Cédric Wasser

University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics

Peter Merian-Weg 6

Basel, 4002

Switzerland

http://www.cedricwasser.net

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

11

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963

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 28,442

in Total Papers Citations

28

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (11)

1.

Buyer-Optimal Extensionproof Information

Number of pages: 64 Posted: 25 Jul 2017 Last Revised: 17 Sep 2019
Stefan Terstiege and Cédric Wasser
Maastricht University - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 246 (155,375)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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information design, monopoly, regulation

2.

Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 20 Jul 2015 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2018
Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser
University of Melbourne - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 227 (167,873)

Abstract:

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partnership dissolution, mechanism design, property rights, interdependent values, asymmetric type distributions

3.

Competitive Information Disclosure to an Auctioneer

Number of pages: 67 Posted: 05 Sep 2019 Last Revised: 14 Apr 2021
Stefan Terstiege and Cédric Wasser
Maastricht University - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 105 (317,832)

Abstract:

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information design, optimal auctions, disclosure

4.

Incomplete Information in Rent-seeking Contests

Forthcoming in Economic Theory
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 27 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2014
Cédric Wasser
University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 83 (366,521)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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Rent-seeking, Contest, Incomplete Information, Private values

5.

Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6274
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 06 Feb 2017
Jörg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger and Cédric Wasser
University of Dortmund - Department of Economics, University of Dortmund - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 71 (400,671)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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all-pay auction, lottery contest, favoritism, head start, revenue dominance

6.

Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests

Ruhr Economic Paper No. 524
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 18 Feb 2015
Jörg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger and Cédric Wasser
University of Dortmund - Department of Economics, University of Dortmund - Department of Economics and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 45 (495,979)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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All-pay auction; lottery contest; head start; revenue dominance

7.

A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

Number of pages: 7 Posted: 16 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2014
Cédric Wasser
University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 44 (500,463)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Contest, Imperfectly discriminating, Equilibrium existence, Private information, Interdependent values

8.

Bilateral k+1-price Auctions with Asymmetric Shares and Values

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2014
Cédric Wasser
University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 43 (504,926)

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Asymmetric auctions, Double auction, First-price auction, Partnership dissolution, Detail-free mechanism

9.

On Optimal Head Starts in All-Pay Auctions

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 21 Mar 2014 Last Revised: 17 Apr 2014
Christian Seel and Cédric Wasser
Maastricht University and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 41 (514,115)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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Contest, All-pay auction, Head start

10.

Signaling in Auctions Among Competitors

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 27 Mar 2010
Benedikt von Scarpatetti and Cédric Wasser
University of Basel and University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics
Downloads 37 (533,398)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Auction, Oligopoly, Signaling

11.

Differential Treatment and the Winner's Effort in Contests with Incomplete Information

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 22 Jun 2021 Last Revised: 30 Jul 2021
Cédric Wasser and Mengxi Zhang
University of Basel - Faculty of Business and Economics and Institute for Microeconomics, University of Bonn
Downloads 21 (629,461)

Abstract:

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contests, all-pay auction, favoritism, winner's effort, mechanism design