Stephen Morris

MIT

77 Massachusetts Avenue

50 Memorial Drive

Cambridge, MA 02139-4307

United States

http://https://economics.mit.edu/faculty/semorris

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

108

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Scholarly Papers (108)

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1.

Global Games: Theory and Applications

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1275R
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 4,479 (3,821)
Citation 29

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Common Knowledge, Coordination, Currency Crises, Global Games, Higher Order Beliefs, Unique Equilibrium

2.

Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1406; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Imperial College London, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 1,770 (17,107)
Citation 5

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Beauty Contests, Bubbles, Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Martingales, Public Information, Asset Prices

3.

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Downloads 1,645 (19,170)
Citation 136

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R3
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 25 Mar 2018
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 603 (77,058)
Citation 4

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 417 (121,219)
Citation 4

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 346 (149,346)
Citation 6

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Correlated Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Robust Predictions, Information Structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R2
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 279 (187,633)
Citation 2

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11867
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
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Citation 116
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Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure., robust predictions

4.

Robust Mechanism Design

Downloads 1,605 (19,889)
Citation 124

Robust Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 1,181 (30,941)
Citation 33

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Mechanism Design, Common Knowledge, Universal Type Space, Interim Equilibrium, Ex-post Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies

Robust Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 May 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 424 (118,553)
Citation 48

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Mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex-post equilibrium, Dominant strategies

5.

The Wald Problem and the Relation of Sequential Sampling and Ex-Ante Information Costs

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 23 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2019
Stephen Morris and Philipp Strack
MIT and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 1,439 (23,568)
Citation 25

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Sequential Sampling, Entropy Cost, Information Acquisition

6.

Expectations, Networks, and Conventions

Number of pages: 71 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 19 Jan 2018
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University and MIT
Downloads 1,134 (33,287)
Citation 19

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networks, incomplete information, centrality, common prior, heterogeneous priors, network game

7.

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Downloads 1,042 (37,532)
Citation 109

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 341 (151,673)
Citation 3

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 242 (216,447)
Citation 1

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First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 184 (279,685)
Citation 9

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 152 (330,132)
Citation 3

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 123 (390,323)
Citation 54

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First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

8.

Liquidity Black Holes

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1434
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 19 Sep 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 1,001 (39,726)
Citation 19

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Liquidity, asset pricing, global games

9.

Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 03 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Atsushi Kajii
MIT and Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Downloads 924 (44,425)
Citation 2

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Higher Order Beliefs Refinements

10.

Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching Games

Santa Fe Institute Working Paper No. 97-08-072E
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 29 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 759 (58,058)
Citation 7

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local interaction, incomplete information, higher order beliefs, random matching

11.

Justifying Rational Expectations

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-04
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 24 Dec 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 757 (58,368)
Citation 1

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Rational Expectations, Common Knowledge

12.

Higher-Order Expectations

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 16 Dec 2017
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University and MIT
Downloads 741 (59,981)
Citation 4

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higher-order beliefs, higher-order expectations, networks, common prior, heterogeneous priors

13.

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Downloads 734 (60,692)
Citation 58

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 420 (119,855)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Information bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 18 Oct 2012
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 157 (321,176)
Citation 1

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RRR, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 79 (528,699)
Citation 45

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Dec 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 78 (532,865)

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Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

14.

Information and Market Power

Downloads 726 (61,602)
Citation 13

Information and Market Power

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 070_2015
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 04 Aug 2015
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann
MIT, Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
Downloads 383 (133,416)

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Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 05 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 250 (209,623)
Citation 8

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 06 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 93 (477,143)
Citation 3

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Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10791
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, demand function competition, incomplete information, linear best responses, market power, moment restrictions, price impact, quadratic payoffs, supply function competition, volatility

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13295
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 12 Nov 2018
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 0
Citation 3
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15.

