Nikolai Visnjic

Goethe University Frankfurt

Gr├╝neburgplatz 1

Frankfurt am Main, 60323

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS
Rank 48,651

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 48,651

in Total Papers Downloads

652

CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.
Downloads 269 ( 94,502)

Insight Private Equity

SAFE Working Paper No. 23
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 20 Jun 2013
Andrej Gill and Nikolai Visnjic
Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 180 (140,427)

Abstract:

private equity, leveraged buyouts, active shareholders, corporate restructuring, operational performance

Insight Private Equity

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 12 Oct 2012
Andrej Gill and Nikolai Visnjic
Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 89 (244,391)

Abstract:

Private Equity, Active Shareholders, Leveraged Buyouts, Operational Performance, Corporate Restructuring

2.
Downloads 185 (137,048)
Citation 1

Performance Benefits of Tight Control

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 22 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2011
Andrej Gill and Nikolai Visnjic
Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 120 (197,628)
Citation 1

Abstract:

LBO, RLBO, IPO, Private Equity, Corporate Control, Restructuring

Performance Benefits of Tight Control

SAFE Working Paper No. 24
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Jun 2013 Last Revised: 19 Nov 2016
Andrej Gill and Nikolai Visnjic
Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration and Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 65 (295,007)
Citation 1

Abstract:

private equity, leveraged buyouts, active shareholders, ownership concentration, corporate governance

3.

The Real Exit: Selling Strategies Subsequent to Private Equity Backed IPOs

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 04 Mar 2013
Nikolai Visnjic
Goethe University Frankfurt
Downloads 157 (128,650)

Abstract:

private equity, initial public offering, ownership structure, corporate governance, exit