Pierre Chaigneau

Queen's University

Assistant Professor

Smith School of Business - Queen's University

143 Union Street

Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6

Canada

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

15

DOWNLOADS
Rank 11,956

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 11,956

in Total Papers Downloads

3,928

CITATIONS
Rank 30,798

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 30,798

in Total Papers Citations

18

Scholarly Papers (15)

Does Improved Information Improve Incentives?

Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 442/2014
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 24 May 2013 Last Revised: 23 Aug 2017
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 753 (31,592)

Abstract:

Loading...

Executive compensation, limited liability, options, risk management, relative performance evaluation.

The Value of Informativeness for Contracting

NBER Working Paper No. w20542
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 9 (609,804)

Abstract:

Loading...

The Value of Informativeness for Contracting

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10180
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

contract theory, informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation

Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 17 Dec 2011 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2014
Matthieu Bouvard, Pierre Chaigneau and Adolfo de Motta
McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management, Queen's University and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 584 (44,554)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

transparency, banking, rollover risk, stress tests, crises

Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises

Paris December 2012 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI-AFFI Paper
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 12 Jun 2012
Matthieu Bouvard, Pierre Chaigneau and Adolfo de Motta
McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management, Queen's University and McGill University - Desautels Faculty of Management
Downloads 63 (350,493)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

transparency, banking, rollover risk, crises

The Value of Performance Signals Under Limited Liability

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 439/2014
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 29 Aug 2014 Last Revised: 14 Jun 2019
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 482 (56,972)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

informativeness principle, limited liability, option repricing, pay-for-luck, performance-based vesting, performance-sensitive debt

The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability

NBER Working Paper No. w20456
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 08 Sep 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 3 (654,630)

Abstract:

Loading...

The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10143
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and Paul Baerwald School of Social Work
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

contract theory, Informativeness principle, limited liability, options, pay-for-luck, principal-agent model, relative performance evaluation

The Informativeness Principle Without the First-Order Approach

Games and Economic Behavior, Forthcoming, European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 444/2014
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 28 Aug 2018
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 417 (68,081)

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, principal-agent model, informativeness principle

The Generalized Informativeness Principle

NBER Working Paper No. w20729
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 8 (616,700)

Abstract:

Loading...

The Generalized Informativeness Principle

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10279
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 08 Dec 2014
Pierre Chaigneau, Alex Edmans and Daniel Gottlieb
Queen's University, London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting and University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, informativeness principle., principal-agent model

5.

The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

Paris December 2011 Finance Meeting EUROFIDAI - AFFI
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 14 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 04 Jul 2017
Pierre Chaigneau and Nicolas Sahuguet
Queen's University and HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics
Downloads 388 (74,892)

Abstract:

Loading...

CEO compensation, CEO retention, corporate governance, monitoring, ownership structure

6.

Risk-Shifting and the Regulation of Bank CEOs' Compensation

Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 9, No. 4, 2013, 23rd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2010 Paper
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 24 Aug 2010 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2016
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 284 (106,219)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Banking regulation, CEO incentives, Corporate governance, Moral hazard

7.
Downloads 252 (120,418)

Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 19 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 26 Sep 2018
Pierre Chaigneau and Louis Eeckhoudt
Queen's University and Facultes Universitaires Catholiques de Mons (FUCAM)
Downloads 210 (143,770)

Abstract:

Loading...

downside risk, prudence, risk aversion, risk neutral probabilities, risk substitution

Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities

Centre Interuniversitaire sur le Risque, les Politiques Economiques et l'Emploi, Working Paper Series, No. 21, 2015
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 24 Nov 2015
Pierre Chaigneau and Louis Eeckhoudt
Queen's University and Catholic University of Lille - IESEG School of Management
Downloads 42 (422,556)

Abstract:

Loading...

asset pricing, downside risk, quadratic pricing kernel, linear pricing kernel, prudence, risk neutral probabilities

8.

Risk Aversion, Prudence, and Compensation

Forthcoming, European Journal of Finance
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 19 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 08 Aug 2014
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 215 (140,891)

Abstract:

Loading...

downside risk, executive compensation, principal-agent model, prudence, risk preferences, stock options

9.

Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors

Journal of Business Ethics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 22 Jun 2014 Last Revised: 03 Aug 2016
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 160 (183,964)

Abstract:

Loading...

corporate social performance (CSP), corporate social responsibility (CSR), executive compensation, fiduciary duty, incentive contracts, principal-agent model, socially responsible investment (SRI)

10.

Prudence and the Convexity of Compensation Contracts

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 28 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 27 Feb 2017
Queen's University, HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics and HEC Montréal
Downloads 112 (243,463)

Abstract:

Loading...

executive compensation, principal-agent model, options, prudence, risk aversion

11.

The Complementarity of Governance Mechanisms: Performance Measurement and Active Monitoring

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 09 Feb 2019 Last Revised: 31 Mar 2019
Pierre Chaigneau and Nicolas Sahuguet
Queen's University and HEC Montreal - Institute of Applied Economics
Downloads 52 (379,310)

Abstract:

Loading...

Board Monitoring, CEO Turnover, Corporate Governance System, Governance Complementarity, Learning, Performance Measure

12.

Changes in Probability Distributions and the Form of Compensation Contracts

Forthcoming, Economic Theory Bulletin
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 02 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 04 Jul 2014
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 51 (382,606)

Abstract:

Loading...

executive compensation, first-order approach, informativeness, likelihood ratio, performance measure, principal-agent model

13.

The Implications of Reverse Convertible Bonds for Bank Runs and Risk Shifting

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 07 Oct 2018
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 40 (421,813)

Abstract:

Loading...

banking regulation, contingent capital, financial regulation, financial stability, reverse convertible bonds

14.

Excessive Discretion in Corporate Disclosure? Evidence from Option Valuation

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 18 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 06 Apr 2019
Pierre Chaigneau, Julien Le Maux and Antoine Noël
Queen's University, HEC Montreal - Department of Accounting Studies and NEOMA Business School
Downloads 29 (469,320)

Abstract:

Loading...

disclosure, dividend yield, executive stock option, fair measurement, volatility

15.

The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 22 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 25 Jun 2017
Pierre Chaigneau
Queen's University
Downloads 26 (484,765)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Loading...

deferred compensation, executive compensation, learning, principal-agent model, stock-options, vesting