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Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Professor

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021

United States

  • Princeton University - Department of Economics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

90

DOWNLOADS
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Top 690

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26,869

CITATIONS
Rank 537

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 537

in Total Papers Citations

904

Scholarly Papers (90)

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1.

Global Games: Theory and Applications

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1275R
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 2,379 (3,013)
Citation 154

Abstract:

Common Knowledge, Coordination, Currency Crises, Global Games, Higher Order Beliefs, Unique Equilibrium

2.

Robust Mechanism Design

Downloads 1,515 ( 9,030)
Citation 63

Robust Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,118 (14,398)
Citation 63

Abstract:

Mechanism Design, Common Knowledge, Universal Type Space, Interim Equilibrium, Ex-post Equilibrium, Dominant Strategies

Robust Mechanism Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1421R
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 20 May 2004
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 397 (60,035)
Citation 63

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex-post equilibrium, Dominant strategies

3.

Beauty Contests, Bubbles and Iterated Expectations in Asset Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1406; AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Imperial College London, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 1,507 (8,652)
Citation 83

Abstract:

Beauty Contests, Bubbles, Noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium, Martingales, Public Information, Asset Prices

4.

Liquidity Black Holes

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1434
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 19 Sep 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 811 (21,621)
Citation 68

Abstract:

Liquidity, asset pricing, global games

5.

Refinements and Higher Order Beliefs: A Unified Survey

Northwestern Center Working Paper No. 1197
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 03 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Atsushi Kajii
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University
Downloads 806 (22,948)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Higher Order Beliefs Refinements

6.

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Downloads 781 ( 25,046)

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RR
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Apr 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 291 (86,212)

Abstract:

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 052-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 16 May 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 190 (133,493)

Abstract:

First Degree Price Discrimination, Second Degree Price Discrimination, Third Degree Price Discrimination, Private Information, Privacy, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Concavification

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 16 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 124 (192,756)

Abstract:

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896R
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Jul 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 104 (219,745)

Abstract:

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium

The Limits of Price Discrimination

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1896RRR
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 72 (278,494)

Abstract:

First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Concavification

7.

Justifying Rational Expectations

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-04
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 24 Dec 2001
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 644 (30,231)

Abstract:

Rational Expectations, Common Knowledge

8.

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Downloads 597 ( 36,228)
Citation 3

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Sep 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 375 (64,237)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Information bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RR
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 18 Oct 2012
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 117 (201,505)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821RRR, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 023-2011
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 20 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 08 May 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (318,559)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1821R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 15 Dec 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 49 (339,816)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Correlated equilibrium, Robustness to private information, Moments restrictions, Identification, Informations bounds

9.

Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching Games

Santa Fe Institute Working Paper No. 97-08-072E
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 29 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 578 (34,198)
Citation 3

Abstract:

local interaction, incomplete information, higher order beliefs, random matching

10.

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Downloads 529 ( 42,414)
Citation 5

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1433
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 365 (66,292)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

Risk and Wealth in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1433R
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Nov 2004
Bernardo Guimaraes and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 164 (152,769)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Currency crisis, sunspots, global games, risk aversion, wealth, portfolio

11.

Heterogeneity and Uniqueness in Interaction Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1402
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 499 (41,731)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Heterogeneity, Uniqueness, Global Games

12.

Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1241R
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 14 Feb 2002
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 490 (43,453)
Citation 83

Abstract:

Debt, Coordination, Liquidity, Common Knowledge

13.

Communication and Monetary Policy

Downloads 489 ( 46,976)
Citation 35

Communication and Monetary Policy

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1405
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Mar 2003
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 337 (72,902)
Citation 35

Abstract:

Communication, Monetary Policy, Transparency, Common Knowledge

Communication and Monetary Policy

BIS Working Paper No. 123
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Dec 2005
Jeffery D. Amato, Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Goldman Sachs International, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 152 (163,130)
Citation 35

Abstract:

14.

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Downloads 480 ( 47,963)
Citation 3

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 008-2014
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 22 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 276 (91,430)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Interdependent Preferences, Higher Order Preferences, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Sep 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Department of Economics
Downloads 98 (229,216)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Interdependent Preferences, Higher-Order Preference Hierarchy, Universal Type Space, Strategic Distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R3
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 46 (349,250)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Hierarchy of Preferences, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772R
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 28 Feb 2011
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (370,054)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1772RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 20 Jul 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 20 (464,834)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Interdependent preferences, Higher-order preference hierarchy, Universal type space, Strategic distinguishability

15.

