Paul Klemperer

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Manor Road Building

Manor Road

Oxford, OX1 3BJ

United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • University of Oxford - Department of Economics

    • Email
    • Tel: +44 1865 278 588
    • Fax: +44 1865 278 557

  • Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

43

DOWNLOADS
Rank 2,196

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,196

in Total Papers Downloads

27,776

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 842

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 842

in Total Papers Citations

647

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1,180

Scholarly Papers (43)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

Auctions: Theory and Practice

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 05 Apr 2004
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 4,297 (4,683)
Citation 60

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Mechanism Design, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS

2.

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Downloads 3,551 ( 6,435)

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Oxford University Economics Working Paper No. 1999-W12
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 04 Sep 1999
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 3,551 (6,317)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Loading...

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 13, Issue 3, July 1999
Posted: 27 Aug 1999
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

3.

Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Downloads 2,333 (12,515)
Citation 304

Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

Number of pages: 129 Posted: 17 Oct 2006
Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 2,266 (12,916)
Citation 52

Abstract:

Loading...

switching costs, network effects, lock-in, network externalities, co-ordination, indirect network effects

Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5798
Number of pages: 131 Posted: 10 Oct 2006
Joseph Farrell and Paul Klemperer
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 67 (657,815)
Citation 62
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Switching costs, network effects, lock-in, network externalities, coordination, indirect network effects

4.

Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 12 Oct 2000
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 2,226 (13,519)
Citation 14

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Litigation, Stock Markets, Queues, Financial Crashes, Brand Loyalty, War of Attrition, Bertrand, Perfect Competition, E-Commerce, Spectrum Auctions, Treasury Auctions, Electricity, Internet

5.

What Really Matters in Auction Design

Downloads 1,563 (23,492)

What Really Matters in Auction Design

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Nov 2000
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,563 (23,093)
Citation 27

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Antitrust, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Collusion, Entry Deterrence, Predation, Takeover Battles, Ascending Auction, Sealed-Bid Auction, Winner's Curse, Uniform Price Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Anglo-Dutch Auction, Electricity, TV franchise, Football TV-rights, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Competition Policy

What Really Matters in Auction Design

Posted: 06 Feb 2003
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Antitrust, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, Bidding, Auction Theory, Collusion, Entry Deterrence, Predation, Takeover Battles, Ascending Auction, Sealed-Bid Auction, Winner's Curse, Uniform Price Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Anglo-Dutch Auction, Electricity, TV franchise, Football TV-rights, Private Values, Common Values, Mechanism Design, Competition Policy

6.

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences

Downloads 1,248 (32,740)
Citation 8

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 28 Jan 2002
Paul Klemperer and Kenneth Binmore
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University College London - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,248 (32,187)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Telecommunications, SpectrumAuctions, Mobile Phones, 3G, MTS, Bidding

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences

Posted: 11 Feb 2002
Paul Klemperer and Kenneth Binmore
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University College London - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Telecommunications, SpectrumAuctions, Mobile Phones, 3G, MTS, Bidding

7.

Collusion and Predation in Auction Markets

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 16 Feb 2001
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,126 (37,895)

Abstract:

Loading...

Antitrust, Collusion, Predation, Entry, Entry Deterrence, Auctions, Telecommunications, Takeovers, Electricity, Bidding, Auction Theory, Radiospectrum, UMTS, Mobile Phones, Mechanism Design

8.

Bidding Markets

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 18 Aug 2005
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,124 (38,022)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Bidding Markets, Auctions, Antitrust, Competition Policy, Bidding, Market Power, Private Values, Common Values, Anti-trust

9.

Toeholds and Takeovers

Downloads 1,052 (41,846)
Citation 1

Toeholds and Takeovers

Nuffield College, Economics Working Paper No. 1998-W4&121; and CRSP Working Paper No. 405
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 16 May 2000
Paul Klemperer, Ming Huang and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and Stanford University
Downloads 1,052 (41,206)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Toeholds and Takeovers

Posted: 19 May 1999
Jeremy Bulow, Ming Huang and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University, Cornell University - Samuel Curtis Johnson Graduate School of Management and University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

10.

Prices and the Winner's Curse

Downloads 741 (67,614)

Prices and the Winner's Curse

Nuffield College, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1998-W2
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 09 May 1999
Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 741 (66,603)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

Prices and the Winner's Curse

Posted: 11 Feb 2002
Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford University

Abstract:

Loading...

11.

