University of Bonn
in Total Papers Citations
Rent-seeking, Contest, Incomplete Information, Private values
Asymmetric auctions, Double auction, First-price auction, Partnership dissolution, Detail-free mechanism
Contest, Imperfectly discriminating, Equilibrium existence, Private information, Interdependent values
Contest, All-pay auction, Head start
Auction, Oligopoly, Signaling
partnership dissolution, mechanism design, property rights, interdependent values, asymmetric type distributions
All-pay auction; lottery contest; head start; revenue dominance
all-pay auction, lottery contest, favoritism, head start, revenue dominance
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