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1629
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 19 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 480 (45,090)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, Rationalizability, Ex post equilibrium, Belief free, Types, Payo types, Belief types, Supermodular games, Potential games

16.

Catalytic Finance: When Does it Work?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1400
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 478 (46,250)
Citation 31

Abstract:

Moral Hazard, Financial Crisis, International Financial Architecture, Global Games

17.

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Downloads 458 ( 50,828)

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Feb 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 258 (98,262)

Abstract:

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 28 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 200 (127,230)

Abstract:

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Correlated Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Robust Predictions, Information Structure

Information Design: A Unified Perspective

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11867
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Mar 2017
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

Bayesian persuasion, correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, information design, information structure., robust predictions

18.

Co-operation and Timing

CARESS Working Paper No. 95-05
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 23 Nov 2000
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 414 (54,512)
Citation 4

Abstract:

coordination, common knowledge

19.

Information and Market Power

Downloads 402 ( 59,718)

Information and Market Power

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 070_2015
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 04 Aug 2015
Stephen Morris, Dirk Bergemann and Tibor Heumann
Princeton University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 263 (96,282)

Abstract:

Demand Function Competition, Supply Function Competition, Price Impact, Market Power, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information and Market Power

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2017
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 05 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 139 (175,860)

Abstract:

Demand function competition, Supply function competition, Price impact, Market power, Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, Moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Market Power

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10791
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

Bayes correlated equilibrium, demand function competition, incomplete information, linear best responses, market power, moment restrictions, price impact, quadratic payoffs, supply function competition, volatility

20.

Coordination, Communication and Common Knowledge: A Retrospective on the Electronic Mail Game

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1401
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Feb 2003
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 389 (58,595)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Common Knowledge, Coordination, Communication

21.

Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1818, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 020-2011, ROBUST MECHANISM, D. Bergemann & S. Morris, eds., World Scientific, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 19 Aug 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 380 (63,815)
Citation 58

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Robust mechanism design, Common knowledge, Universal type space, Interim equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Dominant strategies, Rationalizability, Partial implementation, Full implementation, Robust implementation

22.

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Downloads 372 ( 65,446)
Citation 13

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 13 Mar 2006
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 211 (120,748)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Iterative Deletion, Direct Mechanism

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561R
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 May 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 161 (155,186)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

23.

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1336
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 27 Nov 2001
David M. Frankel, Stephen Morris and Ady Pauzner
Iowa State University - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics
Downloads 367 (65,249)
Citation 41

Abstract:

Equilibrium Selection, Global Games, Strategic Complementarities, Supermodular Games

24.

Contagious Adverse Selection

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 001-2010
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 359 (68,243)
Citation 10

Abstract:

25.

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Downloads 332 ( 74,761)

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973R
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 14 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 166 (151,115)

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 067_2014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 16 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 120 (197,628)

Abstract:

Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief Free Rationalizatility

Informational Robustness and Solution Concepts

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Dec 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 46 (349,188)

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Informational robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Interim corrrelated rationalizability, Belief free rationalizability

26.

The CNBC Effect: Welfare Effects of Public Information

Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1312
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Aug 2001
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 330 (71,241)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Transparency, Disclosures, Coordination, Overreaction To Public Information

27.

Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 024-2011
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Oct 2011
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 329 (68,886)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

28.

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Downloads 326 ( 76,247)

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 254 (99,877)

Abstract:

correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909R, Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 054-2013
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 May 2014 Last Revised: 22 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 49 (339,761)

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, incomplete information, robust predictions, information structure, sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

The Comparison of Information Structures in Games: Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and Individual Sufficiency

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (447,455)

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

29.

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

Downloads 320 ( 77,863)
Citation 24

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 081_2016
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 02 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 319 (77,645)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Illiquidity Component of Credit Risk

International Economic Review, Vol. 57, Issue 4, pp. 1135-1148, 2016
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Nov 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 1 (580,002)
Citation 24
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Abstract:

30.

Multidimensional Private Value Auctions

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1423
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 10 Jun 2003
Hanming Fang and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 320 (76,247)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Multidimensional Auctions, Revenue Equivalence, Allocative Efficiency, Information Acquisition

31.

Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1519
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 23 Jun 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 315 (74,761)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Mechanism Design, Implementation, Robustness, Common Knowledge, Interim Equilibrium, Interative Deletion, Dominant Strategies

32.

