George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences Department of Economics

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science

133 South 36th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297

United States

http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU

Goldsmith Professor

HW Arndt Building

College of Business and Economics

Canberra, ACT 2601

Australia

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

53

DOWNLOADS
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7,728

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 4,413

in Total Papers Citations

143

CROSSREF CITATIONS

159

Scholarly Papers (53)

1.

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 26 Jun 2003
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 633 (50,393)

Abstract:

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Human Capital, Managerial Incentives, Firm Boundaries, Firm Organization

2.

Reputation Effects

PIER Working Paper No. 07-034
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 22 Oct 2007
George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 449 (77,391)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects

3.
Downloads 374 ( 95,780)
Citation 2

The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 31 Jul 2002
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 246 (149,236)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 May 2002
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 128 (265,744)

Abstract:

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Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 03 Sep 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Volker Nocke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Mannheim
Downloads 326 (111,049)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 17 Oct 2004
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (592,139)
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5.
Downloads 306 (119,590)

Common Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Aug 2006
Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 172 (208,378)

Abstract:

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Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

Common Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575R, PIER Working Paper No. 07-018
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 21 Jun 2007
Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 134 (256,742)

Abstract:

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Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

6.
Downloads 296 (123,881)
Citation 1

Social Assets

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 263 (139,466)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Social Assets, Social Capital, Social Arrangements, Nonmarket Interactions, Social Norms

Social Assets

International Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 1057-1091, November 2006
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Oct 2006
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (548,935)
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7.

The Social Context of Economic Decisions

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 14 Oct 2002
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 295 (124,278)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Social Capital, Social Assets, Social Institutions

8.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 264 (139,587)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

9.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 221 (166,004)

Abstract:

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Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

10.

Reputations in Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 13-034
Number of pages: 86 Posted: 30 Jun 2013
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 196 (185,625)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

11.

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 148, No. 5, 2013, PIER Working Paper No. 10-32
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 28 Sep 2010 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2017
George J. Mailath and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Universitaet Mannheim
Downloads 193 (188,205)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Adverse Selection, Separation, Differentiable Strategies, Incentive-Compatibility

12.

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1573
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 25 Jul 2006
George J. Mailath and Georg Nöldeke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of BaselUniversity of Basel
Downloads 186 (194,568)

Abstract:

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Adverse selection, Market breakdown, Separation, Competitive pricing

13.

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

Number of pages: 50 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 186 (194,568)
Citation 26

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Game, Commitment

14.
Downloads 169 (211,413)
Citation 5

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5225
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 111 (295,086)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

PIER Working Paper No. 15-008
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Feb 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 58 (435,727)

Abstract:

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Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment.

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

International Economic Review, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 315-330, 2017
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 30 May 2017
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 0
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15.

Social Assets, Second Version

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 07 Jun 2004
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 167 (213,573)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

16.
Downloads 165 (215,694)
Citation 3

Pricing in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1752
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 28 Jan 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 103 (311,064)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Directed Search, Matching, Premuneration Value, Prematch Investments, Search

Pricing in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 10-003
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 27 Jan 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 62 (421,321)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Directed Search, Matching, Premuneration Value, Prematch Investments, Search

17.

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version)

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 05 Mar 2004
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 156 (226,199)

Abstract:

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sunk investments, inefficient investments, sunspots, random prices

18.
Downloads 147 (237,436)
Citation 1

Matching with Incomplete Information

PIER Working Paper No. 12-032
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 29 Aug 2012
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 109 (299,053)

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

Matching with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1870
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 28 Aug 2012
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 38 (522,085)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

19.

Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?

PIER Working Paper No. 07-022
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 01 Aug 2007
George J. Mailath and Georg Nöldeke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of BaselUniversity of Basel
Downloads 144 (241,520)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Adverse selection, market breakdown, separation, competitive pricing

20.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 143 (242,925)

Abstract:

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Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

21.

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 02 May 2001
George J. Mailath, Steven A. Matthews and Tadashi Sekiguchi
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 137 (251,430)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Private strategies, repeated games, public perfect equilibria

22.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 129 (263,290)
Citation 16

Abstract:

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

23.

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 126 (267,918)

Abstract:

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General Equilibrium, Sunspots, Incomplete Markets

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Oct 2004
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 112 (293,253)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 30 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 13 (689,566)
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Simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

25.

