Jesse M. Fried

Harvard Law School

Professor of Law

1575 Massachusetts

Griswold Hall 506

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10289/Fried

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Research Associate

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium

Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat

1000 Brussels

Belgium

  • Harvard Law School

    • Email
    • Tel: 617-384-8158

  • European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

50

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in Total Papers Downloads

88,646

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 460

in Total Papers Citations

1,121

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1,452

Scholarly Papers (50)

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1.

Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 647-673, 2005, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 8-22, 2005, Academy of Management Perspectives, pp. 5-24, February 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 528
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Jul 2005 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 11,228 (756)
Citation 26

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Keywords: Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, disclosure, stealth compensation, compensation consultants, camouflage.

2.

What Courses Should Law Students Take? Harvard's Largest Employers Weigh In

HLS Program on the Legal Profession Research Paper No. 2014-12, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 14-20
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 20 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 23 Nov 2014
John C. Coates IV, Jesse M. Fried and Kathryn E. Spier
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 8,528 (1,218)
Citation 1

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legal education, accounting, finance, law firms, legal practice, corporate finance, legal profession

3.

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Downloads 8,503 ( 1,222)
Citation 494

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, pp. 71-92, 2003, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 421
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Jan 2003 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 8,255 (1,279)
Citation 47

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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

NBER Working Paper No. w9813
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 05 Jul 2003 Last Revised: 26 Oct 2022
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 192 (260,510)
Citation 76

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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Aug 2003
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 56 (615,759)
Citation 132
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M14, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, stock options, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, executive loans, compensation consultants, expensing

4.

Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

Harvard University Press, 2004
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 30 Apr 2004 Last Revised: 18 Jul 2019
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 7,909 (1,397)
Citation 6

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Corporate governance, managers, executives, shareholders, boards, directors, executive compensation, principal-agent problem, pay for performance, agency costs, stock options, rents, camouflage

5.

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Downloads 6,031 ( 2,195)
Citation 205

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 69, pp. 751-846, 2002, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 366, June 2002
Number of pages: 97 Posted: 19 Jun 2002 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 5,810 (2,303)
Citation 2

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corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage, insider trading, indexed options, vesting

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

NBER Working Paper No. w9068
Number of pages: 101 Posted: 20 Jul 2002 Last Revised: 13 Oct 2022
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 184 (270,771)
Citation 2

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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Number of pages: 103 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 37 (735,058)
Citation 17
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Corporate governance, managers, shareholders, directors, boards, executive compensation, stock options, private benefits of control, principal-agent problem, agency costs, rent extraction, golden parachutes, accounting, FASB rules, disclosure, camouflage

6.

Paying for Long-Term Performance

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 158, pp. 1915-1959, 2010, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 658
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 14 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 08 Oct 2010
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 5,764 (2,355)
Citation 52

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executive compensation, executive pay, equity-based compensation, restricted shares, options, risk-taking, long-term, retention, backdating, spring-loading, unloading, insider trading, hedging, derivatives

7.

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 807-822, 2005, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 653125, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 505, February 2005
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Feb 2005 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 3,915 (4,590)
Citation 16

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Executive compensation, agency problems, pay for performance, nonperformance pay, performance pay, soft landing, golden goodbyes, camouflage, misreporting, restatement, earning manipulation, incentives

8.

Short-Termism and Capital Flows

Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Forthcoming., European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 342/2017, Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 17-062
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 10 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 25 Nov 2018
Jesse M. Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School (HBS)
Downloads 2,122 (12,381)
Citation 8

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short-termism; quarterly capitalism; corporate governance; share buybacks; open market repurchases; dividends; equity issuances; seasoned equity offerings; equity compensation; acquisitions; payout policy; capital flows; capital distribution

9.

Alibaba: A Case Study of Synthetic Control

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 533/2020, Harvard Business Law Review, Volume 11, Issue 2, 2021, Pages 279-309
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 28 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 31 Jan 2023
Jesse M. Fried and Ehud Kamar
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law
Downloads 1,938 (14,283)

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Alibaba, Ant Group, China, Controlled Firms, Controlling Shareholder, Corporate Control, VIEs, Corporate Governance

10.

