Author Page for Pablo T. Spiller

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of Certiorari, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (filed Nov. 16, 2007)

U.S. Supreme Court

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 19 Nov 2007 Last Revised: 23 May 2012

William J. Baumol, Robert H. Bork, Robert W. Crandall, George Daly, Harold Demsetz, Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Kenneth G. Elzinga, Gerald R. Faulhaber, Franklin M. Fisher, Charles John Goetz, Robert W. Hahn, Jerry A. Hausman, Thomas Jorde, Robert E. Litan, Paul W. MacAvoy, J. Gregory Sidak, Pablo T. Spiller and Daniel F. Spulber

New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Independent, Brookings Institution, Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, NERA Economic Consulting, University of Virginia - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, University of Virginia - School of Law, University of Oxford, Smith School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - Council on Foreign Relations- Washington D.C., Yale School of Management (Deceased), Criterion Economics, L.L.C., University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

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Citation 1

Abstract:

2.

Economists' Statement on U.S. Broadband Policy

AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper No. 06-06-01

Number of pages: 4 Posted: 23 Mar 2006

New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, University of Pennsylvania - Business & Public Policy Department, Institute for International Economics, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - Council on Foreign Relations- Washington D.C., University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, University of Texas at Austin - Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit, University of Oxford, Smith School, Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, Clemson University, National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased), Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy, Stanford University, New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Georgetown University, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, University of California, Berkeley - School of Information, Technology Policy Institute, Kansas State University - Department of Economics and Institute for Business Innovation

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Citation 5

Abstract:

3.

Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

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Citation 25

2

Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 22 Aug 2003

Mario Bergara, Barak D. Richman and Pablo T. Spiller

Universidad de la Republica (University of Uruguay) - Department of Economics, Duke University - School of Law and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 340 (81,906)

Citation 25

Abstract:

Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, May 2003

Posted: 22 Aug 2003

Mario Bergara, Barak D. Richman and Pablo T. Spiller

Universidad de la Republica (University of Uruguay) - Department of Economics, Duke University - School of Law and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Abstract:

4.

Rigidity of Public Contracts

Downloads 284 (100,727)

4

Rigidity of Public Contracts

GMU School of Public Policy Research Paper No. 2013-13, IESE Business School Working Paper No. 07/2013

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 05 Jul 2013 Last Revised: 04 Dec 2014

Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller and Sebastian Stolorz

George Mason University - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and George Mason University - School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs

Downloads 183 (155,311)

Abstract:

Rigidity of Public Contracts

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 13, Nro. 3, pp. 396-427

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 22 Jul 2014 Last Revised: 21 Jan 2017

Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller and Sebastian Stolorz

George Mason University - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and George Mason University - School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs

Downloads 99 (254,005)

Abstract:

Rigidity of Public Contracts

NBER Working Paper No. w21186

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 26 May 2015

Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller and Sebastian Stolorz

George Mason University - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and George Mason University - School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs

Downloads 2 (626,574)

Abstract:

Rigidity of Public Contracts

Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, Vol. 13, Issue 3, pp. 396-427, 2016

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Aug 2016

Marian W. Moszoro, Pablo T. Spiller and Sebastian Stolorz

George Mason University - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and George Mason University - School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs

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Abstract:

5.

Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications

In "The Manufacturing of Markets: Legal, Political and Economic Dynamics," edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant. Cambridge University Press (ISBN 978-1-107-05371-7), 2014.

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 26 Jul 2011 Last Revised: 02 Feb 2014

Pablo T. Spiller and Marian W. Moszoro

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and George Mason University - Department of Economics

Downloads 276 (103,712)

Citation 2

Abstract:

6.

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in Support of the Petitioners, Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., No. 07-512 (Filed Sept. 4, 2008)

U.S. Supreme Court

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Sep 2008 Last Revised: 23 May 2012

New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Independent, Brookings Institution, Georgetown University - Robert Emmett McDonough School of Business, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, NERA Economic Consulting, University of Virginia - Department of Economics, New York University School of Law, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, University of Virginia - School of Law, University of Oxford, Smith School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Boston University - School of Law, University of California, Berkeley - School of Law, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) - Council on Foreign Relations- Washington D.C., Yale School of Management (Deceased), University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, Criterion Economics, L.L.C., University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management

Downloads 246 (117,027)

Abstract:

7.

Political Contestability and Public Contracting

Downloads 205 (139,752)

Citation 2

2

Political Contestability and Public Contracting

Journal of Public Economic Theory (Forthcoming)

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 08 Dec 2011 Last Revised: 15 Jun 2018

Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller

George Mason University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 189 (150,739)

Citation 2

Abstract:

Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts

NBER Working Paper No. w18636

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 22 Dec 2012

Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller

George Mason University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 16 (534,816)

Citation 2

Abstract:

8.

Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Petitioners, Bell Atlantic V. Twombly

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 21 Jan 2009

New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Brookings Institution, University of Virginia - Department of Economics, Global Economics Group, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management, University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics, Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group, Stanford University, affiliation not provided to SSRN, New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Georgetown University, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, Stanford University - Law School, Institute for Business Innovation and Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics

Downloads 200 (143,113)

Citation 1

Abstract:

9.