Auctions vs. Negotiations

Downloads 734 (68,446)
Citation 217

Auctions vs. Negotiations

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 10 Aug 1999
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 635 (81,214)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions vs. Negotiations

NBER Working Paper No. w4608
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 21 Dec 2000 Last Revised: 06 Aug 2022
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 99 (518,793)
Citation 31

Abstract:

Loading...

12.

Competition Policy in Auctions and 'Bidding Markets'

HANDBOOK OF ANTITRUST ECONOMICS, P. Buccirossi, ed., MIT Press, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 11 Apr 2008
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 699 (72,911)

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Bidding Markets, Competition Policy, Bidding, Antitrust, Market Power, Common Values, Anti-trust

13.

Network Effects and Switching Costs: Two Short Essays for the New Palgrave

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 02 Aug 2006
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 650 (79,928)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Loading...

network effects, switching costs, lock-in, network externalities, co-ordination, indirect network effects

14.

How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions

Downloads 647 (80,387)
Citation 39

How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 28 Jan 2002
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 622 (83,373)
Citation 33

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding

How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Mar 2002
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 25 (966,679)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, 3G, UMTS, bidding

How (Not) to Run Auctions: The European 3g Telecom Auctions

Posted: 15 May 2002
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding

15.

Using and Abusing Auction Theory

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 28 Apr 2003
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 646 (80,544)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Economic Theory, methodology, auctions, bidding, auction theory, spectrum auctions, telecommunications, UMTS, 3G, mobile-phones

16.

Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation

Downloads 551 (98,719)
Citation 12

Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation

Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 151 , Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2132; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-3, Nuffield College Oxford, Economics Working Paper 2013-W12
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 29 Aug 2013 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2014
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 549 (98,006)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Loading...

bail-in, bank, bank capital, bank crisis, capital requirements, contingent capital, contingent convertible bond, debt overhang, deposit insurance, living wills, regulatory capital, regulatory forbearance, SIFI, systemically important financial institution, too-big-to-fail

Market-Based Bank Capital Regulation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9618
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 03 Sep 2013
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (1,237,886)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bail-in, bank, bank capital, bank crisis, capital requirements, contingent capital, contingent convertible bond, debt overhang, deposit insurance, living wills, regulatory capital, regulatory forbearance, SIFI, systemically important financial institution, too-big-to-fail

17.

The Tobacco Deal

Downloads 476 (117,623)

The Tobacco Deal

Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1998-W15&147
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 05 Apr 1999
Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 476 (116,266)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

The Tobacco Deal

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
Posted: 09 Apr 1999
Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford University

Abstract:

Loading...

18.

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Downloads 464 (121,242)
Citation 6

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, pp. 272-300
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 04 Apr 2004
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 436 (129,072)

Abstract:

Loading...

Methodology, economic policy, economic theory, auctions, bidding, auction theory, spectrum auctions, telecommunications, UMTS, 3G, mobile-phones

Using and Abusing Economic Theory

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 29 Apr 2003
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 28 (936,730)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Economic theory, methodology, auctions, bidding, auction theory, spectrum auctions, telecommunications, UMTS, 3G, mobile-phones

19.

Regulated Prices, Rent-Seeking, and Consumer Surplus

Journal of Political Economy, 2012
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 12 Mar 2012
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 364 (160,159)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

Price Control, Rationing, Allocative Efficiency, Microeconomic Theory, Marginal Revenue, Minimum Wage, Rent Control, Consumer Welfare, Rent Seeking

20.

An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing

Downloads 336 (174,620)

An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing

Oxford University, Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1998(1997-W17)
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 03 Sep 1999
Paul Klemperer and Richard Gilbert
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 336 (173,300)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing

Posted: 06 May 2000
Paul Klemperer and Richard Gilbert
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...

21.

When are Auctions Best?

Downloads 329 (178,619)
Citation 1

When are Auctions Best?

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 1973
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 19 Jul 2007
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 260 (226,697)

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, jump bidding, sequential sales, procurement, entry

When are Auctions Best?

NBER Working Paper No. w13268
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 23 Jul 2007 Last Revised: 03 Oct 2022
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 66 (663,053)

Abstract:

Loading...

When are Auctions Best?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6393
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 29 May 2008
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 3 (1,224,072)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Entry, Jump Bidding, Procurement, Sequential Sales

22.

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Downloads 305 (193,484)
Citation 65

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

American Economic Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 08 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2015
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 295 (199,167)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Sequential Sales, Procurement, Entry

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7411
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 08 Sep 2009
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 10 (1,138,508)
Citation 8
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, entry, jump bidding, procurement, sequential sales

23.

