Jeremy C. Kress

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

701 Tappan Street

Ann Arbor, MI MI 48109

United States

  • University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

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Top 17,479

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2,731

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 44,152

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 44,152

in Total Papers Citations

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

9

Scholarly Papers (7)

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1.

Credit Default Swap Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity

Harvard Journal on Legislation, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2011
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 03 Apr 2010 Last Revised: 10 May 2011
Jeremy C. Kress
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 1,179 (16,906)

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Credit Default Swap, Clearinghouse, Systemic Risk, Regulatory Reform, Federal Reserve, 13(3), Counterparty Risk, Jump-To-Default Risk, Credit Default Swaps

2.

Board to Death: How Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis

59 Boston College Law Review 877 (2018), Ross School of Business Paper No. 1370
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 23 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 01 Apr 2018
Jeremy C. Kress
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 709 (35,073)
Citation 3

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Busy Directors, Overcommitment, Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Board Composition, Financial Institutions, London Whale, Wells Fargo

3.

Regulating Entities and Activities: Complementary Approaches to Nonbank Systemic Risk

Southern California Law Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 03 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 17 Sep 2018
Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy and Daniel Schwarcz
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, Boston College Law School and University of Minnesota Law School
Downloads 334 (89,563)
Citation 2

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Systemic Risk, Financial Stability, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Nonbank Financial Companies, Entity-Based Regulation, Activities-Based Regulation

4.

Solving Banking's 'Too Big to Manage' Problem

Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 104, 2019, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 20 Mar 2019
Jeremy C. Kress
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 212 (143,622)

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Too Big to Manage, Too Big to Fail, Dodd-Frank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, Break Up the Banks

5.

Modernizing Bank Merger Review

37 Yale Journal on Regulation (2020)
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 23 Aug 2019 Last Revised: 01 Sep 2019
Jeremy C. Kress
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 116 (238,858)

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banks, bank mergers, bank consolidation, Dodd-Frank Act, antitrust

6.

The Last SIFI: The Unwise and Illegal Deregulation of Prudential Financial

71 Stanford Law Review Online 171 (2018)
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 13 Nov 2018 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2018
Jeremy C. Kress
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business
Downloads 104 (257,967)

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Systemic Risk, Financial Stability, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Systemically Important Financial Institutions, SIFI, Nonbank Financial Companies, Prudential Financial

7.

Activities Are Not Enough!: Why Nonbank SIFI Designations Are Essential to Prevent Systemic Risk

Forthcoming, Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: Ten Years After the Great Crash (Douglas W. Arner, Emilios Avgouleas, Danny Busch, & Steven L. Schwarcz, eds., 2019), Boston College Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 492
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 25 Oct 2018 Last Revised: 15 Nov 2018
Jeremy C. Kress, Patricia A. McCoy and Daniel Schwarcz
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, Boston College Law School and University of Minnesota Law School
Downloads 77 (311,909)

Abstract:

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Systemic Risk, Financial Stability, Financial Stability Oversight Council, Financial Stability Board, Nonbank Financial Companies, Entity-Based Regulation, Activities-Based Regulation