The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders

124 Yale Law Journal 1554-1628 (2015), ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 200
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 03 Mar 2013 Last Revised: 28 Apr 2015
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,859 (15,243)
Citation 8

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AOL-Time Warner, corporate governance, short-termism, short-term shareholders, long-term shareholders, agency costs, earnings manipulation, managerial myopia, share repurchases, open market repurchases, acquisitions, seasoned equity offerings, real earnings management, Wal-Mart

11.

The European Commission's Sustainable Corporate Governance Report: A Critique

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper 553/2020, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 20-30, Yale Journal on Regulation Bulletin
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 21 Oct 2020 Last Revised: 27 Apr 2021
Mark J. Roe, Holger Spamann, Jesse M. Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School (HBS)
Downloads 1,850 (15,367)

Abstract:

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corporate governance, short-termism, hedge funds, shareholder activism, European Union, securities regulation, agency costs, research and development, political economy, investment, payouts, repurchases

12.

Will Nasdaq's Diversity Rules Harm Investors?

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 579/2021
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 26 Mar 2021 Last Revised: 09 Apr 2021
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,846 (15,427)

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NASDAQ, SEC, corporate governance, boards, diversity

13.

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Downloads 1,831 (15,631)
Citation 15

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Berkeley Business Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp. 291-326, 2004, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 487, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 583861
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,762 (16,282)
Citation 2

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Executive compensation, pay for performance, agency costs, rent extraction, stealth compensation, camouflage, retirement benefits, deferred compensation, executive pensions, perks

Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

NBER Working Paper No. w10742
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 22 Sep 2004 Last Revised: 09 Nov 2022
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 69 (552,286)
Citation 3

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14.

Excess-Pay Clawbacks

Journal of Corporation Law, Vol. 36, pp. 722-751, 2011
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 05 Jul 2011 Last Revised: 14 Oct 2015
Jesse M. Fried and Nitzan Shilon
Harvard Law School and Peking University School of Transnational Law
Downloads 1,647 (18,409)
Citation 1

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Dodd-Frank, Clawback, Executive Compensation, Bonuses, Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Manipulation, Managerial Power, Sarbanes Oxley

15.

Renegotiation of Cash Flow Rights in the Sale of VC-Backed Firms

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Vol. 95, pp. 384-399, 2010, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 956243
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 12 Jan 2007 Last Revised: 29 Jul 2011
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt University Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,510 (21,004)
Citation 13

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Venture capital, preferred stock, liquidation preferences, corporate governance, incomplete contracting

16.

Insider Trading via the Corporation

University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2014, Forthcoming, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 743, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 12-39
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 02 Aug 2012 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2020
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,419 (23,083)
Citation 3

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insider trading, corporate governance, stock buybacks, share repurchases open market repurchases, equity issuances, at-the-market offerings, overvalued equity, payout policy, seasoned equity offerings, manipulation, real earnings management

17.

Carrots and Sticks: How VCs Induce Entrepreneurial Teams to Sell Startups

Cornell Law Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 19 Feb 2013 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2020
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt University Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,331 (25,394)
Citation 3

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venture capital, startups, preferred shareholders, common shareholders, corporate governance, entrepreneurs, founders, mergers, trade sales, carve-outs, vote-buying, opportunism, liquidation preferences

18.

Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, pp., 421-477, 2000
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 01 Mar 2000 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,271 (27,138)
Citation 2

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share repurchases, repurchase tender offer, insider trading, signaling, securities regulation, corporate governance

19.

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Yale Law Journal, Vol. 105, pp. 857-934, 1996, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 166
Number of pages: 93 Posted: 19 Jun 2003 Last Revised: 07 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 1,128 (32,374)
Citation 5

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Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

20.

Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups

New York University Law Review, Vol. 81, pp. 967-1025, 2006
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 19 Aug 2005 Last Revised: 27 Jun 2011
Jesse M. Fried and Mira Ganor
Harvard Law School and University of Texas at Austin - School of Law
Downloads 1,124 (32,527)
Citation 5

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venture capital, start-ups, preferred stock, corporate governance, fiduciary duties

21.