Communication and Monetary Policy

Downloads 631 (73,777)
Citation 46

Communication and Monetary Policy

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1405
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 417 (120,894)
Citation 11

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Communication, Monetary Policy, Transparency, Common Knowledge

Communication and Monetary Policy

BIS Working Paper No. 123
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Dec 2005
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 214 (243,719)
Citation 2

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16.

Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1402
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 629 (74,066)
Citation 1

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Heterogeneity, Uniqueness, Global Games

17.

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Downloads 581 (81,671)
Citation 18

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 393 (129,522)
Citation 4

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Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Nov 2004
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 188 (274,435)
Citation 4

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Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

18.

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Downloads 579 (82,398)
Citation 11

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 298 (175,747)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher Order Preferences, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Sep 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 116 (410,348)
Citation 3

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Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R3
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 75 (545,505)

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 28 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (638,003)
Citation 5

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 34 (785,786)
Citation 3

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Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

19.

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 573 (83,145)
Citation 11

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Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

20.

Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1241R
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 14 Feb 2002
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 569 (83,874)
Citation 33

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Debt, Coordination, Liquidity, Common Knowledge

21.

Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice

Downloads 555 (86,543)
Citation 5

Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 27 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2021
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and UCL
Downloads 555 (85,549)
Citation 3

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coordination, endogenous information acquisition, continuous stochastic choice

Coordination and Continuous Stochastic Choice

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16495
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 27 Sep 2021
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and UCL
Downloads 0
Citation 3
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continuous stochastic choice, coordination, endogenous information acquisition

22.

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

Downloads 531 (91,493)
Citation 9

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 16-13
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Dec 2016 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2019
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 474 (103,936)
Citation 1

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Equilibrium Shift; Global Games; Rank Beliefs; Fat Tails; Hysteresis; Equilibrium Selection; Multiple Equilibria

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 06 Mar 2019
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 57 (632,441)
Citation 9

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23.

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 522 (93,448)
Citation 15

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

24.

Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1400
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 515 (94,961)
Citation 3

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Moral Hazard, Financial Crisis, International Financial Architecture, Global Games

25.

Co-Operation and Timing

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-05
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 23 Nov 2000
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 487 (101,677)
Citation 5

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coordination, common knowledge

26.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Downloads 479 (103,721)
Citation 7

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 352 (146,571)
Citation 3

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correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R, Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 May 2014 Last Revised: 22 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 75 (545,505)
Citation 5

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Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 52 (661,158)
Citation 4

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

27.

Implementation via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games

Number of pages: 69 Posted: 12 Nov 2020 Last Revised: 05 Dec 2023
Stephen Morris, Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi
MIT, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 466 (107,435)
Citation 6

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Information design, supermodular game, smallest equilibrium implementation, sequential obedience, potential game

28.

Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 437 (115,542)

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Common Knowledge, Coordination, Communication

29.

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Downloads 434 (116,496)
Citation 3

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973R
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 14 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 227 (230,462)
Citation 1

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 067_2014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 138 (356,980)
Citation 2

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief Free Rationalizatility

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 69 (571,928)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

30.

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 27 Nov 2001
David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris and Ady Pauzner
Iowa State University - Department of Economics, MIT and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 431 (117,475)
Citation 18

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Equilibrium Selection, Global Games, Strategic Complementarities, Supermodular Games

31.

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1818, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 020-2011, ROBUST MECHANISM, D. Bergemann & S. Morris, eds., World Scientific, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 429 (118,104)
Citation 8

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Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

32.

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Downloads 409 (124,847)
Citation 1

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 235 (222,803)

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Iterative Deletion, Direct Mechanism

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561R
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 May 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 174 (293,947)

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

33.

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 081_2016
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 02 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 404 (126,610)
Citation 60

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34.

Contagious Adverse Selection

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 001-2010
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 402 (127,353)
Citation 20

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35.

