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Queen Mary University of London
in Total Papers Citations
all-pay auction, rent-seeking, bid-caps, tie-breaks, contest design
imperfect information, equilibrium selection, passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs, vertical contracting, multiple equilibria
Equilibrium selection, passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs, vertical contracting, multiple equilibria, imperfect information
Experiments, voting, Markets, Vote Trading, Competitive Equilibrium
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
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Competitive Equilibrium, Experiments, Markets, Vote Trading, Voting
coordination games, strategic uncertainty, sunspot equilibria, irrelevant information
Experiments, Multicandidate Elections, Plurality, Approval Voting
Approval Voting, Experiments, Multicandidate Elections, Plurality
Collusion, experiment, auctions, bribes
constructive abstention, framing, information aggregation, laboratory experiments, unanimity rule, veto power
This is a National Bureau of Economic Research Paper. NBER charges a fee of
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Laboratory experiments, Majority Runoff, Multicandidate Elections, Plurality
information aggregation, laboratory experiment, Majority Rule, Proportional representation, Turnout
auctions, Collusion, Experiment
Experiment, information aggregation, Turnout, Underdog effect
aggregate uncertainty, experiments, multicandidate elections, plurality, rational-voter model
constructive abstention, information aggregation, Pareto criterion, unanimity rule, veto power
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