Krishnamurthy Iyer

University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

111 Church St SE

Minneapolis, MN 55455

United States

  • University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 15,310

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73

CROSSREF CITATIONS

15

Scholarly Papers (13)

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1.

Mean Field Equilibria of Dynamic Auctions with Learning

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 31 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 10 Nov 2014
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Mukund Sundararajan
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Google Inc.
Downloads 1,271 (28,388)
Citation 21

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mean field equilibrium, dynamic auction markets, conjoint valuation

2.

Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2018
David Lingenbrink and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 645 (71,954)
Citation 11

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dynamic Bayesian persuasion, infinite linear program, threshold mechanism

3.

Welfare Analysis of Dark Pools

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 16 Apr 2012 Last Revised: 15 Jul 2018
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Ciamac C. Moallemi
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 639 (72,821)

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dark pools, welfare, adverse selection, competitive markets

4.

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 544 (88,898)
Citation 8

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artificial currency, mechanism design, welfare, repeated allocation

5.

Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 13 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 08 Aug 2022
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer and David Lingenbrink
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Cornell University
Downloads 339 (154,034)
Citation 6

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Bayesian persuasion, non-expected utility maximizers, revelation principle

6.

Information Aggregation and Allocative Efficiency in Smooth Markets

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 02 Apr 2010 Last Revised: 01 Nov 2011
Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari and Ciamac C. Moallemi
University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Stanford University and Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations
Downloads 310 (169,476)
Citation 3

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information aggregation, smooth markets, cost functions

7.

Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 26 May 2018 Last Revised: 05 Aug 2018
David Lingenbrink and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 258 (204,508)
Citation 5

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inventory signaling, information design

8.

Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion

Columbia Business School Research Paper
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 24 May 2021 Last Revised: 23 Oct 2022
Jerry Anunrojwong, Krishnamurthy Iyer and Vahideh Manshadi
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Yale School of Management
Downloads 251 (210,111)
Citation 9

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information design, social services, Pareto improvement, congestion

9.

Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 17 Oct 2016
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 249 (211,777)
Citation 7

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artificial currency, welfare, incentive compatibility, repeated all-pay auctions

10.

When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 27 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 10 May 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 215 (243,815)
Citation 1

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mechanism design, collusion, efficient allocation, impossibility results, surplus submodularity

11.

When Fixed Price Meets Priority Auctions: Competing Firms with Different Pricing and Service Rules

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 13 May 2016 Last Revised: 21 Apr 2017
Jiayang Gao, Krishnamurthy Iyer and Huseyin Topaloglu
Cornell University - Operations Research & Industrial Engineering, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering and Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering
Downloads 182 (283,343)
Citation 4

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priority queues, mechanism design, game theory

12.

The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 30 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 03 Jun 2021
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 176 (291,812)

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Non-monetary mechanism, artificial currency, repeated auction, price of anarchy, robust mechanism design

13.

Tractable Equilibria in Sponsored Search With Endogenous Budgets

INSEAD Working Paper No. 2018/47/TOM
Number of pages: 83 Posted: 12 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 15 May 2020
Dragos Florin Ciocan and Krishnamurthy Iyer
INSEAD and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 129 (375,903)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Auctions, Bipartite Matching, Endogenous Budgets