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Jesse M. Fried

Harvard Law School

Professor of Law

1575 Massachusetts

Griswold Hall 506

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10289/Fried

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Research Associate

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114

B-1050 Brussels

Belgium

  • Harvard Law School

    • Email
    • Tel: 617-384-8158

  • European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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SCHOLARLY PAPERS

36

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Rank 131

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Top 131

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62,046

CITATIONS
Rank 414

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Top 414

in Total Papers Citations

1,098

Scholarly Papers (36)

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1.

Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 647-673, 2005, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 8-22, 2005, Academy of Management Perspectives, pp. 5-24, February 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 528
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Jul 2005 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 8,020 (391)
Citation 55

Abstract:

Keywords: Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, disclosure, stealth compensation, compensation consultants, camouflage.

2.

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Downloads 7,513 ( 545)
Citation 281

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, pp. 71-92, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 421
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Jan 2003 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 7,362 (554)
Citation 281

Abstract:

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

NBER Working Paper No. w9813
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 05 Jul 2003
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 98 (224,516)
Citation 281

Abstract:

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3961
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Aug 2003
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 53 (320,801)
Citation 281

Abstract:

M14, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, executive loans, compensation consultants, expensing

3.

Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

Harvard University Press, 2004, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 537783
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 6,115 (687)
Citation 316

Abstract:

Corporate governance, managers, executives, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, principal-agent problem, pay for performance, agency costs, stock options, rents, camouflage

4.

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Downloads 5,670 ( 883)
Citation 232

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 751-846, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 366, June 2002
Number of pages: 97 Posted: 19 Jun 2002 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 5,508 (916)
Citation 232

Abstract:

corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage, insider trading, indexed options, vesting

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

NBER Working Paper No. w9068
Number of pages: 101 Posted: 20 Jul 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 129 (182,990)
Citation 232

Abstract:

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3558
Number of pages: 103 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 33 (389,790)
Citation 232

Abstract:

Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage

5.

What Courses Should Law Students Take? Harvard's Largest Employers Weigh In

HLS Program on the Legal Profession Research Paper No. 2014-12, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 14-20
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 20 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 23 Nov 2014
John C. Coates, IV, Jesse M. Fried and Kathryn E. Spier
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 4,570 (835)

Abstract:

legal education, accounting, finance, law firms, legal practice, corporate finance, legal profession

6.

Paying for Long-Term Performance

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 158, pp. 1915-1959, 2010, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 658
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 14 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 4,005 (1,365)
Citation 14

Abstract:

executive compensation, executive pay, equity-based compensation, restricted shares, options, risk-taking, long-term, retention, backdating, spring-loading, unloading, insider trading, hedging, derivatives

7.

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 807-822, 2005, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 653125, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 505, February 2005
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Feb 2005 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 3,458 (1,918)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Executive compensation, agency problems, pay for performance, nonperformance pay, performance pay, soft landing, golden goodbyes, camouflage, misreporting, restatement, earning manipulation, incentives

8.

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Downloads 1,717 ( 7,148)
Citation 9

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 291-326, 2004, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 487, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 583861
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,681 (7,290)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Executive compensation, pay for performance, agency costs, rent extraction, stealth compensation, camouflage, retirement benefits, deferred compensation, executive pensions, perks

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

NBER Working Paper No. w10742
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 22 Sep 2004
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 36 (377,685)
Citation 9

Abstract:

9.

Excess-Pay Clawbacks

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 36, pp. 722-751, 2011
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 05 Jul 2011 Last Revised: 14 Oct 2015
Jesse M. Fried and Nitzan Shilon
Harvard Law School and Peking University School of Transnational Law
Downloads 1,298 (11,316)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Dodd-Frank, Clawback, Executive Compensation, Bonuses, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Manipulation, Managerial Power, Sarbanes Oxley

10.

Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 95, pp. 384-399, 2010, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 956243
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 12 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 29 Jul 2011
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,191 (11,006)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Venture capital, preferred stock, liquidation preferences, corporate governance, incomplete contracting

11.

Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, pp., 421-477, 2000
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 01 Mar 2000 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,149 (12,866)
Citation 12

Abstract:

share repurchases, repurchase tender offer, insider trading, signaling, securities regulation, corporate governance

12.

The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders

124 Yale Law Journal 1554-1628 (2015), ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 200
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 03 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2015
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,111 (9,130)

Abstract:

AOL-Time Warner, corporate governance, short-termism, short-term shareholders, long-term shareholders, agency costs, earnings manipulation, managerial myopia, share repurchases, open market repurchases, acquisitions, seasoned equity offerings, real earnings management, Wal-Mart

13.

Insider Trading via the Corporation

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 164, No. 4, 2014 (pp.. 801-839)
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 02 Aug 2012 Last Revised: 09 May 2014
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 903 (14,886)

Abstract:

insider trading, corporate governance, stock buybacks, share repurchases, open market repurchases, equity issuances, at-the-market offerings, overvalued equity, payout policy, seasoned equity offerings, manipulation, real earnings management

14.

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Downloads 891 ( 20,167)
Citation 8

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 114, pp. 2386-2436, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 321, 2001, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 49
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 10 Apr 2001 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 833 (21,857)
Citation 8

Abstract:

bankruptcy, insolvency, secured debt, security interest, collateral, valuation, bankruptcy reform

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

NBER Working Paper No. w8276
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 05 May 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 58 (306,812)
Citation 8

Abstract:

15.

Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups

98 Cornell L. Review 1319-1357 (2013)
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 19 Feb 2013 Last Revised: 06 Oct 2013
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and Harvard Law School
Downloads 757 (18,609)

Abstract:

venture capital, startups, preferred shareholders, common shareholders, corporate governance, entrepreneurs, founders, mergers, trade sales, carve-outs, vote-buying, opportunism, liquidation preferences

16.

Open Market Repurchases: Signaling or Managerial Opportunism?

Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 2, pp. 865-894, 2001, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 64
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 30 Aug 2001 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 737 (25,290)
Citation 8

Abstract:

share repurchases, open market repurchases, signaling, managerial opportunism, insider trading, payout policy

17.

Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups

New York University Law Review, Vol. 81, pp. 967-1025, 2006
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 19 Aug 2005 Last Revised: 27 Jun 2011
Jesse M. Fried and Mira Ganor
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 708 (23,687)
Citation 11

Abstract:

venture capital, start-ups, preferred stock, corporate governance, fiduciary duties

18.

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Yale Law Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 857-934, 1996, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 166
Number of pages: 93 Posted: 19 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 623 (25,741)
Citation 34

Abstract:

Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

19.

Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases

California Law Review, Vol. 93, pp. 1323-1386, October 2005
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 21 Oct 2005 Last Revised: 03 Feb 2014
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 613 (32,930)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Payout policy, stock repurchases, dividends, signaling, insider trading

20.

Do VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some Evidence from Silicon Valley

Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 18, 1104-1120 (2012)
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 27 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2014
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Indiana University Maurer School of Law and Harvard Law School
Downloads 557 (38,826)

Abstract:

Venture capital, dilution, corporate governance, inside rounds, opportunism, corporate law, inside financing, adverse selection

21.

Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure

Downloads 555 ( 38,992)
Citation 28

Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure

S. Cal. L. Rev. Vol. 71, pp. 303-392, 1998
Number of pages: 91 Posted: 08 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 21 Nov 2014
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 290 (84,551)
Citation 28

Abstract:

insider trading, executive compensation, corporate governance, securities regulation

Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure

Southern California Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 303-392, 1998
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 22 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 28 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 265 (93,444)
Citation 28

Abstract:

insider trading, executive compensation, corporate governance, securities regulation

22.

Option Backdating and its Implications

GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, William Forbes, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 853-886, 2008, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1118439
Number of pages: 1 Posted: 10 Apr 2008 Last Revised: 24 Jun 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 520 (40,310)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, CEOs, boards, camouflage, managerial power, Sarbanes Oxley, independent directors

23.