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Downloads 1,015 (37,493)
Citation 1

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 114, pp. 2386-2436, 2001, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 321, 2001, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 49
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 10 Apr 2001 Last Revised: 10 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 924 (42,184)
Citation 2

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bankruptcy, insolvency, secured debt, security interest, collateral, valuation, bankruptcy reform

A New Approach to Valuing Secured Claims in Bankruptcy

NBER Working Paper No. w8276
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 05 May 2001 Last Revised: 14 Aug 2022
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 91 (467,608)

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22.

Short-Termism, Shareholder Payouts, and Investment in the EU

European Financial Management, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper 544/2020
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 13 Oct 2020 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2021
Jesse M. Fried and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School and Harvard Business School (HBS)
Downloads 999 (38,363)
Citation 2

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short-termism; EU; payout policy; investment; innovation

23.

Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank Clawback

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 314/2016
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 14 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2016
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 887 (45,272)
Citation 7

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Executive pay, Dodd Frank, clawback, excess pay, securities regulation, misreporting, recovery, erroneously awarded compensation, restatement, accounting, financial reporting, financial results, manipulation

24.

Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure

Downloads 836 (49,149)
Citation 15

Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure

Southern California Law Review, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 303-392, 1998
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 22 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2020
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 476 (99,920)
Citation 17

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insider trading, executive compensation, corporate governance, securities regulation

Reducing the Profitability of Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure

S. Cal. L. Rev. Vol. 71, pp. 303-392, 1998
Number of pages: 91 Posted: 08 Nov 2005 Last Revised: 21 Nov 2014
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 360 (138,247)

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insider trading, executive compensation, corporate governance, securities regulation

25.

Open Market Repurchases: Signaling or Managerial Opportunism?

Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Vol. 2, pp. 865-894, 2001, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 64
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 30 Aug 2001 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 833 (49,392)
Citation 6

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share repurchases, open market repurchases, signaling, managerial opportunism, insider trading, payout policy

26.

Do VCs Use Inside Rounds to Dilute Founders? Some Evidence from Silicon Valley

Journal of Corporate Finance, Volume 18, 1104-1120 (2012)
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 27 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 03 Mar 2014
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt University Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 805 (51,724)
Citation 6

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Venture capital, dilution, corporate governance, inside rounds, opportunism, corporate law, inside financing, adverse selection

27.

Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence

57 Journal of Law and Economics 865-895 (2014)
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 04 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 18 Mar 2015
Brian J. Broughman, Jesse M. Fried and Darian M. Ibrahim
Vanderbilt University Law School, Harvard Law School and William & Mary Law School
Downloads 709 (61,302)
Citation 2

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incorporation, domicile, Delaware, corporate governance, entrepreneurs, founders, startups, corporation, corporate law, charters, venture capital

28.

Informed Trading and False Signaling with Open Market Repurchases

California Law Review, Vol. 93, pp. 1323-1386, October 2005
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 21 Oct 2005 Last Revised: 03 Feb 2014
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 704 (61,884)
Citation 2

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Payout policy, stock repurchases, dividends, signaling, insider trading

29.

China and the Rise of Law-Proof Insiders

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper 557/2020
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 10 Dec 2020 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2022
Jesse M. Fried and Ehud Kamar
Harvard Law School and Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law
Downloads 686 (63,963)
Citation 2

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China, Corporate Governance, Securities Law, Corporate Law, Enforcement, Cross-Listing, Bonding

30.

Insider Abstention

Yale Law Journal, Vol. 13, pp. 455-492, 2003, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 330520
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 18 Sep 2002 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 660 (67,240)

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inside information, insider trading, securities regulation

31.

Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 405/2018, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 18-23, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 401, Harvard Business Law Review, Vol. 10, 2020
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 07 May 2018 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2021
Brian J. Broughman and Jesse M. Fried
Vanderbilt University Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 629 (71,765)
Citation 1

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Startups, Founders, Venture Capital, VC, IPOs, Stock Markets, Innovation, Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, Corporate Governance, CEO, Shareholders, NASDAQ

32.

