George J. Mailath

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences Department of Economics

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science

133 South 36th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297

United States

http://web.sas.upenn.edu/gmailath/

Research School of Economics, ANU

Goldsmith Professor

HW Arndt Building

College of Business and Economics

Canberra, ACT 2601

Australia

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

52

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Top 4,092

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91

CROSSREF CITATIONS

168

Scholarly Papers (52)

1.

Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 03-018
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 26 Jun 2003
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 628 (42,078)

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Human Capital, Managerial Incentives, Firm Boundaries, Firm Organization

2.

Reputation Effects

PIER Working Paper No. 07-034
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 22 Oct 2007
George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 444 (65,319)
Citation 2

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commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects

3.
Downloads 372 ( 80,517)
Citation 1

The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

PIER Working Paper No. 02-018
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 31 Jul 2002
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 244 (126,891)
Citation 1

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The Incentive Costs of Internalizing Externalities

PIER Working Paper No. 02-012
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 May 2002
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 128 (226,494)
Citation 1

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Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper 03-26
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 03 Sep 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Volker Nocke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Mannheim
Downloads 324 (93,637)
Citation 6

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Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 617-633, December 2004
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 17 Oct 2004
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (511,053)
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5.
Downloads 306 (100,337)

Common Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Aug 2006
Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 172 (176,993)

Abstract:

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Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

Common Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1575R, PIER Working Paper No. 07-018
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 21 Jun 2007
Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 134 (218,416)

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Common learning, Common belief, Private signals, Private beliefs

6.
Downloads 286 (107,979)
Citation 1

Social Assets

PIER Working Paper No. 02-003
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 253 (122,249)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Social Assets, Social Capital, Social Arrangements, Nonmarket Interactions, Social Norms

Social Assets

International Economic Review, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 1057-1091, November 2006
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Oct 2006
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 33 (472,620)
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7.

The Social Context of Economic Decisions

PIER Working Paper No. 02-035
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 14 Oct 2002
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 285 (108,374)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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Social Capital, Social Assets, Social Institutions

8.

A Foundation for Markoiv Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 09-029
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2009
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 263 (117,902)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

9.

Laws and Authority

PIER Working Paper No. 16-018
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 09 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Stephen Morris and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, MIT and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 214 (144,808)

Abstract:

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Laws, Authority, Cheap Talk, Game of Life, Social Norms, Conventions

10.

Incentive Compatibility and Differentiability: New Results and Classic Applications

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 148, No. 5, 2013, PIER Working Paper No. 10-32
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 28 Sep 2010 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2017
George J. Mailath and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Universitaet Mannheim
Downloads 191 (161,139)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Adverse Selection, Separation, Differentiable Strategies, Incentive-Compatibility

11.

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

PIER Working Paper No. 02-021
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 12 Aug 2002
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 185 (165,812)
Citation 11

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Game, Commitment

12.

Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1573
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 25 Jul 2006
George J. Mailath and Georg Nöldeke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of BaselUniversity of Basel
Downloads 184 (166,664)

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Adverse selection, Market breakdown, Separation, Competitive pricing

13.
Downloads 165 (183,417)
Citation 4

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5225
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 108 (256,939)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

PIER Working Paper No. 15-008
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Feb 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 57 (377,517)

Abstract:

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Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment.

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

International Economic Review, Vol. 58, Issue 2, pp. 315-330, 2017
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 30 May 2017
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
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14.

Social Assets, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 04-025
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 07 Jun 2004
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 163 (185,247)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

15.

Reputations in Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 13-034
Number of pages: 86 Posted: 30 Jun 2013
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 162 (186,195)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

16.
Downloads 159 (189,289)
Citation 2

Pricing in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1752
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 28 Jan 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 100 (271,303)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Directed Search, Matching, Premuneration Value, Prematch Investments, Search

Pricing in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 10-003
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 27 Jan 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (370,973)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Directed Search, Matching, Premuneration Value, Prematch Investments, Search

17.

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version)

PIER Working Paper No. 04-007
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 05 Mar 2004
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 155 (193,435)

Abstract:

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sunk investments, inefficient investments, sunspots, random prices

18.
Downloads 142 (207,867)
Citation 1

Matching with Incomplete Information

PIER Working Paper No. 12-032
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 29 Aug 2012
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 105 (262,195)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

Matching with Incomplete Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1870
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 28 Aug 2012
Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 37 (454,027)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

19.

Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection?

PIER Working Paper No. 07-022
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 01 Aug 2007
George J. Mailath and Georg Nöldeke
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of BaselUniversity of Basel
Downloads 142 (207,867)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Adverse selection, market breakdown, separation, competitive pricing

20.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1571
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 20 Jul 2006
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 142 (207,867)

Abstract:

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Purification, Belief-free equilibria, Repeated games

21.

Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

PIER Working Paper 01-009
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 02 May 2001
George J. Mailath, Steven A. Matthews and Tadashi Sekiguchi
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 133 (219,070)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Private strategies, repeated games, public perfect equilibria

22.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring, Second Version

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1479R; PIER Working Paper No. 05-014
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 128 (225,691)
Citation 15

Abstract:

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

23.

Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices

PIER Working Paper No. 03-014
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 04 Jun 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 126 (228,463)

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General Equilibrium, Sunspots, Incomplete Markets

24.

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships

PIER Working Paper No. 04-008
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 01 Mar 2004
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 124 (231,211)

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

PIER Working Paper No. 04-039
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Oct 2004
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 109 (255,273)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4793
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 30 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 13 (596,195)
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Simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

26.

Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1479; PIER Working Paper No. 04-033
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 20 Sep 2004
George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 119 (238,422)

Abstract:

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repeated games, private monitoring, almost-public monitoring, coordination, bounded recall

27.

