Aytek Erdil

University of Cambridge

Faculty of Economics

Sidgwick Avenue

Cambridge, CB3 9DD

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

1

DOWNLOADS

46

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 25,123

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 25,123

in Total Papers Citations

8

CROSSREF CITATIONS

30

Scholarly Papers (1)

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 25 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 06 Oct 2010
Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer
University of Cambridge and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 44 (521,460)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

multi-object auction, core, combinatorial auction, package auction, core-selecting auction, Vickrey auction, Vickrey, simultaneous ascending auction, robust design

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer
University of Cambridge and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (824,806)
Citation 4
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

combinatorial auction, core, core-selecting auction, multi-object auction, package auction, robust design, simultaneous ascending auction, Vickrey, Vickrey auction