Political Hazards and the Choice of Contracting: The Case of Municipal Bonds

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 10 Sep 2014 Last Revised: 21 Sep 2018

Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller

George Mason University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 181 (156,794)

Abstract:

10.

Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups and the Implications of Customer Heterogeneity

NBER Working Paper No. w5561

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 25 Apr 1998 Last Revised: 01 Oct 2010

Steven Berry, Pablo T. Spiller and Michael Carnall

Yale University - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and LECG, LLC

Downloads 139 (196,190)

Citation 24

Abstract:

11.

Coase and the Transaction Cost Approach to Regulation

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 11 Jun 2015

Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller

George Mason University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 128 (209,522)

Abstract:

12.

Strategic Judicial Decision Making

NBER Working Paper No. w13321

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 24 Aug 2007 Last Revised: 19 Oct 2007

Pablo T. Spiller and Rafael Gely

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and University of Missouri School of Law

Downloads 92 (264,617)

Citation 5

Abstract:

13.

An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications

NBER Working Paper No. w14152

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 18 Aug 2008 Last Revised: 03 Sep 2010

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 81 (286,219)

Citation 8

Abstract:

14.

The Organizational Implications of Creativity: The Us Film Industry in Mid-Xxth Century

NBER Working Paper No. w13253

Number of pages: 46 Posted: 03 Aug 2007 Last Revised: 29 Oct 2014

Ricard Gil and Pablo T. Spiller

Queen's University (Canada) - Smith School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 57 (345,562)

Citation 1

Abstract:

15.

Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups' Participation in Policy Making - a Selective Survey

NBER Working Paper No. w12209

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 25 May 2006 Last Revised: 05 Jun 2010

Pablo T. Spiller and Sanny Liao

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Downloads 56 (348,540)

Citation 1

Abstract:

16.

Estimating the Welfare Effects of Digital Infrastructure

NBER Working Paper No. w5770

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 05 Feb 1997 Last Revised: 17 Oct 2000

Shane M. Greenstein and Pablo T. Spiller

Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 56 (348,540)

Citation 5

Abstract:

17.

Transaction Cost Regulation

NBER Working Paper No. w16735

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 31 Jan 2011 Last Revised: 01 Feb 2011

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 38 (408,758)

Citation 3

Abstract:

18.

Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

NBER Working Paper No. w11317

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 10 Jun 2005 Last Revised: 17 Jul 2009

Matias Iaryczower, Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Downloads 30 (441,902)

Citation 6

Abstract:

19.

The Evolution of Advanced Large Scale Information Infrastructure in the United States

NBER Working Paper No. w5929

Number of pages: 51 Posted: 26 Jun 2000 Last Revised: 05 Oct 2010

Shane M. Greenstein, Mercedes M. Lizardo and Pablo T. Spiller

Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 18 (504,597)

Citation 1

Abstract:

20.

Political Bonds: Political Hazards and the Choice of Municipal Financial Instruments

NBER Working Paper No. w21188

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 26 May 2015

Abhay Aneja, Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller

Stanford University, George Mason University - Department of Economics and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Downloads 4 (581,933)

Citation 1

Abstract:

21.

What Have We Learned from a Decade of Empirical Research on Growth? Applying Growth Theory Across Countries

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No.1, pp. 283-305, 1999

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

Rui J. P. De Figueiredo, Pablo T. Spiller and Santiago Urbiztondo

Universidad Nacional de La Plata, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and National University of La Plata and FIEL, Argentin

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22.

The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 281-306, 2003

Posted: 19 Jun 2003

Pablo T. Spiller and Mariano Tommasi

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and Universidad de San Andres - Department of Economics

Abstract:

23.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION, Vol 10, No 2, 1994

Posted: 12 May 2000

Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller

World Bank and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Abstract:

24.

Where is the Sin in Sincere? Sophisticated Manipulation of Sincere Judicial Voters

JOURNAL OF LAW, ECONOMICS, AND ORGANIZATION, Vol 11 No 1, Spring 1995

Posted: 02 May 2000

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Abstract:

25.

Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law

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2

Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 2, Summer 1999

Posted: 20 Jun 1999

Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Abstract:

Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 349-377, 1999

Posted: 29 Feb 2008

Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Abstract:

26.

An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 15, No. 1, Spring 1999

Posted: 25 May 1999

Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Pablo T. Spiller and Santiago Urbiztondo

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and National University of La Plata and FIEL, Argentin

Abstract:

27.

Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review

in the Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1997).

Posted: 17 Oct 1997

Pablo T. Spiller and Emerson H. Tiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group and Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law

Abstract:

28.

Strategic Instruments: Politics and Decision Costs in Administrative and Judicial Process

Posted: 19 Sep 1997

Emerson H. Tiller and Pablo T. Spiller

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law and University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group

Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professorship in Business and Technology

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Scholarly Papers (28)

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