Ulrich Laitenberger

Télécom Paris

46 rue Barrault

Paris, Cedex 13 75634

France

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

P.O. Box 10 34 43

L 7,1

Mannheim, 68034

Germany

  • Télécom Paris

  • ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

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17

Scholarly Papers (14)

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1.

Settlements and Appeals in the European Commission's Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 16-010
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 11 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 01 Mar 2016
Michael Hellwig, Kai Hüschelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Competition and Regulation Research Group, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and Télécom Paris
Downloads 204 (161,653)
Citation 2

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Antitrust policy, cartels, settlements, appeals, ex-post evaluation, European Union

2.

Evaluation of Best Price Clauses in Hotel Booking

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 16-066
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 12 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 24 Jan 2018
Matthias Hunold, Reinhold Kesler, Ulrich Laitenberger and Frank Schlütter
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Zurich, Télécom Paris and Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Downloads 196 (167,767)
Citation 4

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Best price clauses, hotel booking, MFN, OTA, vertical restraints

3.

Estimating Consumer Damages in Cartel Cases

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 13-069
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 30 Sep 2013
Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 191 (171,689)

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cartels, damages, consumers, detergents, private damage claims

4.

The Discontent Cartel Member and Cartel Collapse: The Case of the German Cement Cartel

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-084
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 13 Nov 2014
Joseph E. Harrington Jr, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
University of Pennsylvania, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 168 (192,342)
Citation 3

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Collusion, cartel, antitrust enforcement, cement

5.

Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-071
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 23 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 20 Dec 2012
Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 140 (223,812)
Citation 4

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Competition Policy, Empirical Analysis, Cartels, European Union, Fines, Leniency, Duration of Investigation

6.

The Settlement Procedure in EC Cartel Cases: An Empirical Assessment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 15-064
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 23 Sep 2015
Kai Hüschelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and Télécom Paris
Downloads 123 (247,293)
Citation 4

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Competition policy, cartels, settlements, ex-post evaluation, European Union

7.

Minority Share Acquisitions and Collusion: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs

Downloads 114 (261,499)
Citation 4

Minority Share Acquisitions and Collusion: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-037
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 09 Oct 2017 Last Revised: 07 Nov 2018
Sven Heim, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Yossi Spiegel
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and Tel Aviv University, Coller School of Management
Downloads 113 (264,422)
Citation 4

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minority shareholdings, collusion, leniency programs, cartel stability

Minority Share Acquisitions and Collusion: Evidence from the Introduction of National Leniency Programs

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13327
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 26 Nov 2018
Sven Heim, Kai Hueschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Yossi Spiegel
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, FHDW University of Applied Science - Bergisch Gladbach, Télécom Paris and Tel Aviv University, Coller School of Management
Downloads 1 (734,865)
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cartel stability, Collusion, Leniency Programs, minority shareholdings

8.

Determinants of Self-Reporting Under the European Corporate Leniency Program

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 14-043
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Aug 2014
Cung Hoang, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Florian Smuda
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 81 (326,916)
Citation 1

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competition policy, cartels, leniency, European Union

9.

Rent Sharing to Control Non-Cartel Supply in the German Cement Market

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 16-025
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 12 Apr 2016
Joseph E. Harrington, Kai Hüschelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger
Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and Télécom Paris
Downloads 64 (372,351)
Citation 1

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Collusion, cartel, non-cartel supply, cement, distribution channels, intermediary

10.

The Duration of the EC Merger Control Process: Determinants and the Impact of the 2004 Merger Regulation Reform

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 15-063
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Sep 2015
Sven Heim, Kai Hüschelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and Télécom Paris
Downloads 62 (378,462)

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Competition policy, ex-post evaluation, merger control, European Union

11.

Unemployment and Online Labor

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 18-023
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 15 May 2018
Kathrin Borchert, Matthias Hirth, Michael E. Kummer, Ulrich Laitenberger, Olga Slivko and Steffen Viete
Institut für Informatik, University of Würzburg, University of East Anglia (UEA), Télécom Paris, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Information and Communication Technologies Research Group and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 55 (401,144)
Citation 1

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unemployment, crowdworking, online platform

12.

Hotel Rankings of Online Travel Agents, Channel Pricing, and Consumer Protection

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 18-059
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 04 Sep 2019
Matthias Hunold, Reinhold Kesler and Ulrich Laitenberger
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, University of Zurich and Télécom Paris
Downloads 33 (488,818)
Citation 1

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Consumer protection, free-riding, hotel booking, online travel agents, ranking, search bias

13.

Competition, Collusion and Spatial Sales Patterns - Theory and Evidence

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-035
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 09 Jan 2018
Matthias Hunold, Kai Hüschelrath, Ulrich Laitenberger and Johannes Muthers
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Télécom Paris and University of Würzburg - Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
Downloads 21 (556,049)

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Capacity constraints, cartel, cement, spatial competition, transport costs

14.

Rent Sharing to Control Noncartel Supply in the German Cement Market

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Vol. 27, Issue 1, pp. 149-166, 2018
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 02 Feb 2018
Joseph E. Harrington Jr, Kai Hüschelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger
University of Pennsylvania, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and Télécom Paris
Downloads 0 (719,296)
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