Cédric Wasser

University of Bonn

Microeconomics

Lennéstr. 37

Bonn, 53113

Germany

http://www.econ2.uni-bonn.de/members-of-the-chair/cedric-wasser

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

DOWNLOADS

356

CITATIONS
Rank 45,298

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 45,298

in Total Papers Citations

3

Scholarly Papers (8)

1.

Incomplete Information in Rent-seeking Contests

Forthcoming in Economic Theory
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 27 Mar 2010 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2014
Cédric Wasser
University of Bonn
Downloads 53 (279,291)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Rent-seeking, Contest, Incomplete Information, Private values

2.

Bilateral k+1-price Auctions with Asymmetric Shares and Values

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2014
Cédric Wasser
University of Bonn
Downloads 29 (378,284)

Abstract:

Asymmetric auctions, Double auction, First-price auction, Partnership dissolution, Detail-free mechanism

3.

A Note on Bayesian Nash Equilibria in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

Number of pages: 7 Posted: 16 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2014
Cédric Wasser
University of Bonn
Downloads 29 (386,163)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Contest, Imperfectly discriminating, Equilibrium existence, Private information, Interdependent values

4.

On Optimal Head Starts in All-Pay Auctions

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 21 Mar 2014 Last Revised: 17 Apr 2014
Christian Seel and Cédric Wasser
Maastricht University and University of Bonn
Downloads 23 (399,032)

Abstract:

Contest, All-pay auction, Head start

5.

Signaling in Auctions Among Competitors

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 27 Mar 2010
Benedikt von Scarpatetti and Cédric Wasser
University of Basel and University of Bonn
Downloads 21 (399,032)

Abstract:

Auction, Oligopoly, Signaling

6.

Optimal Structure and Dissolution of Partnerships

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 20 Jul 2015 Last Revised: 07 Jan 2017
Simon Loertscher and Cédric Wasser
University of Melbourne - Department of Economics and University of Bonn
Downloads 16 (185,730)

Abstract:

partnership dissolution, mechanism design, property rights, interdependent values, asymmetric type distributions

7.

Revenue Maximizing Head Starts in Contests

Ruhr Economic Paper No. 524
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 18 Feb 2015
Jörg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger and Cédric Wasser
University of Dortmund - Department of Economics, University of Dortmund - Department of Economics and University of Bonn
Downloads 6 (474,409)

Abstract:

All-pay auction; lottery contest; head start; revenue dominance

8.

Optimal Favoritism in All-Pay Auctions and Lottery Contests

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6274
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 06 Feb 2017
Jörg Franke, Wolfgang Leininger and Cédric Wasser
University of Dortmund - Department of Economics, University of Dortmund - Department of Economics and University of Bonn
Downloads 0 (386,163)

Abstract:

all-pay auction, lottery contest, favoritism, head start, revenue dominance