Itai Ashlagi

Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering

473 Via Ortega

Stanford, CA 94305-9025

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

15

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1,569

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 18,090

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 18,090

in Total Papers Citations

46

CROSSREF CITATIONS

14

Scholarly Papers (15)

1.

Optimal Allocation without Money: An Engineering Approach

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 27 Apr 2014 Last Revised: 31 Oct 2014
Itai Ashlagi and Peng Shi
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 340 (110,849)
Citation 15

Abstract:

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market design, priors, assignment, school choice, computation, large market

2.

Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations

Number of pages: 58 Posted: 10 May 2017 Last Revised: 21 Nov 2019
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria and Peng Shi
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, Princeton University, Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations and University of Southern California - Marshall School of Business
Downloads 276 (138,485)
Citation 7

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marketplace and platform design, communication complexity, stable matching, match recommendations, informative signaling

3.

Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 02 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 29 Jul 2021
Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Monachou and Afshin Nikzad
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University, Department of Management Science & Engineering and University of Southern California, Department of Economics
Downloads 263 (145,457)
Citation 3

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4.

Simple and Approximately Optimal Contracts for Payment for Ecosystem Services

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 18 Feb 2021 Last Revised: 19 May 2021
Wanyi Li, Itai Ashlagi and Irene Lo
Stanford University Management Science & Engineering, Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering and Stanford
Downloads 156 (234,606)

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contract design, payment for ecosystem services

5.

Assigning More Students to Their Top Choices: A Tiebreaking Rule Comparison

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 27 Mar 2015 Last Revised: 23 Jun 2015
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad and Assaf I Romm
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, University of Southern California, Department of Economics and Harvard University
Downloads 125 (279,173)
Citation 1

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6.

Dynamic Matching: Characterizing and Achieving Constant Regret

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 12 Apr 2021
Stanford University, Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering and Northwestern University
Downloads 104 (317,832)

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dynamic matching, queueing, optimal control

7.

On Matching and Thickness in Heterogeneous Dynamic Markets

Number of pages: 78 Posted: 16 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 12 May 2018
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Operations Research Center, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Electrical Engineering and Computer Science and Yale School of Management
Downloads 103 (319,901)
Citation 13

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Matching Markets, Stochastic Networks, Kidney Exchange

8.

Matching with Couples Revisited

MIT Sloan Research Paper
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 07 Nov 2010 Last Revised: 01 Dec 2010
Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman and Avinatan Hassidim
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, University of Toronto and Bar Ilan university, Israel
Downloads 72 (397,538)
Citation 3

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Stability, Matching, Couples, Many-to-One, Algorithm

9.

Matching in Dynamic Imbalanced Markets

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 25 Sep 2018 Last Revised: 25 May 2019
Itai Ashlagi, Afshin Nikzad and Philipp Strack
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, University of Southern California, Department of Economics and Yale, Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (518,870)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Kidney Exchange, Dynamic Matching

10.

On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 10 Sep 2021
Stanford University, Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering and Northwestern University
Downloads 22 (622,538)

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dynamic matching, queueing, optimal control

11.

Equilibrium Allocations Under Alternative Waitlist Designs: Evidence from Deceased Donor Kidneys

NBER Working Paper No. w25607
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 08 Mar 2019
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, University of Toledo Medical Center, Stanford University - Department of Economics and New York University (NYU) - Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy
Downloads 21 (629,461)
Citation 1

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12.

The Need for (Long) Chains in Kidney Exchange

NBER Working Paper No. w18202
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 07 Jul 2012 Last Revised: 28 Mar 2021
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), affiliation not provided to SSRN and Dept. of Economics, Stanford University
Downloads 18 (650,783)

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13.

Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

NBER Working Paper No. w16720
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 31 Jan 2011 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2021
Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering and Dept. of Economics, Stanford University
Downloads 16 (665,128)
Citation 2

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14.

Market Failure in Kidney Exchange

NBER Working Paper No. w24775
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 06 Jul 2018 Last Revised: 12 Sep 2021
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering, University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School, Stanford University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA)
Downloads 12 (695,759)
Citation 3

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15.

Kidney Exchange: An Operations Perspective

NBER Working Paper No. w28500
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 01 Mar 2021 Last Revised: 06 Mar 2021
Itai Ashlagi and Alvin E. Roth
Stanford University - Department of Management Science & Engineering and Dept. of Economics, Stanford University
Downloads 1 (787,428)
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