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Downloads 603 (75,352)
Citation 8

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Texas Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 5, p. 1113, 2011
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 May 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 538 (85,848)

Abstract:

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share repurchases, equity issuances, executive pay, stock, stock options, restricted stock, corporate governance, agency costs, overvalued equity, insider trading, payout policy, seasoned equity offerings, executive compensation, manipulation

Share Repurchases, Equity Issuances, and the Optimal Design of Executive Pay

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 696
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 27 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 02 Jul 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 65 (570,812)
Citation 9

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33.

Option Backdating and its Implications

GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, William Forbes, ed., Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, Washington and Lee Law Review, Vol. 65, pp. 853-886, 2008, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1118439
Number of pages: 1 Posted: 10 Apr 2008 Last Revised: 24 Jun 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 578 (79,435)
Citation 7

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Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, CEOs, boards, camouflage, managerial power, Sarbanes Oxley, independent directors

34.

The SEC's Misguided Climate Disclosure Rule Proposal

GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 61, 2022, GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 61, 2022, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2022-27, 41 Banking & Financial Services Policy Report 1, 2022, Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 22-17, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 4256724
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 27 Oct 2022 Last Revised: 05 Jan 2023
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Jonathan Berk, Sanjai Bhagat, Bernard S. Black, William J. Carney, David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Charles M. Elson, Jesse M. Fried, Sean J. Griffith, Jonathan M. Karpoff, F. Scott Kieff, Edmund W. Kitch, Kate Litvak, Julia D. Mahoney, Paul G. Mahoney, Adam C. Pritchard, Dale A. Oesterle, Roberta Romano, Christina Parajon Skinner and Todd J. Zywicki
George Washington University, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law, Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Finance, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Emory University School of Law, University of Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh - Katz School of Business, University of Delaware - John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance, Harvard Law School, Fordham University School of Law, University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business, George Washington University - Law School, University of Virginia School of Law, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, University of Virginia School of Law, University of Michigan Law School, Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law, Yale Law School, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School and George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School
Downloads 577 (79,607)

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SEC authority, climate disclosure, ESG, institutional investors, individual investors, information economics, government policy, financial markets, government power

35.

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

Downloads 568 (81,186)
Citation 17

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

Cornell Law Review, Vol. 82, pp.1279-1348, 1997, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 224
Number of pages: 79 Posted: 27 Jan 1998 Last Revised: 05 May 2009
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 474 (100,401)
Citation 20

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Secured debt, bankruptcy, reorganization, chapter 11, priority, creditors, debtors, security interests, collateral, unsecured debt, lenders, borrowers

The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics

NBER Working Paper No. w6472
Number of pages: 70 Posted: 11 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 10 Mar 2022
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 94 (457,740)

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36.

Stock Investors' Returns are Exaggerated

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 618/2021
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 16 Nov 2021 Last Revised: 29 Nov 2021
Jesse M. Fried, Paul Ma and Charles C. Y. Wang
Harvard Law School, University of Minnesota and Harvard Business School (HBS)
Downloads 537 (87,038)

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All-shareholder returns; capital flows; dividend reinvestment; equity premium; market timing; total shareholder returns

37.

Firms Gone Dark

University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 76, pp. 135-160 (2009), UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1300751
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Nov 2008 Last Revised: 26 Apr 2013
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 521 (90,417)

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securities regulation, mandatory disclosure, going dark, agency costs

38.

Managers' Fiduciary Duty Upon the Firm's Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 55, pp. 1813-1844, 2002
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 27 Oct 2002 Last Revised: 27 Sep 2010
Jesse M. Fried and Alon Chaver
Harvard Law School and University of California, Berkeley - School of Law
Downloads 461 (104,827)
Citation 2

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insolvency, bankruptcy, contracts, executory contracts, fiduciary duty

39.

Cheap-Stock Tunneling Around Preemptive Rights

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 408/2018, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 18-33, Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 11 Jun 2018 Last Revised: 11 Sep 2019
Jesse M. Fried and Holger Spamann
Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School
Downloads 459 (105,357)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Controlling shareholder, tunneling, equity issuance, equity issue, equity tunneling, preemptive rights, minority shareholders, public shareholders, rights offers, rights issues, private firms

40.

