Daniel Saavedra

UCLA Anderson School of Management

Assistant Professor

Los Angeles, CA

United States

  • UCLA Anderson School of Management

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

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Top 10,115

in Total Papers Downloads

4,615

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 16,416

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 16,416

in Total Papers Citations

32

CROSSREF CITATIONS

18

Scholarly Papers (7)

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1.

The Taxman Cometh: Does Tax Uncertainty Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?

Downloads 1,529 ( 11,364)
Citation 15

The Taxman Cometh: Does Tax Uncertainty Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?

Review of Accounting Studies, September 2017, Volume 22, Issue 3, pp 1198–1228 , Kenan Institute of Private Enterprise Research Paper No. 18-1
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 11 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 04 May 2018
Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew and Daniel Saavedra
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 1,437 (12,270)
Citation 5

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Cash holdings; Tax avoidance; Tax uncertainty; FIN 48; Disclosures; Long-run repatriation tax costs

The Taxman Cometh: Does Tax Uncertainty Affect Corporate Cash Holdings?

Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2017
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 10 Mar 2018
Michelle Hanlon, Edward L. Maydew and Daniel Saavedra
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 92 (283,869)
Citation 11

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Cash Holdings; Tax Avoidance; Tax Uncertainty; FIN 48; Disclosures; Long-Run Repatriation Tax Costs

2.

The Pecking Order and Financing Decisions: Evidence from Changes to Financial Reporting Regulation

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 17 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 20 May 2018
Patricia L. Naranjo, Daniel Saavedra and Rodrigo S. Verdi
Rice University, UCLA Anderson School of Management and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 1,335 (14,101)
Citation 3

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Financial Reporting Regulation, Financing Decisions, Information Asymmetry, Capital Structure, International Accounting, IAS, IFRS

3.

Is Tax Volatility Priced by Lenders in the Syndicated Loan Market?

Downloads 713 ( 35,113)
Citation 1

Is Tax Volatility Priced by Lenders in the Syndicated Loan Market?

European Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 25 Sep 2013 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2018
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 688 (36,290)
Citation 1

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Tax Volatility, Debt Contracting, Tax Risk, Borrowing Costs

Is Tax Volatility Priced by Lenders in the Syndicated Loan Market?

European Accounting Review Forthcoming
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 03 Jan 2019
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 25 (511,863)

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Tax Volatility, Debt Contracting, Tax Risk, Borrowing Costs

4.

Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts

Downloads 482 ( 58,505)
Citation 7

Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 08 Jul 2015 Last Revised: 19 Dec 2017
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 419 (68,680)
Citation 5

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Renegotiation, Bargaining, Incomplete Contracts, Security Design, Bank Loans

Syndicate Size and the Choice of Covenants in Debt Contracts

The Accounting Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 27 Mar 2018
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 63 (355,109)
Citation 3

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Renegotiation, Incomplete Contracts, Syndicate Size, Covenants

5.

Analysis of Unsuccessful Tax Avoiders

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 27 Aug 2014
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 281 (108,846)
Citation 1

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Unsuccessful Tax Avoidance, Failed Tax Strategies, Tax Settlements, Debt Contracting

6.

The Information Content of Forgoing Tax Refunds: Evidence from Private Debt Contracts

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 04 Mar 2016 Last Revised: 23 Mar 2019
Daniel Saavedra and John S. Hughes
UCLA Anderson School of Management and University of California at Los Angeles
Downloads 141 (206,979)
Citation 1

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Tax Refunds, Debt Contracting, Communication, Revelation, Tax Policy, Tax Loss Carryback

7.

How Do Debt Contracts Allocate Control Over Unforeseen Investment Decisions?

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 23 May 2018 Last Revised: 09 Jul 2019
Daniel Saavedra
UCLA Anderson School of Management
Downloads 134 (215,675)
Citation 1

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Investments, Loan Maturity, Covenants, Security Design, Bank Loans