Iryna Topolyan

University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics

Carl H. Lindner Hall 2925 Campus Green Drive

PO Box 0371

Cincinnati, OH 45221-0211

United States

  • University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

99

TOTAL CITATIONS

12

Scholarly Papers (3)

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1.

Group Contests with Private Information and the 'Weakest Link'

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 26 May 2018
Stefano Barbieri, Dan Kovenock, David A. Malueg and Iryna Topolyan
Tulane University - Department of Economics, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of California Riverside and University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics
Downloads 72 (640,473)
Citation 10

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All-Pay Auction, Groups, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Weakest Link, Incomplete Information, Coordination

2.

Correlated Play in Weakest-Link and Best-Shot Group Contests

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 03 Jul 2023
Iryna Topolyan and Stefano Barbieri
University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics and Tulane University - Department of Economics
Downloads 20 (1,015,999)
Citation 2

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All-pay auction, correlated equilibrium, public randomization, best shot, weakest link.

3.

A Tractable Group All-Pay Auction

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 28 Jun 2024
Stefano Barbieri and Iryna Topolyan
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics
Downloads 7 (1,165,882)

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All-pay auction, correlated equilibrium, constant elasticity of substitution.