George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences Department of Economics

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science

133 South 36th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297

United States

http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU

Goldsmith Professor

HW Arndt Building

College of Business and Economics

Canberra, ACT 2601

Australia

  • University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

    • Email
    • Tel: 215-898-7908
    • Fax: 215-573-2057

  • Research School of Economics, ANU

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

54

DOWNLOADS
Rank 9,054

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 9,054

in Total Papers Downloads

10,313

TOTAL CITATIONS
Rank 5,258

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 5,258

in Total Papers Citations

217

Scholarly Papers (54)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 26 Jun 2003
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 660 (82,001)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Human Capital, Managerial Incentives, Firm Boundaries, Firm Organization

2.

Reputation Effects

PIER Working Paper No. 07-034
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 22 Oct 2007
George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 491 (118,674)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects

3.

The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

Downloads 411 (146,603)
Citation 4

The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 31 Jul 2002
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 268 (230,666)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 May 2002
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 143 (412,900)

Abstract:

Loading...

4.

Reputations in Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 13-034
Number of pages: 86 Posted: 30 Jun 2013
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 408 (147,842)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

5.

Common Learning

Downloads 372 (163,839)

Common Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Aug 2006
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 203 (302,901)

Abstract:

Loading...

Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

Common Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575R, PIER Working Paper No. 07-018
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 21 Jun 2007
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 169 (358,265)

Abstract:

Loading...

Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

6.

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 03 Sep 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Volker Nocke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Mannheim
Downloads 349 (175,798)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

7.

The Social Context of Economic Decisions

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 14 Oct 2002
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 330 (186,740)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Social Capital, Social Assets, Social Institutions

8.

Pricing in Matching Markets

Downloads 314 (196,898)
Citation 2

Pricing in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1752
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 28 Jan 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 218 (282,979)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed Search, Matching, Premuneration Value, Prematch Investments, Search

Pricing in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 10-003
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 27 Jan 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 96 (560,300)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed Search, Matching, Premuneration Value, Prematch Investments, Search

9.

Social Assets

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 297 (208,987)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Social Assets, Social Capital, Social Arrangements, Nonmarket Interactions, Social Norms

10.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 293 (211,903)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Markov, bounded recall, purification

11.

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 148, No. 5, 2013, PIER Working Paper No. 10-32
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 28 Sep 2010 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2017
George J. Mailath and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Universitaet Mannheim
Downloads 286 (217,292)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse Selection, Separation, Differentiable Strategies, Incentive-Compatibility

12.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 279 (223,008)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

13.

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

Downloads 235 (264,575)
Citation 3

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2161
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Jan 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 161 (373,572)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Wisdom of the Crowd, Information aggregation, Common prior, NonBayesian updating

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

PIER Working Paper No. 19-001
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Jan 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 74 (656,530)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Wisdom of the Crowd, Information aggregation, Common prior, NonBayesian updating

14.

Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?

PIER Working Paper No. 07-022
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 01 Aug 2007
George J. Mailath, Georg Nöldeke and Georg Nöldeke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of BaselUniversity of Basel
Downloads 234 (265,691)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse selection, market breakdown, separation, competitive pricing

15.

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Downloads 228 (272,344)
Citation 8

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 12-008
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 15 Mar 2012
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 68 (687,345)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 13-060
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Oct 2013
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (738,836)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2024
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 07 Oct 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (738,836)

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Investments, Premuneration values, Underinvestment, Transfers

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 15-034
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Oct 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 42 (859,375)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

16.

Matching with Incomplete Information

Downloads 220 (281,875)
Citation 2

Matching with Incomplete Information

PIER Working Paper No. 12-032
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 29 Aug 2012
Quingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 157 (381,766)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

Matching with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1870
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 28 Aug 2012
Quingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 63 (715,226)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

17.

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

Downloads 217 (285,542)
Citation 4

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5225
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 132 (440,352)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

PIER Working Paper No. 15-008
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Feb 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 85 (605,635)

Abstract:

Loading...

Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment.

18.

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1573
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 25 Jul 2006
George J. Mailath, Georg Nöldeke and Georg Nöldeke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of BaselUniversity of Basel
Downloads 214 (289,370)

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse selection, Market breakdown, Separation, Competitive pricing

19.

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

Number of pages: 50 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 214 (289,370)
Citation 26

Abstract:

Loading...

Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Game, Commitment

20.

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

Downloads 211 (293,221)
Citation 10

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 08-027
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 31 Jul 2008
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 152 (392,585)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

PIER Working Paper No. 10-007
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 04 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 05 Mar 2010
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (738,836)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

21.

Social Assets, Second Version

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 07 Jun 2004
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 196 (313,996)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

22.

