Kaoru Ueda

Nanzan University - Faculty of Economics

18 Yamazato-cho,Showa-ku

Nagoya , 466-8673

Japan

  • Nanzan University - Faculty of Economics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

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313

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28

Scholarly Papers (3)

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1.

Prize Sharing in Collective Contests

Downloads 157 (401,767)
Citation 20

Prize Sharing in Collective Contests

Bar-Ilan University Department of Economics Research Paper No. 2010-08
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 08 Mar 2011 Last Revised: 26 May 2011
Shmuel Nitzan and Kaoru Ueda
Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics and Nanzan University - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 79 (669,161)
Citation 7

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collective contest, mixed public-good prize, endogenous sharing rules, the group-size paradox

Prize Sharing in Collective Contests

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3212
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 26 Oct 2010
Shmuel Nitzan and Kaoru Ueda
Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics and Nanzan University - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 78 (674,158)
Citation 13

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collective contest, mixed public-good prize, endogenous sharing rules, the group-size paradox

2.

Cost Sharing in Collective Contests

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4825
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 03 Jul 2014
Shmuel Nitzan and Kaoru Ueda
Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics and Nanzan University - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 86 (627,881)

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collective contest, selective incentives, cost sharing, intra-group heterogeneity, elasticity of marginal effort costs, prize sharing

3.

Intra-Group Heterogeneity in Collective Contests

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4096
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 12 Feb 2013
Shmuel Nitzan and Kaoru Ueda
Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics and Nanzan University - Faculty of Economics
Downloads 70 (705,765)
Citation 8

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collective contest, intra-group heterogeneity, elasticity of marginal effort costs, unequal stakes and group performance, military alliance, ‘exploitation of the large’