1-25 Atsuta-nishimachi, Atsuta
Nagoya, Aichi 456-8612
Nagoya Gakuin University - Department of Economics
Approval voting, Characterization, Dichotomous preferences, Strategy-proofness, May's Theorem
Satiation, Unbounded-from-below choice sets, Individually rational utility set, Competitive equilibrium
approval voting, variable set of alternatives, ballot aggregation functions
Borda rule, social choice function, axiomatic characterization
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