
Paul Viefers and Philipp Strack
A.T. Kearney GmbH and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 68 (311,597)

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Optimal stopping, Dynamic behavior, Regret

3.

Optimal Stopping with Private Information

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2014
Thomas Kruse and Philipp Strack
University of Duisburg-Essen and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 634 (37,125)

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Optimal Stopping, Dynamic Implementability, Posted-Price Mechanism

4.

Stochastic Choice and Optimal Sequential Sampling

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 06 May 2015 Last Revised: 22 Mar 2017
Drew Fudenberg, Philipp Strack and Tomasz Strzalecki
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Harvard Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 629 (37,444)

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5.

Unrealistic Expectations and Misguided Learning

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 16 Dec 2015 Last Revised: 22 Apr 2017
Paul Heidhues, Botond Koszegi and Philipp Strack
ESMT, Central European University (CEU) - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 622 (37,987)

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6.

Gambling in Dynamic Contests

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 18 Dec 2014
Christian Seel and Philipp Strack
Maastricht University and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 469 (54,493)
Citation 1

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discontinuous games, dynamic contests, relative performance pay, risk-taking behavior

7.

Continuous Time Contests with Private Information

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 28 May 2011 Last Revised: 28 Jun 2013
Christian Seel and Philipp Strack
Maastricht University and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 438 (59,231)

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Contests, All-Pay Auctions, Silent Timing Games

8.

Groupthink and the Failure of Information Aggregation in Large Groups

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 24 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 30 Nov 2017
Matan Harel, Elchanan Mossel, Philipp Strack and Omer Tamuz
University of Geneva, University of Pennsylvania - Statistics Department, University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Downloads 433 (60,215)

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Bayesian learning

9.

The Wald Problem and the Equivalence of Sequential Sampling and Static Information Costs

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 23 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 15 Sep 2017
Stephen Morris and Philipp Strack
Princeton University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 381 (70,033)

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Sequential Sampling, Entropy Cost, Information Acquisition

10.
Downloads 354 ( 76,334)
Citation 1

Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 25 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 22 May 2015
Paul Heidhues, Sven Rady and Philipp Strack
ESMT, University of Bonn and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 354 (75,713)
Citation 1

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Strategic Experimentation, Two-Armed Bandit, Bayesian Learning, Information Externality, Mediated Communication, Cheap Talk

Strategic Experimentation with Private Payoffs

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10634
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 01 Jun 2015
Paul Heidhues, Sven Rady and Philipp Strack
ESMT, University of Bonn and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
Citation 1
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Bayesian learning, cheap talk, information externality, mediated communication, strategic experimentation, two-armed bandit

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 257 (107,990)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953R3
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 27 May 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 34 (424,207)

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Dynamic mechanism design, Repeated sales, Stochastic flow, Flat rates, Two-part Tariffs, Leasing

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953RR
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 23 Jan 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (457,566)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales, Impulse response function, Stochastic flow

Dynamic Revenue Maximization: A Continuous Time Approach

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1953R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 01 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Philipp Strack
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 15 (528,605)

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Mechanism design, Dynamic auctions, Repeated sales

12.

Deadlines in Stochastic Contests

Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 52, p. 134-142
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 24 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 11 Nov 2014
Matthias Lang, Christian Seel and Philipp Strack
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich - Faculty of Economics, Maastricht University and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 286 (96,919)

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Contest, All-Pay Auction, Research Tournament

13.

Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 20 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 18 Nov 2016
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 277 (100,336)

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Revenue Management, Strategic Buyers, Name Your Own Price, Mechanism Design

14.

Risk-Taking in Contests: The Impact of Fund-Manager Compensation on Investor Welfare

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 03 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 23 Jun 2016
Philipp Strack
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 255 (109,443)

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Dynamic Contests, Risk-Taking Behavior, All-Pay Contest, Managed Funds, Endogenous Risk, Black-Scholes

15.

Never, Ever Getting Started: On Prospect Theory Without Commitment

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 19 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 29 Jul 2018
Sebastian Ebert and Philipp Strack
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management gemeinnützige GmbH and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 245 (114,428)

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Prospect Theory, Risk-Taking, Skewness Preference, Time- Inconsistency

16.

Active Learning with Misspecified Beliefs

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 09 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 28 Feb 2016
Drew Fudenberg, Gleb Romanyuk and Philipp Strack
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Harvard University and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 209 (133,917)

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17.

Turning Up the Heat: The Demoralizing Effect of Competition in Contests

Number of pages: 73 Posted: 30 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 16 Jan 2018
Dawei Fang, Thomas H. Noe and Philipp Strack
Göteborg University - Center For Finance, University of Oxford - Said Business School and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 200 (143,630)

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all-pay contests, risk-taking, contest structures

18.

A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 09 Jan 2018 Last Revised: 13 Feb 2018
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 176 (156,922)

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19.

Expectation-Based Loss Aversion and Strategic Interaction

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 15 Mar 2017
University of Bonn, University of Bonn - Economic Science Area, Saarland University and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 96 (250,633)

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Non-Cooperative Games, Expectation-Based Loss Aversion, Reference-Dependent Preferences, Mixed Strategies

20.

An Inverse Optimal Stopping Problem for Diffusion Processes

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 28 Apr 2017
Thomas Kruse and Philipp Strack
University of Duisburg-Essen and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 70 (305,570)

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Optimal Stopping, Reflected Stochastic Processes, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Implementability

21.

Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Jan 2015
Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu and Philipp Strack
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (331,279)
Citation 1

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