Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
Toulouse School of Economics
Time-inconsistency, Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, Investment Good, Asymmetric Information
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File name: ECIN.pdf
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bargaining, the Nash Solution, ISHARA Preference, Risk Aversion
Bargaining, Nash Solution, Rubinstein Bargaining Solution, risk sharing, change in risk, decreasing absolute risk aversion
Pre-hire Screening, Interim Performance Evaluation, Subjective Evaluation, Halo Effect
collusion, falsification, health care insurance, physician payment
Assortative matching, efficient risk sharing, transferable utility, systematic risk, idiosyncratic risk, risk vulnerability, Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk
all-pay auction; buy-price; entry
all-pay auction; Bertrand competition; buy-price; list price
File name: BOER.pdf
risk sharing, moral hazard, matching
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