Stephen Morris

MIT

77 Massachusetts Avenue

50 Memorial Drive

Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

United States

http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

97

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32,144

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 376

in Total Papers Citations

444

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1,481

Scholarly Papers (97)

1.

Global Games: Theory and Applications

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1275R
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 3,309 (3,113)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Common Knowledge, Coordination, Currency Crises, Global Games, Higher Order Beliefs, Unique Equilibrium

2.

Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1406; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Imperial College London, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 1,622 (10,361)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Beauty Contests, Bubbles, Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Martingales, Public Information, Asset Prices

3.
Downloads 1,540 ( 11,238)
Citation 96

Robust Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1,137 (17,685)
Citation 31

Abstract:

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Mechanism Design, Common Knowledge, Universal Type Space, Interim Equilibrium, Ex-post Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies

Robust Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421R
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 May 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 403 (72,089)
Citation 21

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Mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex-post equilibrium, Dominant strategies

4.
Downloads 1,423 ( 12,754)
Citation 30

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R3
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 488 (56,996)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 378 (77,606)
Citation 5

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 323 (93,102)
Citation 2

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Correlated Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Robust Predictions, Information Structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R2
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 234 (131,174)
Citation 4

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11867
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 5
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Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure., robust predictions

5.

Liquidity Black Holes

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1434
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 19 Sep 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 889 (25,887)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Liquidity, asset pricing, global games

6.

Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 03 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Atsushi Kajii
MIT and Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Downloads 887 (25,970)
Citation 1

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Higher Order Beliefs Refinements

7.
Downloads 856 ( 27,305)
Citation 18

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 314 (96,094)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 200 (152,774)

Abstract:

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 131 (220,467)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 129 (223,177)

Abstract:

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 82 (305,773)
Citation 16

Abstract:

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

8.

Expectations, Networks, and Conventions

Number of pages: 71 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2018
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Harvard University and MIT
Downloads 769 (31,684)
Citation 11

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networks, incomplete information, centrality, common prior, heterogeneous priors, network game

9.

Justifying Rational Expectations

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-04
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 24 Dec 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 710 (35,325)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Rational Expectations, Common Knowledge

10.

Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching Games

Santa Fe Institute Working Paper No. 97-08-072E
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 29 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 663 (38,706)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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local interaction, incomplete information, higher order beliefs, random matching

11.
Downloads 633 ( 41,229)
Citation 8

Information and Market Power

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 070_2015
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 04 Aug 2015
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann
MIT, Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and HEC Montreal
Downloads 358 (82,770)

Abstract:

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Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 05 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 217 (141,336)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 06 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 58 (370,719)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10791
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, demand function competition, incomplete information, linear best responses, market power, moment restrictions, price impact, quadratic payoffs, supply function competition, volatility

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13295
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 1
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12.
Downloads 624 ( 42,037)
Citation 13

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 383 (76,453)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Information bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 18 Oct 2012
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 125 (228,628)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RRR, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 61 (361,327)
Citation 12

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Dec 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 55 (380,715)

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

13.

The Wald Problem and the Relation of Sequential Sampling and Ex-Ante Information Costs

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 23 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2019
Stephen Morris and Philipp Strack
MIT and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 600 (44,460)
Citation 12

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Sequential Sampling, Entropy Cost, Information Acquisition

14.

Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1402
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 566 (47,743)

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Heterogeneity, Uniqueness, Global Games

15.

Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1241R
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 14 Feb 2002
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 540 (50,635)
Citation 4

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Debt, Coordination, Liquidity, Common Knowledge

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1433
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 370 (79,599)

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Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1433R
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Nov 2004
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 167 (180,019)
Citation 1

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Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

17.

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 530 (51,871)
Citation 8

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Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

18.
Downloads 529 ( 52,002)
Citation 37

Communication and Monetary Policy

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1405
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 352 (84,413)
Citation 7

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Communication, Monetary Policy, Transparency, Common Knowledge

Communication and Monetary Policy

BIS Working Paper No. 123
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Dec 2005
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 177 (171,032)
Citation 1

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Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 282 (107,979)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher Order Preferences, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Sep 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 101 (267,019)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R3
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 62 (358,318)

Abstract:

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 28 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 44 (420,339)
Citation 5

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (518,443)
Citation 3

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

20.

Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1400
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 502 (55,560)

Abstract:

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Moral Hazard, Financial Crisis, International Financial Architecture, Global Games

21.

Higher-Order Expectations

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 16 Dec 2017
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Harvard University and MIT
Downloads 466 (61,175)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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higher-order beliefs, higher-order expectations, networks, common prior, heterogeneous priors

22.

Co-Operation and Timing

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-05
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 23 Nov 2000
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 454 (63,015)
Citation 4

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coordination, common knowledge

23.
Downloads 452 ( 63,342)
Citation 3

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 16-13
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2019
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 423 (67,933)

Abstract:

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Equilibrium Shift; Global Games; Rank Beliefs; Fat Tails; Hysteresis; Equilibrium Selection; Multiple Equilibria

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 06 Mar 2019
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 29 (488,764)
Citation 4

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24.

Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1401
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 422 (68,759)

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Common Knowledge, Coordination, Communication

25.

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1818, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 020-2011, ROBUST MECHANISM, D. Bergemann & S. Morris, eds., World Scientific, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 397 (74,026)
Citation 7

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Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 299 (101,412)
Citation 2

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correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R, Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 May 2014 Last Revised: 22 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 57 (374,008)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 32 (473,110)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

27.

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 384 (76,904)
Citation 3

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

28.

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1336
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 27 Nov 2001
David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris and Ady Pauzner
Iowa State University - Department of Economics, MIT and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 381 (77,570)
Citation 2

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Equilibrium Selection, Global Games, Strategic Complementarities, Supermodular Games

29.
Downloads 379 ( 78,038)
Citation 1

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 215 (142,550)

Abstract:

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Iterative Deletion, Direct Mechanism

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561R
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 May 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 164 (182,826)

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

30.
Downloads 370 ( 80,301)
Citation 3

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973R
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 14 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 194 (157,308)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 067_2014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 125 (228,628)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief Free Rationalizatility

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 51 (394,413)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

31.

Contagious Adverse Selection

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 001-2010
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 367 (81,081)
Citation 15

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32.

The Cnbc Effect: Welfare Effects of Public Information

Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1312
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Aug 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 355 (84,236)

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Transparency, Disclosures, Coordination, Overreaction To Public Information

33.

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1519
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 341 (88,240)

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Interative Deletion, Dominant Strategies

34.
Downloads 338 ( 89,103)
Citation 47

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 081_2016
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 02 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 337 (88,753)
Citation 53

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Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

International Economic Review, Vol. 57, Issue 4, pp. 1135-1148, 2016
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Nov 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 1 (689,218)
Citation 1
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35.

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1423
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 10 Jun 2003
Hanming Fang and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 329 (91,796)

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Multidimensional Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, Allocative Efficiency, Information Acquisition

36.

Interim Rationalizability

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Drew Fudenberg, Eddie Dekel and Stephen Morris
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Northwestern University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 325 (93,016)
Citation 1

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rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, university type space

37.

Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 069_2015
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 May 2015 Last Revised: 05 Dec 2015
Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 324 (93,369)
Citation 6

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38.

Topologies on Types

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2093
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and MIT
Downloads 297 (102,722)
Citation 28

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rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, universal type space, strategic topology

39.

Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 27 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 29 May 2019
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and Duke University - Finance
Downloads 291 (105,813)
Citation 4

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coordination, endogenous information acquisition, continuous stochastic choice, higher order beliefs

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 161 (185,725)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 34 (463,483)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 29 (488,764)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 26 (506,090)
Citation 2

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 23 (524,683)
Citation 2

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Citation 3
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

41.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 263 (117,283)
Citation 1

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2027
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 223 (137,592)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (458,812)
Citation 8

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

43.

Policy Conditionality

PIER Working Paper No. 97-013
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Stephen Coate
MIT and Cornell University - Department of Economics
Downloads 255 (120,706)
Citation 1

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Policy Conditionality, Transfers, Policy Persistence, Political Economy

44.
Downloads 233 (132,815)
Citation 15

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 131 (221,794)
Citation 10

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 May 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 102 (265,236)
Citation 1

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

45.

Ex Post Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1502
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 226 (136,238)
Citation 2

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Ex Post Equilibrium, Implementation, Single Crossing, Interdependent Values

46.

Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 43-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 13 Oct 2012
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 223 (138,017)
Citation 5

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Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RR
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 178 (170,149)
Citation 3

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RRR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Apr 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 39 (441,046)
Citation 12

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

48.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 212 (144,761)

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Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

49.

Best Response Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1377
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
MIT and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 212 (144,761)

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Best Response Equivalence, Duality, Farkas' Lemma, Potential Games

50.
Downloads 208 (148,065)
Citation 5

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 125 (228,628)
Citation 1

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 83 (305,773)
Citation 4

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

51.

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.1394
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 30 Jan 2003
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
MIT and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 206 (148,747)

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Incomplete Information, Potential, Refinements, Robustness

52.
Downloads 204 (150,157)
Citation 2

Information and Volatility

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 056-2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 07 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 163 (183,763)
Citation 2

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Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 03 Dec 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 41 (432,456)
Citation 1

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incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

53.

Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 075_2016
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 197 (155,949)
Citation 2

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market liquidity, risk-taking channel, runs

54.

Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 010-2011
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 194 (157,437)
Citation 4

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55.
Downloads 192 (158,943)
Citation 10

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928R
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jun 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 143 (205,239)
Citation 8

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Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928RR
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 49 (401,642)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Idiosyncratic shocks, Aggregate shocks, Volatility, Confounding information, Moment restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs, Bayes correlated equilibrium

56.

Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Jun 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 188 (161,954)

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-Post incentive compatibility

57.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 173 (174,458)
Citation 11

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optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 138 (211,356)
Citation 2

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First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 35 (458,812)
Citation 2

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First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

59.

Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 079_2016
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 06 May 2016
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and Duke University - Finance
Downloads 154 (192,728)
Citation 4

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coordination, endogenous information acquisition, costly local distinguishability, higher order beliefs

60.

Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1271R
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 145 (202,511)

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Electronic Mail, Common Knowledge, Coordination

61.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 142 (205,927)

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Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

62.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822R
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 129 (222,399)
Citation 3

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

63.

Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2066
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 128 (223,681)
Citation 1

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief-Free Rationalizability

64.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1479R; PIER Working Paper No. 05-014
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 127 (224,996)
Citation 15

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

65.

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1600
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 121 (233,378)

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Dynamic auction, Rationalizability, Extensive form, Uniqueness, Strategic uncertainty

66.

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Apr 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 120 (234,824)

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

67.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1479; PIER Working Paper No. 04-033
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 119 (236,315)

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

68.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 114 (243,807)
Citation 1

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Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

69.

Redemption Risk and Cash Hoarding by Asset Managers

BIS Working Paper No. 608
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 01 Feb 2017
Stephen Morris, Ilhyock Shim and Hyun Song Shin
MIT, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 113 (245,335)
Citation 4

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asset manager, bond market liquidity, cash hoarding, global game, investor redemption, strategic complementarity

70.
Downloads 113 (245,335)
Citation 1

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 113 (246,538)
Citation 2

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Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

71.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1451; PIER Working Paper No. 04-004
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 106 (256,603)

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Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

72.

Information and Interaction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2088
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 97 (272,471)

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Networks, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

73.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 97 (272,471)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

74.

Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 061-2014
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 24 Apr 2014
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 95 (276,256)
Citation 2

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common knowledge, higher order beliefs, timing frictions, Calvo frictions, coordination

75.

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1628
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 17 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 87 (292,169)

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Common prior, Correlated equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, Uniqueness

76.

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561RR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 74 (321,771)
Citation 2

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

77.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 68 (336,997)
Citation 8

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

78.

The Robustness of Robust Implementation

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 002-2010
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn and Stephen Morris
Independent and MIT
Downloads 68 (336,997)

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Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 38 (445,459)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 24 (518,443)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

80.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 59 (362,414)
Citation 4

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Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 017-2011
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 11 Jul 2011
Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux
MIT, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 55 (380,715)

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Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 57-67, 2012
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 10 Feb 2012
Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux
MIT, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 3 (664,230)
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82.

Inspiring Regime Change

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 06 Oct 2018
Stephen Morris and Mehdi Shadmehr
MIT and University of Chicago
Downloads 56 (371,778)
Citation 4

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83.

Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices

BIS Working Paper No. 692
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 25 Jan 2018
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 54 (378,119)
Citation 3

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central bank communication, market expectations, crowding out

84.

First-Price Auctions with General Information Structures: A Short Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2132
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 53 (381,342)

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First-price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

85.

Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609RR
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 07 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 41 (423,645)
Citation 1

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationaliz¿ability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 28 (500,147)

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Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Revenue equivalence, Adverse selection, Neutral selection, Advantageous selection

Countering the Winner’s Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2147R (2019)
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 04 Jun 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 12 (597,687)

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Optimal auction, Common values, Maximum game, Posted price, Reserve price, Revenue equivalence

87.

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1846, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 30-2012
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (427,570)
Citation 1

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Mechanism Design, Robust mechanism design, Efficient auctions, Interdepedent types, Partial implementation, Full implementation

88.
Downloads 39 (431,703)
Citation 2

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2133
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 39 (441,046)
Citation 1

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Revenue guarantee, Common values, Affiliated values, Revenue equivalence, Revenue ranking, First-price auction, Second-price auction, English auction

Revenue Guarantee Equivalence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12964
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 05 Jun 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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affiliated values, common values, English auction, First-price auction, revenue equivalence, Revenue guarantee, revenue ranking, second-price auction

89.

Welfare Effects of Public Information

Bundesbank Series 1 Discussion Paper No. 2000,07
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 08 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 10 (586,996)

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90.

Information, Market Power and Price Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2200, September 2019
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Sep 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, HEC Montreal and MIT
Downloads 5 (619,842)

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Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Price Volatility

91.

Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13332
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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advantageous selection, Adverse Selection, common values, maximum game, neutral selection, Optimal auction, posted price, revenue equivalence

92.

Fiscal Stabilization and Exchange Rate Instability: A Theoretical Approach and Some Policy Conclusions Using Mexican Data

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 329-356, August 1990
Posted: 19 Apr 2006
Andrew Feltenstein and Stephen Morris
Georgia State University - Department of Economics and MIT

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Fiscal stabilization, Mexico, exchange rates

93.

Political Correctness

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, April 2001
Posted: 01 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT

Abstract:

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94.

Contagion

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2000
Posted: 15 Jan 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT

Abstract:

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95.

Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited

International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 28, Iss. 3, August 1999
Posted: 26 Oct 1999
Stephen Morris
MIT

Abstract:

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96.

Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information

Posted: 01 Sep 1999
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
Imperial College London, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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97.

A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2025
Posted: 07 Apr 1999
Hyun Song Shin and Stephen Morris
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and MIT

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