Pierre Chaigneau

Queen's University

Associate Professor

Smith School of Business - Queen's University

143 Union Street

Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6

Canada

Queen’s University

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

22

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7,526

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,461

in Total Papers Citations

215

CROSSREF CITATIONS

18

Scholarly Papers (22)

1.
Downloads 994 (43,597)
Citation 6

How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?

Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 439/2014
Number of pages: 81 Posted: 29 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2021
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 961 (44,990)
Citation 5

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informativeness principle, limited liability, option repricing, pay-for-luck, performance-based vesting, performance-sensitive debt

The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability

NBER Working Paper No. w20456
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Sep 2014 Last Revised: 25 May 2023
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 31 (878,453)

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The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10143
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
Downloads 1 (1,181,121)
Citation 1
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contract theory, Informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation

How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15755
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 11 Feb 2021
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
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2.
Downloads 868 (52,568)
Citation 11

Does Improved Information Improve Incentives?

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 442/2014
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 24 May 2013 Last Revised: 28 Dec 2022
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 828 (55,181)
Citation 4

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Executive compensation, limited liability, options, risk management, relative performance evaluation.

The Value of Informativeness for Contracting

NBER Working Paper No. w20542
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 06 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 17 Feb 2023
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 39 (811,078)

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The Value of Informativeness for Contracting

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10180
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
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contract theory, informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation

3.

A Theory of Fair CEO Pay

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper No. 865/2022
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 11 Dec 2022 Last Revised: 02 Jan 2024
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 843 (54,690)
Citation 2

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Executive compensation, fairness, moral hazard

Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 17 Dec 2011 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2014
Matthieu Bouvard, Pierre Chaigneau and Adolfo de Motta
Toulouse School of Economics, University Toulouse Capitole (TSM-Research), Queen's University and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 692 (70,008)
Citation 25

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transparency, banking, rollover risk, stress tests, crises

Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises

Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 12 Jun 2012
Matthieu Bouvard, Pierre Chaigneau and Adolfo de Motta
Toulouse School of Economics, University Toulouse Capitole (TSM-Research), Queen's University and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 110 (460,852)
Citation 22

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transparency, banking, rollover risk, crises

The Informativeness Principle Without the First-Order Approach

Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 444/2014
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 28 Aug 2018
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 470 (113,516)
Citation 1

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Contract theory, principal-agent model, informativeness principle

The Generalized Informativeness Principle

NBER Working Paper No. w20729
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 08 Dec 2014 Last Revised: 20 Feb 2023
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 54 (705,380)

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The Generalized Informativeness Principle

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10279
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 1 (1,181,121)
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Contract theory, informativeness principle., principal-agent model

6.

Executive Compensation With Social and Environmental Performance

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 02 Feb 2023 Last Revised: 17 May 2024
Pierre Chaigneau and Nicolas Sahuguet
Queen's University and HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics
Downloads 512 (104,138)

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corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, ESG measurement, ESG harmonization, executive compensation

7.

The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 14 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 04 Jul 2017
Pierre Chaigneau and Nicolas Sahuguet
Queen's University and HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics
Downloads 439 (124,491)
Citation 3

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CEO compensation, CEO retention, corporate governance, monitoring, ownership structure

8.

When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal?

European Corporate Governance Institute – Finance Working Paper 780/2021
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 18 Aug 2021 Last Revised: 13 Jul 2023
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and London School of Economics
Downloads 359 (156,391)
Citation 1

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informativeness principle, limited liability, performance-sensitive debt

9.

Risk-Shifting and the Regulation of Bank CEOs' Compensation

Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2013, 23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2010 Paper
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2010 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2016
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 325 (174,029)
Citation 2

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Banking regulation, CEO incentives, Corporate governance, Moral hazard

10.

