Yu Zhou

Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University

Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto

Kyoto, 606-8501

Japan

affiliation not provided to SSRN

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

125

SSRN CITATIONS

3

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

Menu Mechanisms

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 28 Jan 2020
Andrew Mackenzie, Yu Zhou and Yu Zhou
Department of Economics, Maastricht University and affiliation not provided to SSRNGraduate School of Economics, Kyoto University
Downloads 65 (429,172)

Abstract:

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menu mechanism, privacy, strategy-proofness, robust implementation

2.

Competitive Equilibria in Matching Models with Financial Constraints

GSBE Research Memoranda; No. 007
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 17 May 2019
P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Yu Zhou and Yu Zhou
Maastricht University and affiliation not provided to SSRNGraduate School of Economics, Kyoto University
Downloads 41 (525,189)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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financial constraints, matching with contracts, stable outcome, quantity-constrained competitive equilibrium, equivalence result, lattice property, core outcome, rural hospital theorem

3.

Serial Vickrey Mechanism

ISER DP No. 1095, July 2020
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 17 Sep 2020
Yu Zhou, Yu Zhou and Shigehiro Serizawa
affiliation not provided to SSRNGraduate School of Economics, Kyoto University and Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Downloads 10 (725,071)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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the assignment market, minimum price equilibrium, general preferences, structural characterizations, Serial Vickrey mechanism, dynamic incentive compatibility

4.

A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems

ISER DP No. 1120
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 05 Mar 2021
Yu Zhou, Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun and Shigehiro Serizawa
affiliation not provided to SSRNGraduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Seoul National University - School of Economics and Osaka University - Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Downloads 9 (733,068)

Abstract:

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Slot allocation problem, single-peakedness, efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, Vickrey rule