Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

550 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20429

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

9

DOWNLOADS

588

CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (9)

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and during the Great Depression

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 27 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 18 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 114 (237,868)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

Office of Financial Research Research Paper No. 18-06
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 15 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 22 (514,452)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression, Financial Stability

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2018-05
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 22 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 12 (578,163)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and During the Great Depression

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 869
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 18 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 11 (584,718)

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double liability, moral hazard, market discipline, bank runs, Great Depression

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-20
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 11 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 23 Dec 2018
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 91 (277,799)

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Fed member banks, bank networks, liquidity risk

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Office of Financial Research Working Paper No. 15-05, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-75
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 22 Aug 2015
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 47 (396,667)

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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

FRB Richmond Working Paper No. 16-6
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 07 Jul 2016
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 15 (558,667)

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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

NBER Working Paper No. w21684
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 02 Nov 2015
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 4 (631,795)

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Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Sep 2016 Last Revised: 22 Mar 2019
Haelim Anderson, Mark E. Paddrik and Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research and Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business
Downloads 101 (259,318)

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bank networks, financial interconnectedness, systemic risk, contagion, liquidity withdrawal, the National Banking Acts

Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

OFR WP 16-13
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 21 Mar 2017
Mark E. Paddrik, Haelim Anderson and Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business
Downloads 48 (392,960)

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bank networks, financial interconnectedness, systemic risk, contagion, liquidity withdrawal, National Banking Act

4.

Stopping Contagion with Bailouts: Microevidence from Pennsylvania Bank Networks During the Panic of 1884

Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming, OFR WP 16-03
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 03 Apr 2016
John C. Bluedorn and Haelim Anderson
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department and Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Downloads 42 (407,318)

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financial networks, contagion, systemic risk, systemically important banks (SIBs)

5.

Determinants of Long-Term Versus Short-Term Bank Credit in EU Countries

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7436
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 20 Apr 2016
Haelim Anderson, Claudia Ruiz Ortega and Thierry Tressel
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department
Downloads 41 (411,003)

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Economic Insecurity

6.

Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 06 May 2019
Haelim Anderson, Selman Erol and Guillermo Ordoñez
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 24 (492,696)

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Dual banking system, Federal Reserve Act, Shadow Banking, Interbank Networks, Systemic Risk

7.

Retail Trade by Federal Reserve District, 1919 to 1939: A Statistical History

NBER Working Paper No. w16617
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 18 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 31 Dec 2010
Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 13 (549,717)

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8.

Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

NBER Working Paper No. w23828
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Sep 2017
Haelim Anderson, Gary Richardson and Brian Yang
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, University of California at Irvine and University of Minnesota - Duluth
Downloads 3 (611,579)
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9.

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936-1937 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

Posted: 06 Sep 2014
Haelim Anderson and Patrick Van Horn
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Scripps College

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Monetary policy, Economic history, banking regulation