The Generalized War of Attrition

Downloads 287 (206,234)
Citation 32

The Generalized War of Attrition

Department of Economics Working Paper No. 1998-W1
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 08 Apr 1999
Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 211 (277,654)

Abstract:

Loading...

The Generalized War of Attrition

NBER Working Paper No. w5872
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 21 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 20 Jul 2022
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 76 (613,106)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Loading...

The Generalized War of Attrition

Posted: 14 Apr 1999
Paul Klemperer and Jeremy Bulow
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford University

Abstract:

Loading...

24.

Price Controls and Consumer Surplus

Downloads 276 (214,783)
Citation 1

Price Controls and Consumer Surplus

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 17 Aug 2009 Last Revised: 27 Feb 2012
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 152 (372,330)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Price Controls, Consumer Surplus, Rationing, Marginal Revenue, Minimum Wage, Rent Control

Price Controls and Consumer Surplus

Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2086
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 10 Nov 2011
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 120 (449,490)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

rationing, allocative efficiency, microeconomic theory, marginal revenue, minimum wage, rent control,consumer welfare, rent seeking

Price Controls and Consumer Surplus

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7412
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 08 Sep 2009
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 4 (1,211,111)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Allocative Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, marginal revenue, Microeconomic Theory, Minimum Wage, rationing, rent control

25.

What is the Top Priority on Climate Change?

Downloads 254 (233,231)
Citation 1

What is the Top Priority on Climate Change?

Number of pages: 12 Posted: 17 Jan 2009 Last Revised: 16 Feb 2009
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 244 (241,458)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

climate change, global warming, environmental policy

What is the Top Priority on Climate Change?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7141
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Feb 2009
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 10 (1,138,508)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

climate change mitigation, sustainability

26.

Some Observations on the British and German 3g Telecom Auctions

Downloads 250 (236,923)
Citation 6

Some Observations on the British and German 3g Telecom Auctions

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 11 Dec 2002
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 230 (255,899)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Telecommunications, Spectrum Auctions, 3G, UMTS, Bidding, Mobile Phones

Some Observations on the British and German 3g Telecom Auctions

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 22 Nov 2002
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 20 (1,020,946)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, 3G, UMTS, bidding

27.

Do Firms' Product Lines Include Too Many Varieties?

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 28, No. 3, Autumn 1997
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 24 Sep 1997
Paul Klemperer and Jorge Padilla
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Compass Lexecon
Downloads 235 (251,740)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

28.

Product-Mix Auctions

Downloads 203 (288,838)

Product-Mix Auctions

Nuffield College Working Paper 2018-W07
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 01 Feb 2010 Last Revised: 13 Jan 2020
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 202 (289,237)

Abstract:

Loading...

Multi-Object Auction, TARP, Central Banking, Simultaneous Ascending Auction, Treasury Auction, Term Auction, Toxic Assets, Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction, Product-Mix Auction

Product-Mix Auctions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13667
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 16 Apr 2019 Last Revised: 23 Apr 2019
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 1 (1,252,858)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auction, Bank of England, bidding language, geometric bidding language, Multi-object auction, multi-product auction, product mix auction, product-mix auction, Simultaneous ascending auction, simultaneous multiple round auction

29.

A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, 'Toxic Asset' Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions

Downloads 200 (292,737)
Citation 7

A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, 'Toxic Asset' Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions

Journal of the European Economic Association, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 29 Jul 2009 Last Revised: 16 Sep 2016
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 192 (303,114)
Citation 8

Abstract:

Loading...

multi-object auction, TARP, central banking, simultaneous ascending auction, treasury auction, term auction, toxic assets, simultaneous multiple round auction, Product-Mix Auction

A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, 'Toxic Asset' Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7395
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 08 Sep 2009
Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 8 (1,162,559)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

central banking, multi-object auction, simultaneous ascending auction, TARP, term auction, treasury auction

30.

Understanding Preferences: 'Demand Types', and The Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities

Number of pages: 68 Posted: 04 Sep 2015 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2019
Elizabeth Baldwin and Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 157 (362,260)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Loading...

consumer theory; equilibrium existence; general equilibrium; competitive equilibrium; duality; indivisible goods; geometry; tropical geometry; convex geometry; auction; product mix auction; product-mix auction; substitute; complement; demand type; matching

31.

Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-Cyclical Bank Capital

Downloads 139 (399,700)
Citation 13

Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-Cyclical Bank Capital

Forthcoming, Economic Journal
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 11 Sep 2014 Last Revised: 13 Aug 2015
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 139 (400,480)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

bank capital, coco, contingent capital, contingent convertible bond, bail-in, bank, capital requirements, SIFI, debt overhang, regulatory capital

Equity Recourse Notes: Creating Counter-Cyclical Bank Capital

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10213
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 21 Oct 2014
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bail-in, bank, bank capital, capital requirements, coco, contingent capital, contingent convertible bond, SIFI

32.

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Downloads 78 (595,676)
Citation 21

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 25 Sep 2009 Last Revised: 06 Oct 2010
Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer
University of Cambridge and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 76 (613,106)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

multi-object auction, core, combinatorial auction, package auction, core-selecting auction, Vickrey auction, Vickrey, simultaneous ascending auction, robust design

A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7487
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Nov 2009
Aytek Erdil and Paul Klemperer
University of Cambridge and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 2 (1,237,886)
Citation 6
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

combinatorial auction, core, core-selecting auction, multi-object auction, package auction, robust design, simultaneous ascending auction, Vickrey, Vickrey auction

33.

Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters

NBER Working Paper No. w2542
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 23 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 14 Dec 2022
Kenneth Froot and Paul Klemperer
Harvard University Graduate School of Business and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 71 (627,371)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

34.

Rational Frenzies and Crashes

NBER Working Paper No. t0112
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 27 Jun 2007 Last Revised: 24 Apr 2022
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 69 (636,890)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

35.

Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems

Downloads 54 (716,489)

Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 03 Sep 2021
Jeremy Bulow, Paul Klemperer and Stanford GSB Submitter
Stanford University, University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 54 (731,873)

Abstract:

Loading...

Bank Capital, Regulatory Capital, Capital Requirements, Regulatory Forbearance, Bank Runs, Solvency Runs, Liquidity Runs, Stress Tests, Financial Crisis

Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16680
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 09 Nov 2021
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bank capital, bank runs, Capital requirements, financial crisis, Liquidity Runs, Regulatory capital, Regulatory forbearance, Solvency Runs, stress tests

36.

The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3g Telecom Licences

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 05 Mar 2002
Kenneth Binmore and Paul Klemperer
University College London - Department of Economics and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (947,853)
Citation 29
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, telecommunications, spectrum auctions, mobile phones, 3G, UMTS, bidding

37.

Implementing Walrasian Equilibrium: the Languages of Product-mix Auctions

Number of pages: 73 Posted: 19 Sep 2024
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Klemperer and Edwin Lock
University of Oxford - Department of Economics, University of Oxford - Department of Economics and Oxford University
Downloads 11 (1,087,909)

Abstract:

Loading...

product-mix auction, bidding language, competitive equilibrium, Walrasian equilibrium, arctic auction, substitutes, strong substitutes, indivisible goods, product mix auction.

38.

Misdiagnosing Bank Capital Problems

NBER Working Paper No. w29223
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 13 Sep 2021 Last Revised: 08 May 2022
Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Stanford University and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 6 (1,143,061)

Abstract:

Loading...

39.

Strong Substitutes: Structural Properties, and a New Algorithm for Competitive Equilibrium Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15831
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 01 Mar 2021
Elizabeth Baldwin, Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl and Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics, Technische Universität München (TUM), Technische Universität München (TUM) and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (1,215,948)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

40.

Solving Strong-Substitutes Product-Mix Auctions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14976
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 27 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 31 Mar 2021
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Goldberg, Paul Klemperer and Edwin A Locke
University of Oxford - Department of Economics, University of Oxford - Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University of Oxford
Downloads 0 (1,215,948)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

41.

The Equilibrium Existence Duality: Equilibrium with Indivisibilities & Income Effects

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14926
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 29 Jun 2020
Elizabeth Baldwin, Omer Edhan, Ravi Jagadeesan, Paul Klemperer and Alex Teytelboym
University of Oxford - Department of Economics, The University of Manchester, Stanford University - Department of Economics, University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University of Oxford - St. Catherine's College
Downloads 0 (1,215,948)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

42.

Understanding Preferences: "Demand Types", and the Existence of Equilibrium with Indivisibilities

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13586
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 18 Mar 2019
Elizabeth Baldwin and Paul Klemperer
University of Oxford - Department of Economics and University of Oxford - Department of Economics
Downloads 0 (1,215,948)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Competitive Equilibrium, consumer theory, demand type, equilibrium existence, geometry, indivisible goods, Matching, product mix auction, product-mix auction, tropical geometry

43.

Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies

Posted: 06 Jun 1999
Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer
Yale University - Yale Law School and University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Abstract:

Loading...