Krishnamurthy Iyer

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

111 Church St SE

Minneapolis, MN 55455

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

12

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3,684

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 24,933

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 24,933

in Total Papers Citations

23

CROSSREF CITATIONS

13

Scholarly Papers (12)

1.

Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 31 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 10 Nov 2014
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Mukund Sundararajan
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Google Inc.
Downloads 1,083 (22,630)
Citation 15

Abstract:

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mean field equilibrium, dynamic auction markets, conjoint valuation

2.

Welfare Analysis of Dark Pools

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Apr 2012 Last Revised: 15 Jul 2018
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Ciamac C. Moallemi
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 593 (52,011)

Abstract:

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dark pools, welfare, adverse selection, competitive markets

3.

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2018
David Lingenbrink and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 480 (67,713)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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dynamic Bayesian persuasion, infinite linear program, threshold mechanism

4.

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 375 (90,827)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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artificial currency, mechanism design, welfare, repeated allocation

5.

Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 02 Apr 2010 Last Revised: 01 Nov 2011
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Ciamac C. Moallemi
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 284 (123,334)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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information aggregation, smooth markets, cost functions

6.

Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 17 Oct 2016
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 180 (191,418)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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artificial currency, welfare, incentive compatibility, repeated all-pay auctions

7.

When Fixed Price Meets Priority Auctions: Competing Firms with Different Pricing and Service Rules

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 13 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 Apr 2017
Jiayang Gao, Krishnamurthy Iyer and Huseyin Topaloglu
Cornell University - Operations Research & Industrial Engineering, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Industrial Engineering
Downloads 165 (206,252)

Abstract:

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priority queues, mechanism design, game theory

8.

Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 May 2018 Last Revised: 05 Aug 2018
David Lingenbrink and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 152 (220,976)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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inventory signaling, information design

9.

When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 27 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 10 May 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 150 (223,407)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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mechanism design, collusion, efficient allocation, impossibility results, surplus submodularity

10.

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 13 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 11 May 2020
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer and David Lingenbrink
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Cornell University
Downloads 144 (230,836)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Bayesian persuasion, non-expected utility maximizers, revelation principle

11.

Tractable Equilibria in Sponsored Search With Endogenous Budgets

INSEAD Working Paper No. 2018/47/TOM
Number of pages: 83 Posted: 12 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 15 May 2020
Dragos Ciocan and Krishnamurthy Iyer
INSEAD and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 52 (432,956)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Auctions, Bipartite Matching, Endogenous Budgets

12.

Scrip Economies Are Fair and (Approximately) Efficient

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 30 Jun 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 26 (552,848)

Abstract:

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mechanism design, combinatorial auctions, scrip, artificial currencies, allocation without money