Chen Li

New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai

1555 Century Ave

Shanghai, Shanghai 200122

China

http://sites.google.com/view/chen-li

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

5

DOWNLOADS

625

SSRN CITATIONS

1

CROSSREF CITATIONS

9

Scholarly Papers (5)

1.

How Well Does Agency Theory Explain Executive Compensation?

Review, Vol. 100, Issue 3, pp. 201-36, 2018, Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper No. 2018-07-01
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 20 Jul 2018 Last Revised: 19 Mar 2020
Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai and Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business
Downloads 224 (159,359)

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Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach

Baruch College Zicklin School of Business Research Paper No. 2018-02-02
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 26 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2019
Chen Li
New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai
Downloads 96 (317,880)

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Moral Hazard, Top Management Team, Executive Compensation, Structural Model

Are Top Management Teams Compensated as Teams? A Structural Modeling Approach

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 22 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2021
Chen Li
New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai
Downloads 40 (500,536)
Citation 4

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Moral Hazard, Top Management Team, Executive Compensation, Structural Model

3.

Political Connections and Tax-Induced Earnings Management: Evidence from China

European Journal of Finance, 2016, 22(4-6)
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 01 Sep 2016
New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai, Peking University - Guanghua School of Management, Peking University - Guanghua School of Management and University of Macau
Downloads 122 (267,622)
Citation 1

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China; earnings management; effective tax rate; political connections; tax policy

4.

Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2015-17
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 27 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 03 Jan 2019
Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai and Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business
Downloads 115 (279,184)

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5.

Was Sarbanes-Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation

Number of pages: 83
Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics, New York University (NYU) - New York University (NYU), Shanghai and Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business
Downloads 28

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