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version)

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 05 Mar 2004
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 189 (324,645)

Abstract:

Loading...

sunk investments, inefficient investments, sunspots, random prices

23.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 167 (362,292)

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

24.

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 02 May 2001
George J. Mailath, Steven A. Matthews, Tadashi Sekiguchi and Tadashi Sekiguchi
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Kobe UniversityKyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 167 (362,292)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Private strategies, repeated games, public perfect equilibria

25.

Buying Locally

Downloads 163 (369,906)
Citation 2

Buying Locally

PIER Working Paper No. 15-012
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 07 Mar 2015 Last Revised: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 94 (568,051)

Abstract:

Loading...

Buy local, local currency, trading favors, reciprocity, monopolistic competition

Buying Locally

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1992
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 69 (682,004)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Buy local, Local currency, Trading favors, Reciprocity, Monopolistic Competition

26.

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

Downloads 161 (373,736)
Citation 4

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

PIER Working Paper No. 19-018
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 03 Oct 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 102 (537,219)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

information aggregation, model-based reasoning

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2161R, September 2019
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 02 Oct 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (738,836)

Abstract:

Loading...

Model-Based Reasoning, Information Aggregation

27.

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 02 May 2001
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara, Tadashi Sekiguchi and Tadashi Sekiguchi
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and Kobe UniversityKyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 159 (377,679)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Equilibrium Payoffs, Perfect Monitoring

28.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 158 (379,732)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

29.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 157 (381,773)
Citation 16

Abstract:

Loading...

repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

30.

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Downloads 156 (383,881)
Citation 4

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Oct 2004
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 143 (412,900)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 30 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 13 (1,175,055)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

31.

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 154 (388,140)

Abstract:

Loading...

General Equilibrium, Sunspots, Incomplete Markets

32.

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 01 Mar 2004
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 152 (392,384)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs

33.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 145 (407,701)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

34.

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 21 Jun 2003
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 135 (431,300)

Abstract:

Loading...

Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games

35.

Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 19 Aug 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 134 (436,467)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

36.

Social Assets, Third Version

PIER Working Paper No. 06-003
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 24 Jan 2006
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 132 (439,038)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

37.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 126 (455,217)

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

38.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 125 (458,083)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

39.

The Curse of Long Horizons

Downloads 120 (472,701)
Citation 8

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 18-029
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Dec 2018
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 119 (478,167)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

The Curse of Long Horizons

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11431
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 16 Aug 2016
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (1,319,872)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives., moral hazard, principal-agency

40.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 113 (494,556)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Markov, bounded recall, purification

41.

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information

PIER Working Paper No. 13-028
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 22 Jun 2013
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 107 (514,641)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

42.

Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 13-044
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 13 Aug 2013
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 100 (540,040)

Abstract:

Loading...

commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

43.

Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1810
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 22 Jul 2011
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 98 (547,388)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search

44.

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 02 Aug 2004
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 97 (551,047)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs

45.

Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword

Downloads 95 (558,483)

Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword

PIER Working Paper No. 20-002
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 10 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 09 Feb 2021
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath and Yena Park
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 77 (642,133)

Abstract:

Loading...

Financial Coalition, Limited Enforcement, Risk Sharing, Coalition-Proof Equilibrium

Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword

NBER Working Paper No. w26667
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 22 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 14 May 2023
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath and Yena Park
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Rochester - Department of Economics
Downloads 17 (1,121,641)

Abstract:

Loading...

Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14333
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 29 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2021
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger and George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (1,319,872)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

46.

Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 91 (573,657)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

47.

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 16-013
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 01 Sep 2016
V. Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University College London and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 89 (581,585)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

48.

Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence

PIER Working Paper No. 11-012
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 23 May 2011
Martin Cripps, Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business SchoolUniversity College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 82 (610,781)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

Common learning, common belief, private signals, private beliefs

49.

Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword

Center for Financial Studies Working Paper No. 697, 2023
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 24 Feb 2023
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath and Yena Park
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 77 (632,709)

Abstract:

Loading...

Coalitions, Limited Enforcement, Risk Sharing

50.

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (Second Version)

PIER Working Paper No. 12-042
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
Qingmin Liu, George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 77 (632,709)
Citation 13

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

51.

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring

PIER Working Paper No. 08-019
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 02 Jun 2008
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 67 (680,608)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

52.

'Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets' Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 10-037
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 05 Dec 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 61 (712,768)

Abstract:

Loading...

Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

53.

Efficient Non-Contractible Investments

Posted: 19 Aug 2008
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

Matching Models, Investment, Hold-up Problems, Contracting

54.

Financing Losers in Competitive Markets

Posted: 27 Oct 1999
Andrew B. Abel and George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...