Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering

473 Via Ortega

Stanford, CA 94305-9025

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

559

CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Optimal Allocation without Money: An Engineering Approach

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 27 Apr 2014 Last Revised: 31 Oct 2014
Itai Ashlagi and Peng Shi
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 280 (81,067)

Abstract:

market design, priors, assignment, school choice, computation, large market

2.

Matching with Couples Revisited

MIT Sloan Research Paper
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 07 Nov 2010 Last Revised: 01 Dec 2010
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering, University of Toronto and Bar Ilan university, Israel
Downloads 58 (298,207)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Stability, Matching, Couples, Many-to-One, Algorithm

3.

Assigning More Students to Their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 27 Mar 2015 Last Revised: 23 Jun 2015
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad and Assaf I Romm
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University - Economics Department, MS&E Department and Harvard University
Downloads 47 (237,497)

Abstract:

4.

Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

NBER Working Paper No. w16720
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 31 Jan 2011
Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering and HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
Downloads 7 (493,925)

Abstract:

5.

The Need for (Long) Chains in Kidney Exchange

NBER Working Paper No. w18202
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 07 Jul 2012
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), affiliation not provided to SSRN and HBS Negotiations, Organizations and Markets Unit
Downloads 4 (509,099)

Abstract:

6.

Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 10 May 2017 Last Revised: 05 Jul 2017
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria and Peng Shi
Stanford University - Management Science & Engineering, Princeton University, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 0 (282,042)

Abstract:

stable matching, communication complexity, signaling, congestion