Author Page for Haelim Anderson

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and during the Great Depression

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Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and during the Great Depression

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 27 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 18 Oct 2018

Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School

Downloads 114 (237,868)

Abstract:

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

Office of Financial Research Research Paper No. 18-06

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 15 Oct 2018

Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School

Downloads 22 (514,452)

Abstract:

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability Before and During the Great Depression

FDIC Center for Financial Research Paper No. 2018-05

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 22 Oct 2018

Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School

Downloads 12 (578,163)

Abstract:

Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and During the Great Depression

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 869

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 18 Oct 2018

Haelim Anderson, Daniel Barth and Dong Beom Choi

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America – Office of Financial Research and Seoul National University - Business School

Downloads 11 (584,718)

Abstract:

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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Downloads 157 (183,934)

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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-20

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 11 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 23 Dec 2018

Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine

Downloads 91 (277,799)

Abstract:

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Office of Financial Research Working Paper No. 15-05, Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 15-75

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 22 Aug 2015

Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine

Downloads 47 (396,667)

Abstract:

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

FRB Richmond Working Paper No. 16-6

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 07 Jul 2016

Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine

Downloads 15 (558,667)

Abstract:

Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

NBER Working Paper No. w21684

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 02 Nov 2015

Charles W. Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Utah State University - Huntsman School of Business, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine

Downloads 4 (631,795)

Abstract:

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Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

Downloads 149 (192,143)

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Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 29 Sep 2016 Last Revised: 22 Mar 2019

Haelim Anderson, Mark E. Paddrik and Jessie Jiaxu Wang

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research and Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business

Downloads 101 (259,318)

Abstract:

Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts

OFR WP 16-13

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 21 Mar 2017

Mark E. Paddrik, Haelim Anderson and Jessie Jiaxu Wang

Government of the United States of America - Office of Financial Research, Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Arizona State University (ASU) - W.P. Carey School of Business

Downloads 48 (392,960)

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Stopping Contagion with Bailouts: Microevidence from Pennsylvania Bank Networks During the Panic of 1884

Journal of Banking and Finance, Forthcoming, OFR WP 16-03

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 03 Apr 2016

John C. Bluedorn and Haelim Anderson

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department and Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

Downloads 42 (407,318)

Abstract:

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Determinants of Long-Term Versus Short-Term Bank Credit in EU Countries

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7436

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 20 Apr 2016

Haelim Anderson, Claudia Ruiz Ortega and Thierry Tressel

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Research Department

Downloads 41 (411,003)

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Interbank Networks in the Shadows of the Federal Reserve Act

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 06 May 2019

Haelim Anderson, Selman Erol and Guillermo Ordoñez

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Carnegie Mellon University - David A. Tepper School of Business and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Downloads 24 (492,696)

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Retail Trade by Federal Reserve District, 1919 to 1939: A Statistical History

NBER Working Paper No. w16617

Number of pages: 89 Posted: 18 Dec 2010 Last Revised: 31 Dec 2010

Haelim Anderson and Gary Richardson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and University of California at Irvine

Downloads 13 (549,717)

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Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

NBER Working Paper No. w23828

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Sep 2017

Haelim Anderson, Gary Richardson and Brian Yang

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, University of California at Irvine and University of Minnesota - Duluth

Downloads 3 (611,579)

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Abstract:

9.

Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936-1937 Reduce Bank Lending? Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment

Posted: 06 Sep 2014

Haelim Anderson and Patrick Van Horn

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Scripps College

Haelim Anderson

Government of the United States of America – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

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Scholarly Papers (9)

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Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

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