Interim Rationalizability

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Drew Fudenberg, Eddie Dekel and Stephen Morris
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 299 (80,631)

Abstract:

rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, university type space

33.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 256 (98,725)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Markov, bounded recall, purification

34.

Topologies on Types

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2093
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and Stephen Morris
Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 255 (91,183)

Abstract:

rationalizability, incomplete information, common knowledge, universal type space, strategic topology

35.

Policy Conditionality

PIER Working Paper No. 97-013
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
Stephen Morris and Stephen Coate
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Cornell University - Department of Economics
Downloads 244 (102,106)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Policy Conditionality, Transfers, Policy Persistence, Political Economy

36.

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Downloads 242 (105,551)

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 071_2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 11 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 153 (162,153)

Abstract:

First price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price, entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018
Number of pages: 102 Posted: 12 Aug 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (425,379)

Abstract:

First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price, Entry fee

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 25 Nov 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 23 (447,455)

Abstract:

First price auction, Information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Private values, Interdependent values, Common values, Revenue, Surplus, Welfare bounds, Reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R2
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 May 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 21 (458,931)

Abstract:

First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2018R3
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 29 Sep 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 17 (482,308)

Abstract:

First-price auction, information structure, Bayes correlated equilibrium, private values, interdependent values, common values, revenue, surplus, welfare bounds, reserve price

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10792
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (579,951)
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Abstract:

Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, first price auctions, information structure, interdependent values, private values, revenue, welfare bounds

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11782
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
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Abstract:

Bayes correlated equilibrium, common values, First-price auction, information structure, interdependent values, private values, reserve price., revenue, surplus, welfare bounds

37.

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Downloads 239 (106,957)

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2027
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 210 (121,334)

Abstract:

Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Information structure

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion and Bayes Correlated Equilibrium

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 076_2016
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 29 (415,562)

Abstract:

Information Design, Bayesian Persuasion, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Information

38.

Rationalizable Implementation

Downloads 224 (114,193)
Citation 6

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697R
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 05 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Olivier Tercieux
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 125 (191,544)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

Rationalizable Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1697
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 May 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 99 (227,589)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Implementation, Complete information, Rationalizability, Maskin monotonicity

39.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Downloads 204 (125,060)

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RR
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 171 (147,165)

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures in Games

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1909RRR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 16 Apr 2015
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (397,567)

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Bayes Nash equilibrium, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Robust predictions, Information structure, Sufficiency, Blackwell ordering

40.

Ex Post Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1502
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 202 (121,692)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Ex Post Equilibrium, Implementation, Single Crossing, Interdependent Values

41.

Best Response Equivalence

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1377
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 200 (123,313)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Best Response Equivalence, Duality, Farkas' Lemma, Potential Games

42.

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Downloads 194 (131,036)
Citation 10

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Jun 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 121 (196,434)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1666R
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2010
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 73 (276,287)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Dominant strategies

43.

Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No.1394
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 30 Jan 2003
Stephen Morris and Takashi Ui
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Yokohama National University - Department of Economics
Downloads 193 (128,081)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Incomplete Information, Potential, Refinements, Robustness

44.

Information and Volatility

Downloads 191 (132,932)
Citation 1

Information and Volatility

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 056-2013
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 07 Dec 2013 Last Revised: 21 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 154 (161,249)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

Information, Interdependence, and Interaction: Where Does the Volatility Come from?

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 03 Dec 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 37 (381,393)
Citation 1

Abstract:

incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

45.

Information and Volatility

Downloads 178 (141,888)

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928R
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 14 Jun 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 135 (180,067)

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Bayes correlated equilibrium, Volatility, moments restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs

Information and Volatility

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1928RR
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 17 Oct 2014
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 43 (359,341)

Abstract:

Incomplete information, Idiosyncratic shocks, Aggregate shocks, Volatility, Confounding information, Moment restrictions, Linear best responses, Quadratic payoffs, Bayes correlated equilibrium

46.

Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 04 Jun 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 178 (137,048)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-Post incentive compatibility

47.

Common Certainty of Rationality Revisited

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 010-2011
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 20 Mar 2011
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 168 (135,618)
Citation 1

Abstract:

48.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Downloads 149 (165,817)

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 055-2013
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 15 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 123 (193,946)

Abstract:

First Price Auction, Mechanism Design, Robust Predictions, Private Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium.