The Cnbc Effect: Welfare Effects of Public Information

Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1312
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Aug 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 397 (129,580)

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Transparency, Disclosures, Coordination, Overreaction To Public Information

36.

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 372 (138,975)

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Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Interative Deletion, Dominant Strategies

37.

Topologies on Types

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2093
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and MIT
Downloads 366 (141,440)
Citation 29

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rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, universal type space, strategic topology

38.

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1423
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 10 Jun 2003
Hanming Fang and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 359 (144,533)
Citation 7

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Multidimensional Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, Allocative Efficiency, Information Acquisition

39.

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Downloads 357 (145,407)
Citation 39

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2027
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 252 (207,962)

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Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 105 (438,762)
Citation 29

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Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

40.

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Downloads 355 (146,303)
Citation 53

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 176 (290,945)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 50 (673,029)
Citation 2

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 44 (711,797)
Citation 2

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 43 (718,542)
Citation 1

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First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 41 (732,817)
Citation 2

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First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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Citation 6
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Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

41.

Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 069_2015
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 May 2015 Last Revised: 05 Dec 2015
Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin and Muhamet Yildiz
MIT, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 353 (147,160)
Citation 9

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42.

Interim Rationalizability

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Drew Fudenberg, Eddie Dekel and Stephen Morris
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Northwestern University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 353 (147,160)
Citation 11

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rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, university type space

43.

Inspiring Regime Change

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 06 Oct 2018 Last Revised: 06 Sep 2022
Stephen Morris and Mehdi Shadmehr
MIT and University of Chicago
Downloads 326 (160,352)
Citation 7

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Regime Change, Inspiration, Leadership, Vanguard, Mechanism Design, Global Games

44.

Policy Conditionality

PIER Working Paper No. 97-013
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Stephen Coate
MIT and Cornell University - Department of Economics
Downloads 297 (176,810)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Policy Conditionality, Transfers, Policy Persistence, Political Economy

45.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 277 (189,999)
Citation 1

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

46.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 276 (190,713)
Citation 18

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optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

47.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Downloads 271 (195,003)
Citation 85

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RR
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 211 (248,044)
Citation 4

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RRR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Apr 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 60 (616,016)
Citation 51

Abstract:

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

48.

Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 43-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 13 Oct 2012
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 269 (195,711)
Citation 5

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49.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 259 (203,297)
Citation 3

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Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

50.

Information and Volatility

Downloads 257 (205,655)
Citation 1

Information and Volatility

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 056-2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 07 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 190 (271,834)
Citation 1

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Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 03 Dec 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 67 (586,165)

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incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

51.

Rationalizable Implementation

Downloads 255 (206,528)
Citation 19

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, MIT and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 146 (341,297)
Citation 11

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 May 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 109 (426,999)
Citation 3

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Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

52.

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Downloads 253 (208,042)
Citation 13

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 138 (356,980)
Citation 1

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 115 (410,348)
Citation 11

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Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

53.

Ex Post Implementation

Number of pages: 63 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 251 (209,676)
Citation 1

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Ex Post Equilibrium, Implementation, Single Crossing, Interdependent Values

54.

Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 075_2016
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 249 (212,102)
Citation 7

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market liquidity, risk-taking channel, runs

55.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Downloads 246 (214,675)
Citation 7

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 191 (271,834)
Citation 6

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First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 55 (643,614)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

56.

Information and Volatility

Downloads 238 (220,824)
Citation 19

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928R
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jun 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 169 (301,436)
Citation 16

Abstract:

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Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928RR
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 69 (571,928)
Citation 2

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Incomplete information, Idiosyncratic shocks, Aggregate shocks, Volatility, Confounding information, Moment restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs, Bayes correlated equilibrium

57.

Best Response Equivalence

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
MIT and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 238 (220,824)
Citation 2

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Best Response Equivalence, Duality, Farkas' Lemma, Potential Games

58.

