C/ Costa Brava, 6
Madrid, 28034
Spain
Universidad Villanueva
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Downloads
refusal to supply, margin squeeze, TeliaSonera; Bronner, Telefónica, Deutsche Telekom, abuse of dominance, essential facilities
antitrust, innovation, Google, Microsoft, INTEL, high tech markets
competition policy, regulation, digital markets, abuse of dominance, network effects, innovation, consumers’ harm, search neutrality
margin squeeze, essential facilities, abuse of dominance, refusal to supply, regulation
economic analysis, abusive practices, Microsoft, Telefónica, refusal to deal, margin squeeze
DMA, gatekeepers, platform regulation, competition law, core platform services, implementation
internal market, regulated sectors, competition policy, legal coherence, margin squeeze
private enforcement, damages actions, directive, harm estimation, stand-alone claims
Big Data, privacy, digital markets, antitrust
Bologna, European Higher Education Area, TIC’s, learning process