Extremal Information Structures in the First Price Auction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1926
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 14 Nov 2013
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (430,705)

Abstract:

First price auction, Mechanism design, Robust predictions, Private information, Bayes correlated equilibrium

49.

Faulty Communication: Some Variations on the Electronic Mail Game

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1271R
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 27 Sep 2001
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 132 (173,388)

Abstract:

Electronic Mail, Common Knowledge, Coordination

50.

Common Belief Foundations of Global Games

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 069_2015
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 May 2015 Last Revised: 05 Dec 2015
Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin and Muhamet Yildiz
Princeton University - Department of Economics, Bank for International Settlements and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 131 (83,698)
Citation 1

Abstract:

51.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 130 (176,399)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

52.

Games in Preference Form and Preference Rationalizability

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 43-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 13 Oct 2012
Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 127 (148,692)
Citation 1

Abstract:

53.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1479R; PIER Working Paper No. 05-014
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 114 (194,432)
Citation 11

Abstract:

repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

54.

Strategic Distinguishability and Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609R
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 30 Apr 2008
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 112 (201,939)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

55.

An Ascending Auction for Interdependent Values: Uniqueness and Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1600
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 27 Jan 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 106 (204,633)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Dynamic auction, Rationalizability, Extensive form, Uniqueness, Strategic uncertainty

56.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1479; PIER Working Paper No. 04-033
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 101 (212,737)
Citation 11

Abstract:

repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

57.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 100 (215,673)

Abstract:

Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

58.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1451; PIER Working Paper No. 04-004
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 97 (221,624)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

59.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 88 (239,108)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

60.

Coordination, Timing and Common Knowledge

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 061-2014
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 24 Apr 2014
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 82 (239,108)
Citation 1

Abstract:

common knowledge, higher order beliefs, timing frictions, Calvo frictions, coordination

61.

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Downloads 79 (263,113)

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 79 (265,575)

Abstract:

Optimal auction, common values, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, rst-price auction, second-price auction, resale, posted price, maximum value game, wallet game, descending auction, local incentive constraints, global incentive constraints

Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11783
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 17 Jan 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

common values, descending auction, global incentive constraints, local incentive constraints, maximum value game, Optimal auction, posted price, resale, revenue maximization, wallet game

62.

The Role of the Common Prior in Robust Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1628
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 17 Sep 2007
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 74 (253,434)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Common prior, Correlated equilibrium, Ex post equilibrium, Mechanism design, Robust implementation, Rationalizability, Strategic complements, Strategic substitutes, Uniqueness

63.

Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1561RR
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 70 (280,008)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Implementation, Robustness, Common knowledge, Interim equilibrium, Iterative deletion, Direct mechanism

64.

The Robustness of Robust Implementation

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 002-2010
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 22 Dec 2010
Moritz Meyer-Ter-Vehn and Stephen Morris
Independent and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 61 (291,475)
Citation 1

Abstract:

65.

Bayes Correlated Equilibrium and the Comparison of Information Structures

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1822R
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 19 Sep 2013
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (214,224)

Abstract:

Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

66.

Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

Downloads 54 (319,621)

Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 017-2011
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 11 Jul 2011
Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux
Princeton University - Department of Economics, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 51 (333,497)

Abstract:

Robust Rationalizability Under Almost Common Certainty of Payoffs

Japanese Economic Review, Vol. 63, Issue 1, pp. 57-67, 2012
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 10 Feb 2012
Stephen Morris, Satoru Takahashi and Olivier Tercieux
Princeton University - Department of Economics, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics and Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques (PSE)
Downloads 3 (560,249)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

67.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 37 (328,248)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Markov, bounded recall, purification

68.

Efficient Auctions and Interdependent Types

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1846, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 30-2012
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 18 Jan 2012
Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris and Satoru Takahashi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (376,953)

Abstract:

Mechanism Design, Robust mechanism design, Efficient auctions, Interdepedent types, Partial implementation, Full implementation

69.

Robust Virtual Implementation

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1609RR
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 07 Jan 2009
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 30 (369,689)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Mechanism design, Virtual implementation, Robust implementation, Rationaliz¿ability, Ex-post incentive compatibility

70.

Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2064R
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Aug 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (470,220)

Abstract:

Optimal auction, Intermediaries, Posted price, Guaranteed demand auction, Common values, Revenue maximization, Revenue equivalence, First-price auction, Second-price auction, Resale, Maximum value game, Descending auction, Local incentive constraints, Global incentive constraints

71.