The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

PIER Working Paper No. 01-014
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 02 May 2001
George J. Mailath, Ichiro Obara and Tadashi Sekiguchi
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics and Kyoto University - Institute of Economic Research
Downloads 119 (238,422)

Abstract:

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Equilibrium Payoffs, Perfect Monitoring

28.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria with Finite Social Memory

PIER Working Paper No. 12-003, Economic Theory Center Working Paper No. 31-2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 06 Feb 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 115 (244,493)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Purification, Markov perfect equilibrium, dynamic games

29.

Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 03-016
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 21 Jun 2003
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 111 (250,755)

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 08-027
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 31 Jul 2008
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 77 (320,529)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Third Version

PIER Working Paper No. 10-007
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 04 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 05 Mar 2010
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (482,723)
Citation 2

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Repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 12-008
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 15 Mar 2012
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 35 (463,144)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2024
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 07 Oct 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 28 (499,189)

Abstract:

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Matching, Investments, Premuneration values, Underinvestment, Transfers

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 13-060
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 17 Oct 2013
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 25 (517,093)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

PIER Working Paper No. 15-034
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 08 Oct 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University
Downloads 19 (555,662)

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Premuneration Values and Investments in Matching Markets

The Economic Journal, Vol. 127, Issue 604, pp. 2041-2065, 2017
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 06 Sep 2017
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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32.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1451; PIER Working Paper No. 04-004
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 17 Jan 2004
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University of Essex, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 106 (258,977)

Abstract:

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Purification, repeated games, belief-free equilibria, imperfect monitoring

33.
Downloads 104 (262,458)
Citation 1

Buying Locally

PIER Working Paper No. 15-012
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 07 Mar 2015 Last Revised: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 67 (347,047)

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Buy local, local currency, trading favors, reciprocity, monopolistic competition

Buying Locally

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1992
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 36 (458,534)
Citation 1

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Buy local, Local currency, Trading favors, Reciprocity, Monopolistic Competition

Buying Locally

International Economic Review, Vol. 57, Issue 4, pp. 1179-1200, 2016
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 15 Nov 2016
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (694,379)
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34.

Social Assets, Third Version

PIER Working Paper No. 06-003
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 24 Jan 2006
George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 98 (273,154)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

35.

Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 07-024
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2007
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 97 (274,967)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Purification, belief-free equilibria, repeated games

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2161
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 16 Jan 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (391,047)
Citation 4

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Wisdom of the Crowd, Information aggregation, Common prior, NonBayesian updating

The Wisdom of a Confused Crowd: Model-Based Inference

PIER Working Paper No. 19-001
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 17 Jan 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 41 (436,546)

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Wisdom of the Crowd, Information aggregation, Common prior, NonBayesian updating

37.

Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 04-031
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 02 Aug 2004
Martin Cripps, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 75 (322,199)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Reputation, Imperfect Monitoring, Repeated Games, Commitment, Private Beliefs

38.

A Foundation for Markov Equilibria in Infinite Horizon Perfect Information Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-043
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
V. Bhaskar, George J. Mailath and Stephen Morris
University College London, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and MIT
Downloads 70 (334,893)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Markov, bounded recall, purification

39.

Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1810
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 22 Jul 2011
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 67 (342,868)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search

40.

Contemporaneous Perfect Epison Equilibria

PIER Working Paper No. 02-004
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 14 Apr 2002
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 65 (348,284)

Abstract:

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Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

41.

Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 13-044
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 13 Aug 2013
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 59 (365,785)

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commitment, incomplete information, reputation bound, reputation effects, long-run relationships, reputations

42.

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information

PIER Working Paper No. 13-028
Number of pages: 73 Posted: 22 Jun 2013
Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 57 (371,991)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

43.

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 16-013
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 01 Sep 2016
V. Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University College London and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 56 (375,203)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

44.

Common Learning with Intertemporal Dependence

PIER Working Paper No. 11-012
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 23 May 2011
Martin Cripps, J.C. Ely, George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University College London - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 55 (378,412)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Common learning, common belief, private signals, private beliefs

45.

Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria, Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 03-021
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 19 Aug 2003
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 42 (423,826)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Epsilon Equilibrium, Ex Ante Payoff, Multistage Game, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium

46.

Stable Matching with Incomplete Information (Second Version)

PIER Working Paper No. 12-042
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 07 Nov 2012
Columbia University, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 39 (435,823)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Matching, Stability, Stable outcome, Incomplete information, Core

47.

Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall Under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring

PIER Working Paper No. 08-019
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 02 Jun 2008
George J. Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 35 (452,434)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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repeated games, bounded recall strategies, folk theorem, imperfect monitoring

48.

'Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets' Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 10-037
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 05 Dec 2010
George J. Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 32 (465,758)

Abstract:

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Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

49.
Downloads 24 (507,419)
Citation 2

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 18-029
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Dec 2018
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (523,367)
Citation 2

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principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

The Curse of Long Horizons

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11431
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 16 Aug 2016
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives., moral hazard, principal-agency

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2161R, September 2019
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 02 Oct 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 5 (653,505)

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Model-Based Reasoning, Information Aggregation

Learning under Diverse World Views: Model-Based Inference

PIER Working Paper No. 19-018
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 03 Oct 2019
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and Yale University - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (669,887)

Abstract:

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information aggregation, model-based reasoning

51.

Efficient Non-Contractible Investments

Posted: 19 Aug 2008
Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath and Andrew Postlewaite
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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Matching Models, Investment, Hold-up Problems, Contracting

52.

Financing Losers in Competitive Markets

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, Vol 3 No 2
Posted: 27 Oct 1999
Andrew B. Abel and George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Finance Department and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Abstract:

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