Frances M. Tice

University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting

419 UCB

Boulder, CO 80309-0419

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS
Rank 30,876

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Top 30,876

in Total Papers Downloads

1,097

CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.

Do Director Networks Matter for Financial Reporting Quality? Evidence from Restatements

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 16 Jan 2014 Last Revised: 09 Feb 2016
Thomas C. Omer, Marjorie K. Shelley and Frances M. Tice
University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy, University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy and University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting
Downloads 364 (33,486)

Abstract:

social networks, boards of directors, corporate governance, financial reporting quality, restatements

Do Well-Connected Directors Affect Firm Value?

Journal of Applied Finance (Formerly Financial Practice and Education), Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 17-32, 2014
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 25 Oct 2015 Last Revised: 28 Oct 2015
Thomas C. Omer, Marjorie K. Shelley and Frances M. Tice
University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy, University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy and University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting
Downloads 142 (163,401)

Abstract:

Do Well-Connected Directors Affect Firm Value?

Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 24, Issue 2, 2014
Posted: 26 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 27 Oct 2015
Thomas C. Omer, Marjorie K. Shelley and Frances M. Tice
University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy, University of Nebraska at Lincoln - School of Accountancy and University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting

Abstract:

social networks; board of directors; corporate governance; firm value

3.

Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation and Managerial Decision-Making: Evidence from Firm Performance and Investments

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 19 Aug 2015 Last Revised: 17 Nov 2016
Frances M. Tice
University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Accounting
Downloads 70 (65,939)

Abstract:

Relative performance evaluation, executive compensation, agency costs, peer groups