The Wald Problem and the Equivalence of Sequential Sampling and Static Information Costs

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 23 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 15 Sep 2017
Stephen Morris and Philipp Strack
Princeton University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (198,132)

Abstract:

Sequential Sampling, Entropy Cost, Information Acquisition

72.

Reward and Punishment in a Regime Change Game

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 19 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2017
Stephen Morris and Mehdi Shadmehr
Princeton University - Department of Economics and University of Calgary - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (485,842)

Abstract:

Regime Change, Revolution, Leadership, Vanguards, Global Games, Screening

73.

Higher-Order Expectations

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 11 Sep 2017
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Harvard University and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (181,662)

Abstract:

higher-order beliefs, higher-order expectations, networks, common prior, heterogeneous priors

74.

Expectations, Networks, and Conventions

Number of pages: 71 Posted: 03 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 13 Sep 2017
Benjamin Golub and Stephen Morris
Harvard University and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (115,145)

Abstract:

networks, incomplete information, centrality, common prior, heterogeneous priors, network game

75.

Information and Interaction

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2088
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 24 May 2017
Dirk Bergemann, Tibor Heumann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Yale University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (366,231)

Abstract:

Networks, Incomplete Information, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Volatility, Moments Restrictions, Linear Best Responses, Quadratic Payoffs

76.

Redemption Risk and Cash Hoarding by Asset Managers

BIS Working Paper No. 608
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 01 Feb 2017
Stephen Morris, Ilhyock Shim and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics, Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 0 (259,226)

Abstract:

asset manager, bond market liquidity, cash hoarding, global game, investor redemption, strategic complementarity

77.

Coordination and Continuous Choice

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 27 Dec 2016
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business
Downloads 0 (183,909)

Abstract:

coordination, endogenous information acquisition, continuous choice, higher order beliefs

78.

Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2066
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 19 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (234,148)

Abstract:

Incomplete Information, Informational Robustness, Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, Interim Correlated Rationalizability, Belief-Free Rationalizability

79.

Crises: Equilibrium Shifts and Large Shocks

MIT Department of Economics Working Paper No. 16-13
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Stephen Morris and Muhamet Yildiz
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (124,497)

Abstract:

Equilibrium Shift; Global Games; Rank Beliefs; Fat Tails; Hysteresis; Equilibrium Selection; Multiple Equilibria

80.

Informationally Robust Optimal Auction Design

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2065
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Dec 2016
Dirk Bergemann, Benjamin A. Brooks and Stephen Morris
Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (249,689)

Abstract:

optimal auctions, common values, information structure, model uncertainty, ambiguity aversion, robustness, Bayes correlated equilibrium, revenue maximization, revenue equivalence, information rent

81.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, Princeton University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (175,393)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

82.

Welfare Effects of Public Information

Bundesbank Series 1 Discussion Paper No. 2000,07
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 08 Jun 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 0 (524,851)
Citation 9

Abstract:

83.

Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 079_2016
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 06 May 2016
Stephen Morris and Ming Yang
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business
Downloads 0 (175,393)

Abstract:

coordination, endogenous information acquisition, costly local distinguishability, higher order beliefs

84.

Risk Premium Shifts and Monetary Policy: A Coordination Approach

Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper No. 075_2016
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 14 Jan 2016
Stephen Morris and Hyun Song Shin
Princeton University - Department of Economics and Bank for International Settlements
Downloads 0 (161,986)

Abstract:

market liquidity, risk-taking channel, runs

85.

Fiscal Stabilization and Exchange Rate Instability: A Theoretical Approach and Some Policy Conclusions Using Mexican Data

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 329-356, August 1990
Posted: 19 Apr 2006
Andrew Feltenstein and Stephen Morris
Georgia State University - Department of Economics and Princeton University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Fiscal stabilization, Mexico, exchange rates

86.

Political Correctness

Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, April 2001
Posted: 01 Nov 2001
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

87.

Contagion

The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, No. 1, 2000
Posted: 15 Jan 2001
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

88.

Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited

International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 28, Iss. 3, August 1999
Posted: 26 Oct 1999
Stephen Morris
Princeton University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

89.

Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information

Posted: 01 Sep 1999
Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
Imperial College London, Princeton University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

90.

A Theory of the Onset of Currency Attacks

CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 2025
Posted: 07 Apr 1999
Hyun Song Shin and Stephen Morris
Bank for International Settlements and Princeton University - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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