Insider Abstention

Yale Law Journal, Vol. 13, pp. 455-492, 2003, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 330520
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 18 Sep 2002 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 511 (38,180)
Citation 2

Abstract:

inside information, insider trading, securities regulation

24.

Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence

57 Journal of Law and Economics 865-895 (2014)
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 04 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 18 Mar 2015
Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried and Darian M. Ibrahim
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, Harvard Law School and William & Mary Law School
Downloads 480 (37,372)

Abstract:

incorporation, domicile, Delaware, corporate governance, entrepreneurs, founders, startups, corporation, corporate law, charters, venture capital

25.

Firms Gone Dark

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 76, pp. 135-160 (2009), UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1300751
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2013
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 440 (48,293)

Abstract:

securities regulation, mandatory disclosure, going dark, agency costs

26.

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

Downloads 429 ( 53,879)
Citation 16

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 82, pp.1279-1348, 1997, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 224
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 27 Jan 1998 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 397 (58,677)
Citation 16

Abstract:

Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

NBER Working Paper No. w6472
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 11 Jun 2000
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 32 (394,001)
Citation 16

Abstract:

27.

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Downloads 416 ( 55,967)

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 5, p. 1113, 2011
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 May 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 374 (63,008)

Abstract:

share repurchases, equity issuances, executive pay, stock, stock options, restricted stock, corporate governance, agency costs, overvalued equity, insider trading, payout policy, seasoned equity offerings, executive compensation, manipulation

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 696
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 27 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 02 Jul 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 42 (355,753)

Abstract:

28.

Managers' Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 55, pp. 1813-1844, 2002
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 27 Oct 2002 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried and Alon Chaver
Harvard Law School and University of California, Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 380 (57,638)
Citation 2

Abstract:

insolvency, bankruptcy, contracts, executory contracts, fiduciary duty

29.

Hands-Off Options

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 61, pp. 453-474, 2008, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1091068
Number of pages: 1 Posted: 07 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 24 Jun 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 300 (77,784)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Executive compensation, stock options, insider trading, earnings manipulation

30.

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

Downloads 295 ( 83,415)
Citation 17

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

NBER Working Paper No. w8661
Number of pages: 113 Posted: 14 Dec 2001
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 246 (101,124)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3112
Number of pages: 115 Posted: 17 Jan 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 49 (333,081)
Citation 17

Abstract:

Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, private benefits of control, agency costs, rent extraction

31.

Excess Pay and the Dodd-Frank Clawback

Director Notes, No. DN-V3N20, pp. 1-8, October 2011
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 03 Nov 2011
Jesse M. Fried and Nitzan Shilon
Harvard Law School and Peking University School of Transnational Law
Downloads 246 (92,434)

Abstract:

Dodd-Frank, clawback, executive compensation, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock, Sarbanes-Oxley

32.

Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy

Duke Law Journal, Vol. 46, pp. 517-574, 1996
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 08 Apr 1997
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 161 (137,605)
Citation 3

Abstract:

executory contracts, bankruptcy, inefficient breach

33.

How to Tie Equity Compensation to Long-Term Results

Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 22, Issue 1, pp. 99-106, Winter 2010
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 31 Mar 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 4 (520,068)

Abstract:

34.

Short-Termism and Capital Flows

Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 17-062, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 342/2017
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2017
Jesse M. Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School
Downloads 0 (36,223)

Abstract:

Short-termism; quarterly capitalism; corporate governance; share buybacks; open market repurchases; dividends; equity issuances; seasoned equity offerings; equity compensation; acquisitions; payout policy; capital flows; capital distribution

35.

Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 314/2016
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 14 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2016
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 0 (50,295)

Abstract:

Executive pay, Dodd Frank, clawback, excess pay, securities regulation, misreporting, recovery, erroneously awarded compensation, restatement, accounting, financial reporting, financial results, manipulation

36.

Concentration in the Israeli Economy and Bank Investment in Nonfinancial Companies

Posted: 05 Sep 1997
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Louis Kaplow and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School

Abstract:

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