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 01 Mar 2004
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 125 (269,557)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs

26.

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 02 May 2001
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara and Tadashi Sekiguchi
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 122 (274,495)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Equilibrium Payoffs, Perfect Monitoring

27.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 120 (277,788)

Abstract:

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

28.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 116 (284,605)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

29.

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 21 Jun 2003
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 114 (288,111)

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games

30.
Downloads 113 (289,899)
Citation 3

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2161
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Jan 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 68 (401,148)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Wisdom of the Crowd, Information aggregation, Common prior, NonBayesian updating

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

PIER Working Paper No. 19-001
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Jan 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 45 (488,665)

Abstract:

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Wisdom of the Crowd, Information aggregation, Common prior, NonBayesian updating

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 12-008
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 15 Mar 2012
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 35 (537,775)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2024
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 07 Oct 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 29 (572,424)

Abstract:

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Matching, Investments, Premuneration values, Underinvestment, Transfers

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 13-060
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Oct 2013
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 25 (599,130)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 15-034
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Oct 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 21 (627,937)

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 08-027
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 31 Jul 2008
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 78 (371,072)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

PIER Working Paper No. 10-007
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 04 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 05 Mar 2010
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (554,530)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

33.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 107 (301,201)

Abstract:

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Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

34.
Downloads 105 (305,079)
Citation 1

Buying Locally

PIER Working Paper No. 15-012
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 07 Mar 2015 Last Revised: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 68 (401,148)

Abstract:

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Buy local, local currency, trading favors, reciprocity, monopolistic competition

Buying Locally

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1992
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (532,301)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Buy local, Local currency, Trading favors, Reciprocity, Monopolistic Competition

Buying Locally

International Economic Review, Vol. 57, Issue 4, pp. 1179-1200, 2016
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 15 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (798,720)
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35.

Social Assets, Third Version

PIER Working Paper No. 06-003
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 24 Jan 2006
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 100 (315,224)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

36.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 99 (317,203)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

PIER Working Paper No. 19-018
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 03 Oct 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 66 (407,641)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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information aggregation, model-based reasoning

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2161R, September 2019
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 02 Oct 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 30 (566,227)

Abstract:

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Model-Based Reasoning, Information Aggregation

38.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 76 (372,783)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

39.

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 02 Aug 2004
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 75 (375,650)
Citation 10

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs

40.

Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1810
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 22 Jul 2011
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 67 (399,366)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search

41.

Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 66 (402,508)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

42.

Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 13-044
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 13 Aug 2013
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 62 (415,654)

Abstract:

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commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

43.

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 16-013
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 01 Sep 2016
V. Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University College London and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (429,338)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

44.

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information

PIER Working Paper No. 13-028
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 22 Jun 2013
Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (429,338)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

45.

Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence

PIER Working Paper No. 11-012
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 23 May 2011
Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (436,505)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Common learning, common belief, private signals, private beliefs

46.

Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 19 Aug 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 48 (467,044)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

47.

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (Second Version)

PIER Working Paper No. 12-042
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 42 (492,590)
Citation 13

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

48.

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring

PIER Working Paper No. 08-019
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 02 Jun 2008
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (520,289)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

49.

'Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets' Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 10-037
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 05 Dec 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (535,721)

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

50.
Downloads 29 (557,327)
Citation 1

Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword

PIER Working Paper No. 20-002
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 10 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 09 Feb 2021
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath and Yena Park
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (585,314)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Financial Coalition, Limited Enforcement, Risk Sharing, Coalition-Proof Equilibrium

Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword

NBER Working Paper No. w26667
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 22 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 06 Feb 2021
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger, George J. Mailath and Yena Park
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Rochester - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (784,709)
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Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14333
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 29 Jan 2020 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2021
Harold L. Cole, Dirk Krueger and George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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51.
Downloads 26 (575,445)
Citation 4

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 18-029
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Dec 2018
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (592,139)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

The Curse of Long Horizons

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11431
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 16 Aug 2016
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
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differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives., moral hazard, principal-agency

52.

Efficient Non-Contractible Investments

Posted: 19 Aug 2008
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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Matching Models, Investment, Hold-up Problems, Contracting

53.

Financing Losers in Competitive Markets

Posted: 27 Oct 1999
Andrew B. Abel and George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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