Yuichi Yamamoto

University of Pennsylvania

Philadelphia, PA 19104

United States

Harvard University

1875 Cambridge Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

DOWNLOADS

242

CITATIONS
Rank 3,431

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 3,431

in Total Papers Citations

152

Scholarly Papers (8)

1.

Stochastic Games with Hidden States

PIER Working Paper No. 18-028
Number of pages: 100 Posted: 13 Feb 2015 Last Revised: 19 Nov 2018
Yuichi Yamamoto
University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 62 (346,207)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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stochastic game, hidden state, uniform connectedness, robust connectedness,, random blocks, folk theorem

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 12-044
Number of pages: 76 Posted: 20 Nov 2012
Yuichi Yamamoto
University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 29 (478,310)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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repeated game, private monitoring, incomplete information, belief-free equilibrium, ex-post equilibrium, individual learning

Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games - Second Version

PIER Working Paper No. 13-038
Number of pages: 78 Posted: 10 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 17 May 2017
Yuichi Yamamoto
University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 24 (507,098)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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repeated game, private monitoring, incomplete information, belief-free equilibrium, ex-post equilibrium, individual learning

3.

Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 07 Nov 2010
Drew Fudenberg and Yuichi Yamamoto
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 46 (396,784)
Citation 10

Abstract:

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repeated game, public monitoring, incomplete information, perfect public equilibrium, folk theorem, belief-free equilibrium, ex-post equilibrium

4.

Characterizing Belief-Free Review-Strategy Equilibrium Payoffs Under Conditional Independence

PIER Working Paper No. 12-005
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 27 Feb 2012
Yuichi Yamamoto
University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 22 (503,160)
Citation 7

Abstract:

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repeated game, private monitoring, conditional independence, belief-free

5.

The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 11 Nov 2010
Drew Fudenberg and Yuichi Yamamoto
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 19 (520,425)
Citation 146

Abstract:

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Stochastic Game, Public Monitoring, Perfect Public Equilibrium, Folk Theorem

6.

We Can Cooperate Even When the Monitoring Structure Will Never Be Known

PIER Working Paper No. 17-011
Number of pages: 121 Posted: 17 May 2017
Yuichi Yamamoto
University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 16 (537,653)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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stochastic game, hidden state, public monitoring, pseudo-ergodic strategy, folk theorem, ex-post equilibrium

7.

Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure are Unknown

Econometrica Vol. 78, No. 5, p. 1673, September 2010
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 11 Nov 2010
Drew Fudenberg and Yuichi Yamamoto
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 13 (555,423)
Citation 14

Abstract:

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Repeated Game, Public Monitoring, Incomplete Information, Perfect Public Equilibrium, Folk Theorem, Belief-Free Equilibrium, Ex Post Equilibrium

8.

Common Learning and Cooperation in Repeated Games

PIER Working Paper No. 19-008 , Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 19-25
Number of pages: 125 Posted: 10 May 2019
Takuo Sugaya and Yuichi Yamamoto
Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of Pennsylvania
Downloads 11 (567,590)

Abstract:

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repeated game, private monitoring, incomplete information, ex-post equilibrium, individual learning