Information and Interaction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2088
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile and MIT
Downloads 236 (222,689)
Citation 2

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Networks, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

59.

Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 010-2011
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
MIT and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 225 (233,111)
Citation 4

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60.

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 30 Jan 2003
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
MIT and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 223 (235,084)
Citation 6

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Incomplete Information, Potential, Refinements, Robustness

61.

Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Jun 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 214 (244,391)

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-Post incentive compatibility

62.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822R
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 187 (276,079)
Citation 4

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Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

63.

Repression and Repertoires

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 30 Mar 2021
Stephen Morris and Mehdi Shadmehr
MIT and University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Department of Public Policy
Downloads 178 (288,290)

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Repertoires, Contentious Performances, Repression, Leadership, Tactics, Regime Change, Mechanism Design, Global Games

64.

Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 079_2016
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 25 Aug 2021
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
MIT and UCL
Downloads 177 (289,748)
Citation 8

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coordination, endogenous information acquisition, costly local distinguishability, higher order beliefs

65.

Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 168 (302,991)
Citation 2

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Electronic Mail, Common Knowledge, Coordination

66.

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Downloads 167 (304,593)
Citation 1

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162R, 2019
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Feb 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 130 (374,004)

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

Counterfactuals with Latent Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2162 (2019)
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 31 Jan 2019
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 37 (762,453)
Citation 1

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Counterfactuals, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure, Type space, Linear program

67.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 162 (312,570)

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Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

68.

Competition and Public Information: A Note

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2234
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 15 May 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 156 (322,706)

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Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

69.

Redemption Risk and Cash Hoarding by Asset Managers

BIS Working Paper No. 608
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 01 Feb 2017
Stephen Morris, Ilhyock Shim and Hyun Song Shin
MIT, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 149 (335,188)
Citation 40

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asset manager, bond market liquidity, cash hoarding, global game, investor redemption, strategic complementarity

70.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 144 (344,458)
Citation 15

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

71.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 143 (346,402)
Citation 2

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

72.

Search, Information, and Prices

Downloads 141 (350,279)
Citation 6

Search, Information, and Prices

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2224
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 19 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 57 (632,441)

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Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information, and Prices

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2224R
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 15 May 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 51 (667,084)
Citation 5

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Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, "Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information, and Prices

University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper No. 2020-23
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 24 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 33 (793,948)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Search, Price Competition, Bertrand Competition, \Law of One Price", Price Count, Price Quote, Information Structure, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Search, Information and Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14521
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 25 Mar 2020
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics and MIT
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Law of One Price, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Bertrand Competition, information structure, price competition, Price Count, Price Quote, search

73.

Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2066
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 141 (350,279)
Citation 4

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Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief-Free Rationalizability

74.

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Apr 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 138 (356,171)

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Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

75.

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Downloads 137 (358,176)
Citation 1

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 136 (361,167)
Citation 3

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Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
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common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

76.

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1600
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 136 (360,261)

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Dynamic auction, Rationalizability, Extensive form, Uniqueness, Strategic uncertainty

77.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 135 (362,231)
Citation 3

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Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

78.

Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 061-2014
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 24 Apr 2014
Stephen Morris
MIT
Downloads 129 (375,019)
Citation 2

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common knowledge, higher order beliefs, timing frictions, Calvo frictions, coordination

79.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 120 (395,953)

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Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

80.

Implementation via Information Design using Global Games

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 09 Jul 2022
Stephen Morris, Daisuke Oyama and Satoru Takahashi
MIT, University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 119 (398,368)
Citation 2

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Information design, supermodular game, smallest equilibrium implementation, global game, potential game

81.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 117 (403,264)
Citation 6

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Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

82.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 113 (413,683)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

83.

Central Bank Forward Guidance and the Signal Value of Market Prices

BIS Working Paper No. 692
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 25 Jan 2018
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
MIT and Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
Downloads 107 (430,301)
Citation 6

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central bank communication, market expectations, crowding out