Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

550 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20429

United States

  • Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 14,061

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45

CROSSREF CITATIONS

31

Scholarly Papers (13)

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1.

Does Increased Shareholder Liability Always Reduce Bank Moral Hazard?

Downloads 272 (125,699)
Citation 1

Does Increased Shareholder Liability Always Reduce Bank Moral Hazard?

Number of pages: 64 Posted: 27 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 05 Aug 2020
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 216 (157,502)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

Office of Financial Research Research Paper No. 18-06
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 15 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 31 (525,940)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression, Financial Stability

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2018-05
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 22 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 13 (649,703)

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Double Liability, Moral Hazard, Market Discipline, Bank Runs, Great Depression

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and During the Great Depression

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 869
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 18 Oct 2018
Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Seoul National University - Business School
Downloads 12 (657,576)
Citation 1

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double liability, moral hazard, market discipline, bank runs, Great Depression

2.

Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

Downloads 239 (143,319)
Citation 11

Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Sep 2016 Last Revised: 22 Mar 2019
Haelim Anderson, Mark E. Paddrik and Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research and Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business
Downloads 184 (182,956)
Citation 10

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bank networks, financial interconnectedness, systemic risk, contagion, liquidity withdrawal, the National Banking Acts

Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

OFR WP 16-13
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 21 Mar 2017
Mark E. Paddrik, Haelim Anderson and Jessie Jiaxu Wang
Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business
Downloads 55 (419,089)
Citation 4

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bank networks, financial interconnectedness, systemic risk, contagion, liquidity withdrawal, National Banking Act

3.

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Downloads 169 (197,118)
Citation 8

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-20
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 11 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 23 Dec 2018
Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 95 (306,987)
Citation 9

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Fed member banks, bank networks, liquidity risk

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Office of Financial Research Working Paper No. 15-05, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-75
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 22 Aug 2015
Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 49 (441,732)

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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

FRB Richmond Working Paper No. 16-6
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 07 Jul 2016
Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 19 (605,115)

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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

NBER Working Paper No. w21684
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 02 Nov 2015
Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 6 (704,775)

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4.

Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act

Downloads 138 (233,107)
Citation 3

Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 06 May 2019 Last Revised: 17 Aug 2020
Haelim Anderson, Selman Erol and Guillermo Ordoñez
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 138 (233,741)
Citation 3

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Dual banking system, Federal Reserve Act, Shadow Banking, Interbank Networks, Systemic Risk

Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act

NBER Working Paper No. w27721
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 25 Aug 2020
Haelim Anderson, Selman Erol and Guillermo Ordoñez
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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5.

The Effect of the Central Bank Liquidity Support during Pandemics: Evidence from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 928
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 02 Jun 2020
Haelim Anderson, Jin-Wook Chang and Adam M. Copeland
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Downloads 55 (412,688)

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1918 influenza, pandemics, financial stability, bank lending, economic recovery

6.

Stopping Contagion with Bailouts: Microevidence from Pennsylvania Bank Networks During the Panic of 1884

Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming, OFR WP 16-03
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 03 Apr 2016
John C. Bluedorn and Haelim Anderson
International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department and Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Downloads 47 (441,804)

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financial networks, contagion, systemic risk, systemically important banks (SIBs)

7.

Information Management in Times of Crisis

Downloads 43 (457,867)

Information Management in Times of Crisis

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 907, December 2019
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Dec 2019
Haelim Anderson and Adam M. Copeland
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Downloads 29 (537,499)

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information management, bank opacity, banking crisis, Great Depression, depositor confidence

Information Management in Times of Crisis

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2020-01
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 18 Jun 2020
Haelim Anderson and Adam M. Copeland
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Downloads 14 (642,065)

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Information Management, Bank Opacity, Banking Crisis, Great Depression, Depositor Confidence

8.

Determinants of Long-Term Versus Short-Term Bank Credit in EU Countries

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7436
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 20 Apr 2016
Haelim Anderson, Claudia Ruiz Ortega and Thierry Tressel
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department
Downloads 43 (457,867)

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Economic Insecurity

9.

The Effect of the Central Bank Liquidity Support During Pandemics: Evidence from the 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic

FEDS Working Paper No. 2020-050
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 25 Jun 2020
Haelim Anderson, Jin-Wook Chang and Adam M. Copeland
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Downloads 27 (534,684)

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1918 Spanish influenza, Pandemics, Financial stability, Bank lending, Economic recovery

10.

Retail Trade by Federal Reserve District, 1919 to 1939: A Statistical History

NBER Working Paper No. w16617
Number of pages: 89 Posted: 18 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 31 Dec 2010
Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine
Downloads 15 (611,412)

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11.

Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

NBER Working Paper No. w23828
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Sep 2017
Haelim Anderson, Gary Richardson and Brian Yang
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, University of California at Irvine and University of Minnesota - Duluth
Downloads 4 (690,821)

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12.

The Effect of Central Bank Liquidity Support during Pandemics: Evidence from the 1918 Influenza Pandemic

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2020-02
Posted: 22 Jun 2020
Haelim Anderson, Jin-Wook Chang and Adam M. Copeland
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of New York

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1918 influenza, pandemics, financial stability, bank lending, economic recovery

13.

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936-1937 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

Posted: 06 Sep 2014
Haelim Anderson and Patrick Van Horn
Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Scripps College

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Monetary policy, Economic history, banking regulation