The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Pay Tunneling

Downloads 452 (107,296)
Citation 8

The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Pay Tunneling

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 385/2018, Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) - Discussion Paper No. DP12697, Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Volume 138, Issue 3, December 2020, Pages 777-788
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 13 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 31 Jan 2023
Jesse M. Fried, Ehud Kamar and Yishay Yafeh
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law and Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration
Downloads 452 (106,220)
Citation 4

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controlling shareholders, executive compensation, related-party transactions, shareholder voting, tunneling

The Effect of Minority Veto Rights on Controller Tunneling

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12697
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 14 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 02 Dec 2019
Jesse M. Fried, Ehud Kamar and Yishay Yafeh
Harvard Law School, Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law and Hebrew University of Jerusalem - Jerusalem School of Business Administration
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controlling shareholders, corporate governance, corporate law, Executive compensation, minority shareholders, related party transactions, securities regulation, shareholder voting, tunneling, veto rights

41.

Excess Pay and the Dodd-Frank Clawback

Director Notes, No. DN-V3N20, pp. 1-8, October 2011
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 03 Nov 2011
Jesse M. Fried and Nitzan Shilon
Harvard Law School and Peking University School of Transnational Law
Downloads 369 (135,440)

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Dodd-Frank, clawback, executive compensation, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock, Sarbanes-Oxley

42.

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

Downloads 347 (144,961)
Citation 10

Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

NBER Working Paper No. w8661
Number of pages: 113 Posted: 14 Dec 2001 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2022
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 297 (169,917)

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Executive Compensation in America: Optimal Contracting or Extraction of Rents?

Number of pages: 115 Posted: 17 Jan 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law
Downloads 50 (649,621)
Citation 1
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Executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, private benefits of control, agency costs, rent extraction

43.

Hands-Off Options

Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 61, pp. 453-474, 2008, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1091068
Number of pages: 1 Posted: 07 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 24 Jun 2011
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 345 (145,891)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Executive compensation, stock options, insider trading, earnings manipulation

44.

Rights Offers and Delaware Law

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 596/2021
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 Jun 2021 Last Revised: 08 Jul 2021
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 318 (159,118)

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Delaware, Rights Offer, Controlling Stockholder, Insider Trading, Dilution, Equity Issuances

45.

Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy

Duke Law Journal, Vol. 46, pp. 517-574, 1996
Number of pages: 1 Posted: 08 Apr 1997 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2020
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 238 (213,500)

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executory contracts, bankruptcy, inefficient breach

46.

Powering Preemptive Rights with Presubscription Disclosure

Chapter in Luca Enriques and Tobias H. Tröger, eds., The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions (Cambridge University Press, Forthcoming)., European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 418/2018, Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 19-06
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 06 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 26 Oct 2020
Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School
Downloads 229 (221,661)
Citation 2

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Controlling shareholder, tunneling, equity issuance, equity issue, equity tunneling, preemptive rights, minority shareholders, public shareholders, rights offers, rights issues, private firms

47.

Amicus Brief of Law and Finance Professors in Verition Partners v. Aruba Networks (Appraisal Lawsuit)

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 02 Jan 2019
Brian J. Broughman, Audra L. Boone, Albert H. Choi, Jesse M. Fried, Mira Ganor, Antonio J. Macias and Noah Stoffman
Vanderbilt University Law School, Texas Christian University - M.J. Neeley School of Business, University of Michigan Law School, Harvard Law School, University of Texas at Austin - School of Law, Baylor University and Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Finance
Downloads 224 (226,393)

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Appraisal, Efficient Market Hypothesis, Mergers

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repurchases, buybacks, equity issuances, investment, R&D, insider trading, manipulation, disclosure

49.

The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable (HFCA) Act: A Critique

European Corporate Governance Institute - Law Working Paper No. 721/2023
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 12 Jul 2023 Last Revised: 18 Jul 2023
Jesse M. Fried and Tamar Groswald Ozery
Harvard Law School and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Downloads 94 (454,156)

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China, cross-listing, Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, corporate governance

50.

Concentration in the Israeli Economy and Bank Investment in Nonfinancial Companies

Posted: 05 Sep 1997
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Louis Kaplow and Jesse M. Fried
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and Harvard Law School

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