The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 09 Feb 2019 Last Revised: 15 Jul 2022
Pierre Chaigneau and Nicolas Sahuguet
Queen's University and HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics
Downloads 322 (175,821)

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board monitoring, corporate governance system, governance complementarity, hard and soft information, informativeness

11.
Downloads 302 (188,043)
Citation 1

Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 19 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 26 Sep 2018
Pierre Chaigneau and Louis Eeckhoudt
Queen's University and Facultes Universitaires Catholiques de Mons (FUCAM)
Downloads 244 (232,177)

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downside risk, prudence, risk aversion, risk neutral probabilities, risk substitution

Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi, Working Paper Series, No. 21, 2015
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 24 Nov 2015
Pierre Chaigneau and Louis Eeckhoudt
Queen's University and Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management
Downloads 58 (681,288)

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asset pricing, downside risk, quadratic pricing kernel, linear pricing kernel, prudence, risk neutral probabilities

12.

Risk Aversion, Prudence, and Compensation

Forthcoming, European Journal of Finance
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 19 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 08 Aug 2014
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 256 (222,491)
Citation 2

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downside risk, executive compensation, principal-agent model, prudence, risk preferences, stock options

13.

Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors

Journal of Business Ethics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 22 Jun 2014 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2016
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 195 (287,845)

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corporate social performance (CSP), corporate social responsibility (CSR), executive compensation, fiduciary duty, incentive contracts, principal-agent model, socially responsible investment (SRI)

14.

Prudence and the Convexity of Compensation Contracts

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 28 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 27 Feb 2017
Queen's University, HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics and Skema Business School & GREDEG, Université Côte D'Azur
Downloads 158 (345,991)
Citation 2

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executive compensation, principal-agent model, options, prudence, risk aversion

15.

Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 28 Dec 2022 Last Revised: 06 Jul 2023
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 140 (381,637)

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capital structure, downside risk, security design, tranching, upside potential

16.

Excessive Discretion or Information Transmission? Evidence from Option Valuation Reporting

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 22 Sep 2023
Pierre Chaigneau, Julien Le Maux and Antoine Noël
Queen's University, HEC Montreal - Department of Accounting Studies and NEOMA Business School
Downloads 114 (446,327)

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disclosure, dividend yield, executive stock option, fair measurement, manipulation, volatility

17.

The Implications of Reverse Convertible Bonds for Bank Runs and Risk Shifting

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2018
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 100 (490,133)

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banking regulation, contingent capital, financial regulation, financial stability, reverse convertible bonds

18.

When Strong Mitigation against a Pandemic Backfires

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 22 May 2020 Last Revised: 11 Jun 2020
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 92 (517,450)

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COVID-19, economic epidemiology, lockdown, pandemic mitigation, social feasibility

19.

The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 22 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 25 Jun 2017
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 79 (567,759)
Citation 7

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deferred compensation, executive compensation, learning, principal-agent model, stock-options, vesting

20.

Changes in Probability Distributions and the Form of Compensation Contracts

Forthcoming, Economic Theory Bulletin
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 02 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 04 Jul 2014
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 69 (612,239)

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executive compensation, first-order approach, informativeness, likelihood ratio, performance measure, principal-agent model

21.

Stickiness in Financial Reporting? Evidence from Interest Rate Reporting

Number of pages: 11 Posted: 21 Sep 2023
Pierre Chaigneau, Antoine Noël and Julien Le Maux
Queen's University, NEOMA Business School and HEC Montreal - Department of Accounting Studies
Downloads 32 (845,322)

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executive compensation, Interest Rates, manipulation, Regulation, stock option

22.

Performance Measure Skewness and the Structure of CEO Compensation: Theory and Evidence

Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 50
Pierre Chaigneau, Woo-Jin Chang and Stephen A. Hillegeist
Queen's University, EMLYON Business Schoolaffiliation not provided to SSRN and Arizona State University (ASU) - W. P. Carey School of Business, School of Accountancy
Downloads 0

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Performance measure skewness, compensation convexity, CEO compensation, CEO incentives