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Executive compensation, limited liability, options, risk management, relative performance evaluation.
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP10180.
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contract theory, informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation
transparency, banking, rollover risk, stress tests, crises
transparency, banking, rollover risk, crises
Contract theory, principal-agent model, informativeness principle
This is a National Bureau of Economic Research Paper. NBER charges a fee of
$5.00 for this paper.
File name: nber.
File name: DP10279.
Contract theory, informativeness principle., principal-agent model
Informativeness principle, contract theory, principal-agent model, limited liability, pay-for-luck, relative performance evaluation, options
File name: DP10143.
contract theory, Informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation
Banking regulation, CEO incentives, Corporate governance, Moral hazard
CEO compensation, CEO retention, corporate governance, monitoring, ownership structure
downside risk, prudence, risk aversion, risk neutral probabilities, risk substitution
asset pricing, downside risk, quadratic pricing kernel, linear pricing kernel, prudence, risk neutral probabilities
deferred compensation, executive compensation, learning, principal-agent model, stock-options, vesting
downside risk, executive compensation, principal-agent model, prudence, risk preferences, stock options
corporate social performance (CSP), corporate social responsibility (CSR), executive compensation, fiduciary duty, incentive contracts, principal-agent model, socially responsible investment (SRI)
executive compensation, first-order approach, informativeness, likelihood ratio, performance measure, principal-agent model
banking regulation, contingent capital, financial regulation, financial stability, reverse convertible bonds
executive compensation, principal-agent model, options, prudence, risk aversion
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